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Abstract: 
 
The theoretical origins of this dissertation arise from a quest to understand and explain two 
key puzzles relating to EU negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (called Economic 
Partnership Agreement) with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States. These 
negotiations have been ongoing since 2002. These puzzles are:  
 
One, there is the puzzle of how to explain the variable speed that now differentiates ACP 
regions and states in their ratification of their 2007 EPA agreement? ACP states can now be 
divided into those that have ratified, those that have signed and those that have only initialed 
an EPA.  While some seventeen states have now ratified their 2007 agreements, others have 
withheld ratification and even forced a renegotiation of the 2007 agreements.  In a re-
calibration of what John Ravenhill (1985) termed ‘horizontal collaboration’, we now see 
palpable differences among ACP states with regard to their attitude and propensity to accept 
trade reciprocity with the EU.  If one takes an ACP states ratification of an EPA agreement as 
a success for the EU, what explains such EU success in getting some ACP states (and not 
others) to a Yes!   
 
Two, why have these trade negotiations towards an Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
been more protracted and deadlocked than other recent EU FTAs? This is contrary to 
prevalent theoretical suppositions in negotiation analysis (Lempereur, 2009; Hirshman, 1945; 
Emersion, 1962; Ravenhill, 1985; Elgstrom, 2005) that trade dependence of the ACP states on 
the EU and the inordinate market power of the EU should have procured an expeditious 
conclusion to the negotiation round, as materially dependent states acquiesce to their 
dependency. Yet unlike other recent EU FTA attempts which have either been finalized or 
terminated within five years, ACP states in the EPA round have managed remarkable 
resistance to acquiescing to the EU offensive which has thus kept them from providing trade 
reciprocity to the EU for the past 10 years as per the EPA objectives.  EPA negotiations have 
dragged on for more than 10 years, propelled by successful ACP states resistance against the 
EU, in what has been called a case of a ‘not so weak south’. How can this remarkable resistance 
be explained in light of putative ACP material weakness and market dependency on the EU? 
 
The research thus examines these two successes –ACP states success in resisting a quick 
concession to EPAs and the EU success in getting some ACP states to yes. Both of these 
puzzles and questions relate to how to explain efficiency in EPA negotiations. In explaining 
intra-ACP divergence in speed to ratification of EPAs, the research demonstrates the role of 
norms in catalyzing state behavior- beyond the exigency of material economic dependency as 
asymmetrical interdependence theorists would aver. On ACP strength in negotiation in spite of 
its putative economic weakness, the research finds that this can be explained by how ACP 
states exploit the norms of ACP-EU partnership to ‘trap’ the EU into a continuation of 
partnership identity. As such collective clientelism is squarely rooted into new surging 
institutionalism based interpretations of the EU’s strengths and weakness in its external 
governance. 
 
This is a unique strength of the ACP states afforded by the norms of its institutionalized 
relations with the EU. In addition by measuring the degree of ACP states’ persuasion 
(belief/ideology) on the utility of an EPA, the research seeks to show how an ACP state 
propensity to ratify an EPA is predicated more on its belief in the appropriateness of the EPA 
for its economy, rather than by its trade dependence. By introducing these two theoretical 
interpretations [normative institutionalism and belief convergence] the research seeks to show 
that over and above trade dependence, expeditious conclusion of an asymmetrical negotiation is 
determined by the extent of the degree of normative convergence on the objectives of the 
negotiations, as well as the degree which weaker states deny or grant diffuse support to the 
social influence of the materially stronger state. Thus, it is the extent to which a dyad’s parties 
fulfill the expected roles of hierarchical power affordance that determines the speed of 
conclusion of a negotiation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: PROTRACTION AND EFFICIENCY OF EPAs 
1.1 Setting the Scene: Negotiation Analysis in International Relations 
Ever since Albert O. Hirschman’s National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945) made 
the balance of material dependency between states the key analytical variable in explaining the 
outcomes of asymmetrical economic negotiations, there has been wide agreement on the 
proposition that: The efficiency and distribution outcomes of an asymmetrical negotiation will be a 
function of the balance of material dependency between the two states at the negotiation. The 
deduction from Hirschman’s supposition has been that a materially weaker (subordinate) state 
A, would necessarily capitulate to a materially stronger (superordinate) state B depending on 
the extent of A’s material dependency on B.  Following on this supposition, the preferences of 
(subordinate) weaker states in a negotiation are therefore seen as being primarily driven by the 
exigency of their material needs. Or conversely, that the preferences of a stronger 
(superordinate) state are primarily informed (and subsequently enforced) by the material 
superiority such a state enjoys. This is a supposition that implies that states in asymmetrical 
negotiations only operate at the level of coercion and compliance, and states preferences or 
agreements cannot be a matter of internalized persuasion. This supposition thus disputes or 
even totally discounts negotiated agreements based on what Ikenberry and Kupchan call 
‘substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 283). Is it 
possible that beyond a Hirschmanique based interpretation of negotiated outcomes as a 
function of material payoffs that outcomes may be reached out of states’ normative persuasion 
–socialization in Ikenberry and Kupchan’s words? That states may reach agreements that are 
predicated on a shared normative internalization of the negotiation’s objective? Is it possible 
that concessions, acquiescence or lack of agreement between a subordinate state and a 
superordinate state may be based on normative persuasion on an agreed objective?  
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This broad supposition marks the deductive origins of this thesis. Is it plausible that the 
preferences of states can also be predicated on a normative position that is not primarily 
driven by material needs and/or material incentives? And is it possible that beyond material 
interdependence, states (even the superordinate states like the EU in its relationship with the 
ACP states) have other dependencies - social and relational for instance - which a 
Hirschmanisque approach takes for granted and which play a role in influencing the process 
and outcomes of asymmetrical negotiations? These are the questions dealt in in the thesis, 
albeit in a more condensed and crisp form as outlined further down. 
 
These are the broad theoretical concerns under scrutiny in this thesis with the use of the 
ongoing negotiations between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) states for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). The EPA negotiation is an apt 
case of an asymmetrical negotiation since it pits a group of economically weaker states against 
the richest bloc of European states. Out of the current list of the 49 poorest states classified as 
Least Developed Countries, 38 of them belong to the ACP group.  What do the intra-ACP 
variances in outcomes of these negotiations reflect on the role of material interdependence, 
coalitions, states’ normative persuasion and states’ relational vulnerabilities in influencing the 
negotiating process and outcomes? Since the ACP comprises a big number of subordinate 
states (B1, B2, B3, B4 B5…and so on) with variances in their material balance (trade dependency 
and tariff vulnerability) against the EU, the case affords us an excellent comparison of the 
negotiated outcomes of the ACP states vis-à-vis their material dependencies. If a 
Hirschmanisque, structural material argument is to prevail, then we should witness in EPA 
outcomes patterns that mirror the respective dependencies among the ACP states. Is this the 
case? 
 
In setting the scene, this introductory chapter seeks to achieve three ends. One, it broaches 
further on the definitions of economic negotiations and the objectives of economic analysis of 
Elijah Nyaga Munyi PhD 2013 
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negotiated outcomes. This is done to lay the foundation of the kind of exercise that the thesis is 
engaged in. Two it sets out the empirical and theoretical problem which informs this study. 
This is done by introducing the background to the EPA negotiations, the initial organization of 
the negotiations into seven dyads based on seven ACP regions, and an outlay of the state-of-
the -art in EPAs with regard to categorization of ACP states into four categories; (i) Those that 
have ratified EPAs, (ii) those that have only signed EPAs, (iii) those that have only initialed an 
EPA, and (iv) those that have not initialed an EPA at all.  This thesis concerns itself primarily 
with the first 3 categories to discern explanations for this divergence after 2007. As will become 
clearer in subsequent chapters, the problem of explaining EPA negotiations and outcomes has 
a patent deductive basis. Do extant EU-ACP EPA outcomes affirm or discount the centrality of 
asymmetrical trade dependence in fomenting capitulation of ACP states in a Hirshmanisque 
supposition that materially weaker states are likely to acquise to the demands of materially 
superior states in asymmetrical negotiation due to their greater vulnerability to market 
withdraws? The final section of this introductory chapter outlines the structure of the rest of 
the thesis. 
 
Negotiation and bargaining1 are at the heart of many agreements and disagreements in life. 
Whether primarily social, economic or political, bargaining and negotiation activities are 
indispensable in our bid to converge the many differing preferences we hold as individuals 
and groups in society. Whether persuaded, cajoled, compromised or coerced into an 
agreement or even when an agreement is not reached at all, negotiations mark an attempt to 
                                                 
 
 
1 These two words are used interchangeably in chapter one of the thesis and possibly in other parts of the thesis. 
As per the Oxford English Dictionary definition both words at least comprise an element of the other – a 
discussion with a view to establishing a position agreeable to both parties . This is also in agreement with Rubin 
and Brown (The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation pp – 1-2) on the equivalence of the words.   
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suitably converge and manage different interests. Spouses for instance are engaged in a 
constant bargain on mutual expectations and how to share their lives amicably, if not happily. 
Environmental activists and government agencies are often pitted against developers in 
reaching a compromise on intended physical developments – such as dams - deemed injurious 
to the environment. Neighbors will sometimes have to bargain over how to divide costs for 
maintenance of a shared fence. Countries are often pitted against each other in determining 
what tariffs to charge on their respective imports into each other’s markets. Similarly countries 
are often driven to negotiate their boundaries with each other on how to amicably share their 
commonly held resources such as lakes, oceans or rivers. Even in Biblical legend, archrivals 
God and Satan are said to have negotiated the terms of Job’s temptations to test his allegiances. 
Moreover even within one person, there is often an internal ‘negotiation’ on how to prioritize 
and satisfy our many conflicting interests and preferences within limited means. The very 
‘economic’ notion of allocation of scarce resources whether these are material, emotional or 
time requires this brokering or conciliation over different preferences and priorities.  Instances 
of negotiation simply abound in our lives. 
Owing to this preponderance of negotiation activities, it is fair to infer then that the conduct of 
negotiations has a bearing on the nature of agreements or disagreements reached in whatever 
situation the negotiation is applied to. The object of this thesis is to make a contribution in 
expanding data and theorization on variables of influence to outcomes in international 
economic negotiations. To do this, I use the case of the ongoing Free Trade Agreement 
negotiations between the European Union, and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group 
of states. How do we explain the outcomes of the EPAs (as they stand in 2013)? Does the EPA 
negotiation process and outcomes contribute in conveying new variables with which to 
examine and explain how negotiated outcomes in economic negotiations come about? 
 
Economic negotiations are ineluctably complicated processes to unveil systematically, yet this 
is the quest that this work intends to delve into. This is not only because they often involve a 
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varying range of conflicting interests, but also because over time, they involve an uncertain 
fluidity of issues, preferences, emotions, personalities and strategies. A contribution to 
scholarly probe into the conduct of economic negotiations with an attempt at a systematic 
explanation of why we reach the agreements we reach (or fail to reach the agreements we 
seek) is the aspiration of this dissertation. While the influence of any one of the variables 
leading to outcomes (issues, preferences, emotions, market dependency, personalities, norms, 
binding institutions and strategies) cannot be completely excluded in probing causation, a case 
study (whether disciplined configurative, or heuristic, or theory testing) can be used to emphasize 
the vigor or test the cogency of certain theoretical suppositions, or even merely highlight  new 
under-researched variables for explanation of negotiated outcomes. 
 
This work will use the definition of negotiation given by Saner Raymond in his book the Expert 
Negotiator, where negotiation is defined as ‘a process where two or more parties seek an 
agreement to establish what each shall give or take or perform and receive in a transaction 
between them’.2  In narrowing down the definition to that between states, John Odell, a 
scholar of economic negotiation analysis, defines the negotiation process as, ’a sequence of 
actions in which two or more governments address demands and proposals to each other for 
the ostensible purpose of reaching an agreement and changing the behavior of at least one 
party’ (Odell, 2000: 10). The study will also borrow from Odell’s qualification of ‘economic 
negotiations’ as, ‘negotiations in which parties demands, offers and actions in the negotiation 
refer to the production, movement or exchange of goods, services investments, money 
information or their regulation’ (Odell, 2000: 11) These definitions are in accord with Abhinay 
Muthoo’s definition of a bargaining situation as one where, ‘two players have a common 
                                                 
 
 
2 Saner, Raymond. Expert Negotiator, pg 17. 
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interest to cooperate, but have conflicting interests over exactly how to cooperate’ (Muthoo, 
1999: 1). In this thesis therefore bargaining and negotiation are used interchangeably. The 
parties in the study are exclusively states and will mostly involve what ACP and EU 
governments and supranational institutions do as opposed to negotiations between firms. The 
transactions in question in this work primarily involve trade and development assistance 
treaties. 
 
Analysis of outcomes and processes of economic negotiations is a growing field in 
International Relations and has been labeled ‘the science of negotiation’ (Raiffa, 1982), ‘analysis 
of decision making’ (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, 1988), ‘negotiation analysis’ (Odell, 2006), in 
normative ‘bargaining theory’ (Nash 1950,) and even more loosely ‘analysis of economic 
diplomacy’ (Bayne and Woolcock, 2003). 
 
The purpose of analysis of any one given process or processes of economic negotiation 
between states or regions is threefold: (a) to contribute to development of an analytical 
framework (or theory) of understanding negotiations, (b) to build on credible basis for 
generalizations or inferences on the nature of economic negotiations and (c) to build on 
historical descriptions as stocks of cases which shed light on the conduct of negotiations. Of 
course, understanding negotiation has an obvious implication for application on actual 
negotiations. There is an axiomatic premise that learning about what determines the success of 
negotiations can lead to enhancing success of future negotiations. At an academic level these 
objectives (above) are intended to pursue the establishment of some microfoundation(s) that 
the process, actors and context with the outcome.  Can we deduce any patterns of order in 
complex negotiations where uncertainty and asymmetries of power and information abound? 
In spite of the complexity of negotiations is it still possible to derive some persuasive 
explanations on how we arrive at the outcomes that any negotiation ends up with? Given a 
large number of cases of real-life negotiation processes, and examining the outcomes of these 
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negotiations with regard to as many factors we expect to affect the outcomes as possible, is it 
possible to arrive at some approximate, if not exacting indication of how to explain or predict 
or generalize the interaction between the negotiation process, its actors and its outcomes? Is it 
possible to reach a persuasive causal mechanism or model of explanation, where a negotiation 
process under a given set of conditions can be expected to lead to a given outcome with a high 
degree of certitude? This is the ‘science’ of negotiation. And these are just a few of the 
questions raised in the science of negotiation analysis. Naturally, this science involves a great 
deal of simplification of complex negotiations to try and distill what may be exacting patterns 
in the outcomes of negotiations under a given set of approximate conditions and context. To 
put it in the words of Milton Friedman, is ‘...there a way of looking at or interpreting or 
organizing the evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to 
be manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure’3.  An attempt at this 
simplification is undoubtedly a source of frustration (and perhaps criticism) for scholars 
seeking a compelling and cogent model of explanation. However, as with any work in social 
science, simplification is a necessary cost to establish even the slightest insight into what is a 
probable causal regularity between certain variables under consideration. 
 
In international politics, negotiation and bargaining is at the heart of any agreements in 
regional integration building process. Most major theories or conceptual frameworks for 
understanding regional integration have aspects of negotiations embedded. This is the case 
with intergovermentalism, institutionalism, neo-functionalism and even critical theories. 
While intergovernmentalism focuses on interstate bargaining, neo-functionalism focuses on 
                                                 
 
 
3 Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 33 as quoted in 
Walter Mattli’s ‘The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond’ p. 3. 
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the role of supranational institutions in driving, aggregating and mediating interests. 
Institutionalists emphasize the role of institutions (or regimes, in Krasner’s terms) as 
independent causal variables of negotiated outcomes. What differs between these 
interpretations of region-making and negotiations are the underlying assumptions and 
assertions about the actors, the objectives of the actors and the context of region building 
processes. It is inherent therefore that the conduct of economic negotiations affects the nature 
of region building. The objective of this study is to examine the conduct of economic 
negotiations between the European Union (hereafter the EU) and the African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) group of countries. The purpose of this examination is twofold: First, at the 
empirical level, the study uses the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU 
and ACP to investigate and explain how different factors (negotiation capabilities/institutions, 
preferences/relationships, power/coalitions) account for differences in the outcomes of these 
Economic Partnership Agreements for different ACP-EU dyads. The objective here is to 
explore if these cases could provide that most basic role of case studies which as Jeniffer Platt 
(1999) has put it, is to possibly ‘suggest, hypothesis, interpretations and empirical uniformities 
for future quantitative investigation’ (Platt, 1999: 167). Second, at the analysis level, the study 
should lead to an explication of why the parties involved (the EU and the ACP regions in this 
case) reach the outcomes they do and what theoretical suppositions most cogently fit the 
empirical evidence in explanation. How do these negotiation cases add to or discount from 
existing contingent generalizations on the microfoundations of the link between process of 
negotiation and outcomes? 
 
Due to the growing proliferation of regional, bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, there 
has been a growing interest in negotiation analysis of economic negotiations. The overarching 
aim of negotiation analysis is to explore and explain how actors’ dispositions and processes of 
negotiation affect the resulting agreements? Or why parties fail to reach an agreement? Or 
how the negotiation process affects the outcomes reached. And do certain actors, say the 
European Union, the United States or Japan show consistent negotiation strategies with 
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different parties? In the case of the ACP group, an interesting question is obviously that of 
how to explain variations in outcomes of the EU–ACP negotiations for the various ACP 
regions after 2007.  Ultimately, beyond single case explanation and exploration, the ideal goal 
for negotiation analysis is to build contingent generalizations about causal mechanism in 
economic negotiations that may indeed be hypothesis generating. As James Sebenius has 
summarized it, ‘negotiation analysis seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for 
negotiators and third parties’ (Sebenius, 1992: 18). 
 
Moreover, apart from the growing interest in analysis of economic negotiations, aspects of 
economic negotiations make them slightly different from security related negotiations:  First, 
there is wide policy agreement as to the eventual objective for economic negotiations, that is 
the enhancement of economic exchange. The economic ideological divergence of the cold war 
days has dissolved in what has been termed the triumph of economic liberalism following the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union. As Landau (2000: 2) has put it, ‘the “ideology” of 
liberalization is a prerequisite that is accepted by all negotiators’. The triumph of economic 
liberalism has thus narrowed down broad ideological differences over what the objectives of 
economic diplomacy are. The outcomes of the Uruguay round and the establishment of the 
WTO, the proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) as well as the growing number 
of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has almost made increasing economic liberalization 
the only game in town.  Today even countries that still identify as communist, such as the 
Peoples Republic of China, Cuba or Vietnam are resolute free traders and members of the 
World Trade Organization (China- 2001, Cuba- 1995 and Vietnam -2007). This understanding, 
coupled with growing economic exchange makes economic negotiators more conscious of the 
cost of no agreement and more alive to the possibilities of expanding the possibility frontier. 
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This however does not mean that economic negotiations are necessary speedier than security 
negotiation nor does it mean that there lacks variance on the extent of trade liberalization 
considered appropriate by each state. The case of the EU-ACP FTA negotiation has for instance 
been unusually long drawn.  Similarly, as clearly seen4 in the EPA case, there is a variation as 
to how institutionalized the commitment to liberalize trade is among different ACP states (or 
any other states).  As per the study’s findings, this divergence in states’ desire for further trade 
and services liberalization in fact becomes an important norm in explaining not just the 
general protraction of the EPA negotiations but also the propensity of individual ACP states to 
ratify or withhold ratification of an EPA agreement. 
 
Second, for any single negotiating party in an economic negotiation, the range of domestic 
actors and interests tends to vary more widely than in typical security related negotiations. 
The intensity and diversity of domestic economic interests varies greatly. Unlike security 
concerns that are still mostly regarded as a matter of national sovereignty, capital movement 
and commercial interests are more fluid, multinational and less nationalistic. While central 
institutions and leadership of security and defense are still predominantly national, capital 
movement is more diffuse. The state negotiator thus has a more difficult job of aggregating 
and crystallizing the diverging domestic interests into a single position. Thus, over and above 
interests, the process and conduct of the negotiation itself in an economic negotiation is a 
delicate complexity in management and aggregation of a broad range of entangled domestic 
and foreign interests. A principal liberal theory explanatory variable factor for outcomes of 
economic negotiations has been to show how domestic constituencies shape a state’s 
                                                 
 
 
4 From my data collection using SVI questionnaires from EPA negotiators. 
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negotiating preferences and propensity for ratification of a trade agreement. This is the 
foundation of Robert D. Putnam (1988) renowned argument of international negotiations as a 
two level game revolving around the domestic politics of each party.  Many studies in 
negotiation analysis (Abdelal and Kirshner 1999; Putnam, 1988; Davis and Oh, 2007; Hillman 
and Ursprung, 1988; Carranza, 2003; Chorev, 2007; Mo, 1994; Konig and Hug, 2002) have 
examined the interaction between domestic and foreign in shaping and constraining final 
negotiated outcomes of treaties.  While fully cognizant of this angle my study does not 
examine the role of domestic interest in shaping national positions of EU or ACP negotiators. 
For the study I examine the already aggregated national or regional preferences as they are 
presented by the negotiators at the international level. 
1.2 Problem Statement: Explaining EPA efficiency and Explication of extant Research 
Gap 
The study, as might now be palpable is about the conduct of a particular case of economic 
negotiation between the EU and the ACP states for what the two parties labeled Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and an analysis of this negotiation’s outcomes to establish the 
(micro) foundations of their causation. EPAs are essentially Free Trade Agreements that seek 
to introduce trade reciprocity between the EU and ACP states.  This section merely sets out the 
problem.  The demonstration of the superfluous structural interpretations of EPA outcomes as 
a function of market dependency will be outlined in detail in subsequent theoretical chapters. 
 
The EU is a regional grouping of 28 states in Europe and is the world’s biggest trader by 
volume accounting for 20% of the total world exports and imports. It has the world’s most 
supranationalised secretariat (known as the Commission) which is wholly in charge of the 
bloc’s trade policy. The EU is legally incorporated by the 1992 Treaty of European Union 
(TEU). The ACP group of states comprises 79 states which have had ‘special’ preferential 
trading relations with the EU since the Treaty of Rome. These states are spread out through 
Africa (48 states), the Caribbean (16 states) and the Pacific (15 states) and hence the name ACP. 
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The ACP is legally constituted under the Georgetown Agreement of 1975.  For purposes of the 
EPA negotiations, the ACP states divided themselves into seven regions, each of which would 
then negotiate with the EU. However, since some of the members in respective ACP regions 
were not LDCs (and thus were not under any obligation to enter into an EPA with the EU) the 
centrality of regional secretariats in negotiation was dramatically reduced and the regional 
RECs secretariats became only coordinators of the negotiation process. Thus with the 
exception of the Cariforum region, EPA negotiations in other ACP regions was primarily left 
to individual states. In spite of this, the EU continued to hold regionalized negotiating sessions 
in accordance with the emerging constellation of negotiating coalitions. Table 1 below shows 
the various ACP EPA negotiating regions, the states that comprised these regions and the 
status of their EPA. 
 
Table 1. ACP EPA Negotiating Regions and State of EPA Conclusion 
ACP region Member 
States 
 LDCs State of EPA 
Cariforum 
(Caribbean) 
 (15) 
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St 
Kitts & 
Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & 
Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad 
& Tobago, Haiti 
 
Haiti 
Comprehensive EPA 
ratified 
 
Pacific 
 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, 
 
East Timor, 
PNG – Ratified 
Fiji – signed 
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(15) Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Tonga, East 
Timor, Kiribati, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu 
Kiribati, 
Samoa, 
Solomon 
Islands, 
Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu 
 
The rest - Initialed 
 
SADC Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, 
South Africa, Angola, Lesotho, 
Mozambique 
Angola, 
Lesotho, 
Mozambique 
Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and 
Mozambique 
(Ratified) 
 
Angola, Namibia & 
SA - Initialed  
 
West Africa 
(Ecowas) 
 
(16) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, 
Guinea, Niger 
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania,  
Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Togo,Cape Verde,  
Coˆ te d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria 
Benin, 
Burkina Faso, 
Gambia, 
Guinea, 
Guinea 
Bissau, 
Liberia, 
Mali, 
Mauritania, 
Niger, 
Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, 
Togo 
Coˆ te d’Ivoire – 
Signed 
Ghana – initialed  
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EAC 
(5) 
Burundi, Rwanda Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda 
Burundi, 
Rwanda, 
Tanzania, 
Uganda 
All Initialed  
 
ESA 
 
(12) 
Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Zimbabwe, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Sudan 
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Somalia, Zambia 
 Comoros, 
Djibouti, 
Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, 
Malawi,  
Somalia, 
Sudan, 
Zambia 
Seychelles – Ratified 
Mauritius and 
Madagascar - signed 
 
Central 
Africa 
      (9) 
Cameroon, Gabon, Rep. Congo, 
Chad 
Central African, Republic, DR 
Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome & 
Principe 
CAR, DRC, 
Chad, 
Equatorial 
Guinea, Sao 
Tome & 
Principe 
 
 
As can be seen from the table, the EPA were negotiated by seven ACP regions, five of which 
were by African states, one from the Caribbean and One from the Pacific. A comprehensive 
EPA (as opposed to an interim EPA) refers to whether the trade liberalization involved 
included services (comprehensive) or if it involved only goods (interim). For explanations on 
the meaning of initialing, signing and ratification, kindly see footnote 7, below. Of ACP’s 79 
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member states, only Cuba is not signatory to the Cotonou Areements and thus de jure not 
involved in the EPA negotiations. 
 
In June 2000, the European Union and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of 
countries signed the Cotonou Agreement. This was the ‘third’ installment of development 
cooperation agreements between the EU and the ACP group after the Younde (I and II) and 
Lome (I-IV) Conventions dating back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Since 1963, these agreements 
have typically provided the guidelines for EU’s preferential trade and development 
cooperation with its former colonies. The key agreement (and difference) of the Cotonou 
Agreement from previous agreements was that rather than extending the preferential trade 
agreements for the ACP, both parties agreed to phase out the preferential trade treatment and 
re-introduce trade reciprocity. The EU and ACP agreed to conclude a “new World Trade 
Organization (WTO) compatible trading arrangements, removing progressively barriers to 
trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade” (Article 36(1))5. 
This was in essence going to move trade relations from primarily the unilateral EU preferential 
trading system institutionalized by the Lome Agreements, to a reciprocal Free Trade 
Agreement hinged on WTO legality. Thus since September 2002, the EU has been involved in 
negotiations for Free Trade Agreements with the ACP group of states. The first phase of these 
negotiations was done at the all-ACP group level where the EU held negotiations with the 
entire ACP group as a single block on issues of common interest to all ACP states. The second 
phase of the negotiation was to involve six ACP regions namely; West Africa, Central Africa, 
East and Southern Africa, the SADC region, Caribbean and Pacific.  In the final few months of 
2007, a seventh group, the EAC emerged from the ESA group as a separate negotiating entity. 
                                                 
 
 
ACP/61/056/02 Brussels. 2002. P. 2 
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Each of these regions then negotiated for an FTA with the EU. In the last few months of 2007, 
36 ACP states agreed to and initialed an EPA. Since then however, two things have happened; 
One, there developed variable speed with regard to EPA ratification by various ACP states.   
 
Table 2: Variable Speed in Intra- ACP EPA Agreement 
 
ACP 
Region 
No of 
members 
Non-
LDCs 
in 
group6 
            2007                                                         2013 
States with 
No EPAs 
No. of 
states 
Initialed 
(2007)  
No. of 
states 
Signed 
 
Ratified/ 
WTO 
legal 
SADC 7 4 1 1 3 (2009) 1 (2012) 
ESA 11 3 5 2  4 (2009) - 
EAC 5 1 - 5 - - 
Cent Afric 8 3 7  1 (2009) - 
West 
Afric 
16 4 14 1 1 (2008) - 
Cariforum 14 (15) 13 -  - 15 (2009) 
Pacific  15 9 13 1 1 1 (2011) 
Total 76 36 40 10 11 15 
Source: EU Trade (2012) Overview of EPAs. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf  
                                                 
 
 
6 Hence GSP states which are not eligible for export to EU under the EBA 
            Variable Speed 
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Seventeen states (15 Cariforum states plus Papua New Guinea and Seychelles) have moved 
ahead of the rest of ACP and ratified their EPA agreements with the EU. Two, since 2007, 
many of the ACP states that initialed an EPA have not only withheld ratification, but have 
actually compelled the EU into a re-negotiation of some of the 2007 agreements. Table 2 above 
shows the state-of-the-art in EPA variable speed which has developed after 2007, with regard 
to the category of EPA negotiation at which each ACP state stands; these are between 
initialing, signing or ratification7.  
 
The thesis seeks to explain these two features: the variable speed and the unique ACP strength 
against the EU.  The table shows the ACP regions and states, and the number of states in each 
ACP region that have initialed, signed or ratified an EPA agreement. Only through ratification 
of an EPA does it become WTO reported and operational and definitively legal.  As table 2 
shows, the Cotonou Agreement involved 76 ACP states and thus in an ideal case all 76 should 
have been part of an EPA. However, only the non-LDCs among ACP were directly affected by 
the WTO requirement for reciprocity. In 2007, 36 states initialed an EPA with the EU. Since 
then, 17 of these states (15 Cariforum states plus Papua New Guinea and Seychelles8) have 
ratified their EPA agreements and thus made their EPA negotiation complete and the 
agreements operational.  19 of the remaining states (out of 36 who initialed) are either stuck at 
initialing or signed (but not ratified) the agreements. How do we account for this variable 
                                                 
 
 
7 By initialing, a state confirms the authenticity of the agreed texts of the treaty. By signing, the state confirms 
consent to be bound by the contents of the treaty. Ratification signals the due authorization by all concerned 
agencies (executive and parliament) for the application of the treaty. 
8 For Seychelles’ ratification see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146180.pdf 
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speed? Is there a regular pattern or set of qualities that sets the 17 states apart from the rest of 
ACP?  
 
During the negotiation of these FTAs, and even after initialization of interim agreements of 
some of the EPAs treaties, there has been an abiding notion (discussed in the theory chapter) 
that the outcomes were primarily contingent on the structural relations between the EU and 
the ACP and thus an inference that the outcomes reflected a capitulation by African regional 
blocs to EU’s power. An ACP negotiator is for instance quoted as having said that, ‘the balance 
of power in terms of economic clout and resources –meaning experts- is horribly tilted against 
the ACP. So it’s very hard to see how to have a balanced negotiation in the circumstances. So 
it’s neither a partnership nor a negotiation.’9 Such views may of course have some merit. 
However, even if we accepted the argument that the outcomes were simply a reflection of 
asymmetries in power relations, we would still be hard pressed to explain the variances in 
outcomes between different ACP regions. In any case, how much of the agreements could be 
attributed to structural factors? This work attempts a systematic unveiling of how to explain 
the outcomes and variations in outcomes in these FTA negotiations. The approach of this 
study raises two major concerns:  The first concern is mostly descriptive and it deals with 
providing an intellectual order to how to perceive the outcomes from the ACP-EU EPA 
Agreements. Given a positive zone of agreement, can we describe where the outcomes lie? A 
proximate location of the EPA agreements on a Zone of Agreement would affirm or dispel the 
extent to which there was a negotiation. Using a comparison of the parties initial negotiating 
                                                 
 
 
9
 An ACP negotiator responding to a survey carried out on behalf of ICCO. Quoted from Bilal and Stevens (2009) pg 52. 
This book, on pg 50 documents several other situations where the EU is seen as wielding greater power that it could use to 
extract its preferences from the ACP. 
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mandates and the eventual agreements we can establish the reference point from which to 
judge the nature of the gives and take during the negotiation. The second question concerns 
explaining why any given region ended up with the agreement that they did. This therefore 
entails explaining variance among several cases. 
 
This dissertation seeks to examine how to understand the EU- ACP negotiations for Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the outcomes reached. If we map out a negotiation 
frontier of the EU-ACP EPA negotiation and obtain the outcomes reached, what do these 
outcomes say about the nature of wins and concessions in this dyad? What drove the 
outcomes and the variances in outcomes? What theoretical suppositions best explain these 
wins and concessions? The research question of the dissertation is thus framed as follows:  
 
What accounts for bargaining efficiency in EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 
Negotiations? 
 
Bargaining efficiency is used as the main dependent variable in the study. For this study, 
bargaining efficiency refers to the duration taken to reach ratification (or provisional 
application) of an FTA agreement. With regard to EPA conclusion, the question of efficiency 
can be further divided into two main questions: The first aspect of efficiency refers to the 
variable speed which has developed in the sub-dyads where some dyads of EU-ACP regions 
or states have reached ratification before others.  What explains this difference in efficiency 
between different ACP groups? Why has reaching ratification of EPAs been faster for some 
ACP groups than others? The first aspect of the question entails explaining intra-ACP 
variances (sub dyads) in efficiency outcomes. 
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The second aspect regards the efficiency of the super dyad (EU vs. ACP) in reaching an 
agreement and why these EPA negotiations have been so convoluted in spite of the putative 
asymmetrical material differences between the EU and the ACP states. Starting in 2002 and 
expected to be completed by end of 2007, the EU has only managed to complete the 
negotiations with one ACP group (Cariforum) plus Papua New Guinea and Seychelles in 2009 
and 2012 respectively. All the rest of the ACP groups and states are still in the negotiations. 
The second aspect of the efficiency question concerns explaining this 11-year protraction. Thus 
the research question can be further divided into the following two questions. These are the 
two questions that inform the entire research task. 
 
What accounts for bargaining efficiency in EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements? 
(i) What accounts for the variable speed in EPA conclusion between the EU and various 
ACP states?  
 
(ii) What accounts for ACP’s inordinate resistance to EPA conclusion from the EU 
considering the EU’s putative power dominance in the negotiation? 
 
 In the empirical chapter, the research has two major findings regarding the EPA negotiations 
beyond 2007: One, the EU ‘wins’ on the substantive areas considered most contested. This win 
relates to the distribution characteristics on the contested issues.  Although there may seem to 
be what Lorenz, (2012: 6) has called ‘considerable’ regional variances in distributional aspects 
of the outcomes, these variances are only additional to the minimum threshold set by the EU 
positions. For instance, in bargaining for the suitable threshold (volume) and duration of trade 
liberalization, what in WTO lingua is known as “substantially all trade”, all ACP states agree 
to the EU claim of a minimum threshold of 80% liberalization within 15 years. Beyond this 
minimum threshold, some states do choose to liberalize more.  Yet in spite of initial differing 
offers on liberalization threshold sought by different ACP states, all ACP states finally 
converge on the EU stipulated thresholds. The EU thresholds for use of export taxes, MFN 
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clauses and infant industry protection seem to hold equally for all ACP states in Africa and 
Pacific (and a little less generous for the Caribbean). Any variations in the ACP regions’ 
outcomes, particularly the African regions, outcomes are only subsidiary. Thus, overall, the EU 
objectives prevail in as far as main contested issues of EPAs are concerned. The “contested 
issues” and the outcomes from these bargains relate to distribution outcomes rather than 
efficiency outcomes. While the principal concern of my research is on the question of 
efficiency, considerable time is spent in the empirical chapter clarifying the zone of agreement, 
the contestations and the final agreements on these contested issues. The principal purpose of 
this exercise is to demonstrate that on distribution outcomes, the EU commands significant 
wins and that there seems to be only modest variation among ACP regions on the outcomes 
reached. One significant difference however in the outcomes for the EU relates to the time it 
takes to reach an agreement with different ACP regions. This constitutes the efficiency 
problem, and the two sub-research questions relate to this puzzle. 
 
Two, in a case of what has been called a ‘not so weak south’ (Lorenz, 2012) the ACP states 
show remarkable strength in not only withholding ratification of agreed EPAs, but in forcing a 
renegotiation of the 2007 agreements. Why is the EU, which some scholars have characterized 
as a superpower, (Whitman 1997, Reid 2005, McCormick 2006, Cameron 2007), and which has 
indisputable market power over the ACP states unable to push through an expeditious EPA 
conclusion?  
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Table 3: Historical Evolution of Duration (efficiency) of EU-ACP Negotiations 
 
Agreement Duration of Negotiation  
 
Younde I (1963) 6 months 
Younde II (1969) 6 months 
Lome I (1975) 2 years        (73-75) 
Cotonou (2000) 2-3 years    (98-2000) 
  
EU-Korea  3 
EU- Mexico 4 
EU-Peru/Colombia 5 
EU-Egypt 6 
  
EU-Cariforum 7 
EU-Africa and Pacific 11 plus 
  
Source: See Lecomte 2001 
 
As table 3 below shows, why does the historical duration of EU-ACP negotiations keep on 
getting longer over the years in spite of EU’s undisputed market power?  As the table shows, 
FTA negotiations with associated states such as the ACP seem to take much longer than FTAs 
with non-associated states such as Egypt or Peru/Colombia or even North African states.  
Even in the particular case of just the ACP, the duration of negotiations from Younde 1 to EPAs 
has increased from 6 months to durations of more than 10 years in the case of some ACP 
states. Even Lome 1 of 1975 which is historically renowned for its complexity and degree of 
ambition in instituting a real partnership between the EU and the ACP took only two years to 
negotiate. How then is it that these putatively economically weaker ACP states are able to hold 
off so successfully against the EU? 
 
This ACP resistance to a conclusion EPA negotiations (and in fact a re-negotiation) of the 
initialed 2007 agreements, I argue represents a ‘success’ for the ACP states that needs 
explaining.  When power is viewed in a bi-directional sense in negotiation analysis, the power 
A seeming inverse relationship 
between degree of asymmetry 
and speed of FTA conclusion 
particularly for 
institutionalized relations 
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to dominate may be just as potent as the power to resist. How to explain ACP’s resistance 
power is thus a significant puzzle worth our attention.  Why does the EU fail to simply 
terminate the EPA negotiations as it has done with other recent FTA negotiations such as 
ASEAN, Mercusor and Andean? Or rather why is the EU unable to close the deal much faster 
as would be expected (based on timeframes spent on previous of EU-ACP treaty negotiations)?  
What explains ACP states’ successful defense against the EU in negotiating time-frame 
beyond the initial deadline of 2007?  
 
Explaining these respective ‘wins’ is the key empirical and theoretical objective of this 
dissertation. Why does the EU win over those ACP states that have agreed to ratify their EPAs 
– what explains variance in ACP states propensity to ratify an EPA? And why are the 36 ACP 
states that initialed an EPA in 2007 so strong in not only resisting ratification but also forcing a 
re-negotiation of 2007 agreements? 
 
The section below outlines in a condensed form what the research gaps are regarding the 
question of explaining effectiveness in economic negotiations for African, Caribbean and 
Pacific states in their economic negotiations with the EU.  Firstly, as has been constantly 
intimated, the single most important justification for this research question is that it seeks to 
scrutinize the validity of existing interpretations and theoretical assumptions about the 
causation of the outcomes witnessed in EU-ACP negotiations. Although suppositions have 
been made alluding to the role of material asymmetries/dependencies as being the primary 
determinants of the outcomes, such suppositions have not been followed with empirical 
verification and/or affirmation. Using the EPA negotiating process where the EU is pitted 
against 79 ACP states, the quest is to examine if there are regularities or patterns which seem 
to illuminate on the efficiency and distribution properties of the outcomes reached in this 
negotiation. In order to study the relationship between the outcomes of EU-ACP negotiations 
and the negotiating process, one could use one of two methods: A longitudinal approach could 
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be used to study negotiations and outcomes over successive years of ACP-EU relations (from 
the early 1960s Younde Conventions to the 2000s EPAs). This would be superb in showing a 
whole range of factors in negotiation and how these might have changed over time (respective 
parties negotiating objectives, preference foundation, and if the distribution properties of the 
outcomes have changed over time). The other method would be cross-sectional, where we 
examine variance in a single negotiation round across ACP states and examine what creates 
this variance. The EPA round of negotiation renders the cross-sectional study possible. Since 
my focus is on explaining the cross-ACP variances in outcomes rather than the impact of time 
(historical developments) on the outcomes, this work will use the cross-sectional approach 
based on this single case of negotiation.  This is therefore intentioned as a heuristic study that 
seeks to identify new variables or causal mechanisms in explanation of EPA outcomes and in 
extension, possibly provide insights into the foundational structures of economic interactions 
between the EU and the ACP group. If it does not find new explanatory variables, at least the 
study should seek to qualify existing explanations by attempting an empirically supported 
contention on how to interpret EU-ACP economic partnership agreements outcomes. 
 
Secondly, this study is relevant because so far, with a few exceptions such as that by Tony 
(Heron, 2010) who discusses the Cariforum, and Lorenz (2012) who specifically analysis the 
SADC EPA process, most scholars (Bilal and Stevens, 2009; Elgstrom, 2005; Stevens, 2008; 
ECA, 2007) who have tried the explanation of EU-ACP outcomes have offered an 
undifferentiated aggregated, ‘African’ or ‘ACP-wide’ interpretations of the EPA outcomes. 
There has not been much systematic identification let alone explanation of the intra-African or 
ACP-wide variances in outcomes.  The intra-ACP variance in EPA ratification which has 
emerged after 2007 deserves an explanation. The use of the EPA cases outcomes from several 
ACP regions affords the opportunity to not only highlight the variances with the ACP, but also 
to possibly provide insights into what foments these disparities in outcomes. 
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Thirdly and crucially this thesis intends to enhance clarity to the very definition of what 
‘negotiation success’ or ‘failure’ entails. Even though there have been debates on gains and 
losses in the EPA outcomes, (Stevens; 2008; Bilal and Stevens; 2009 and Bilal, 2011) there has 
not been any systematic evaluation of gains or losses based on a standardized definition of 
negotiation success based on pre-negotiation objectives. In negotiation analysis, negotiation 
‘success’ or ‘loss’ is based on the differences between a governments (or regions) pre-
negotiation objectives and the outcomes. This work seeks to more systematically outline the 
pre-negotiation objectives and measure them against the outcomes. It is only this way that we 
could authoritatively talk of gains, losses and concessions. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, chapter II will outline the theoretical setting of the thesis’ tasks 
within conceptual frameworks in negotiation analysis and international relations theory. In 
addition to situating the negotiation agreements within IR theory, the chapter also proposes to 
reference other disciplines trying to understand the outcomes of such economic negotiation 
between states. One such reference will be made with regard to the social psychology of 
negotiation. Owing to the long ‘special relations’ between the EU and ACP states, it is 
proposed that the role of expectations should be factored into negotiation analysis. 
Expectations constitute an attitudinal element of context which IR theories may not provide or 
suitably account for. A similar reference to the psychology of social influence also informs 
sections of the penultimate chapter on the theoretical suppositions derivable from EPA 
outcomes Chapter III will dwell on method and an outline of the empirical data to be sought. 
The introductory parts of section III will primarily focus on ontological musings that guide the 
research exercise while the latter part outlines the research design itself.  Chapter IV delves 
into the key empirical tasks of the dissertation. After a lengthy outline of the EPA negotiation 
zone of agreement to define the negotiated outcomes,  this chapter seeks to provide data that 
shows answers the deductive question of if  outcomes variances are a function of asymmetrical 
dependencies. Here data on ACP states’ trade dependencies and vulnerabilities is presented 
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and correlations with the efficiency outcomes examined. And if material asymmetries are not 
responsible for outcome variances, what is? The second part of the empirical chapter provides 
materials from negotiators’ interviews and subjective value index surveys which measure the 
drivers of states’ propensity to ratify an EPA. Chapter V provides a derivable theorization on 
asymmetrical negotiations from the EPA outcomes. The conclusion wraps up presenting a new 
dilemma on what engenders norm socialization in international asymmetrical relations. 
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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS IN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATION 
ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay down the theoretical and conceptual prism through which 
to examine negotiation outcomes. The chapter is aimed at three tasks: The first section will 
situate negotiation processes and outcomes within existing major rational choice paradigms in 
international relations theory. This will not only examine the scholarly cleavages between 
realism and liberalism in explaining negotiation outcomes but will also broach on the fuzzy 
intersection of both approaches and the difficulties faced by both in issuing definitive 
categorization of negotiation outcomes. The second section will review specific theoretical and 
empirical interpretations of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) outcomes. 
As this study is specific to examining the EU- ACP EPA outcomes, the main objective here will 
be to examine the state-of-the-art in EPAs outcomes explanation? As literature examining the 
outcomes of these negotiations shows, most interpretations of EU-ACP EPA outcomes give an 
untested contention that the outcomes are a mostly a function of material asymmetries10 
between the two regions. These untested assertions mark the deductive foundations of my 
empirical work. How critical is economic dependence in procuring an early end to the EPA 
negotiation? Are those states cariforum which were first to accept and ratify EPAs the most 
economically vulnerable? This literature’s interpretation of power asymmetry may be both in 
the realist structural sense of absolute objective economic disparities or in the more liberal 
theory sense of asymmetrical interdependence. However, as I contend, this theoretical 
asymmetrical dependence argument may be misleading as it’s not empirically supported by 
                                                 
 
 
10 The two important factors reflecting material asymmetry are EU’s market power and its use of EDF funds as 
development assistance for ACP states.   
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evidence from the negotiation process and thus remains spurious. The variable speed that has 
emerged among ACP states after 2007 – between states that have only initialed and those that 
have already ratified their EPA agreements- does not suggest exigencies primarily driven by 
market vulnerability of ACP states.  Although asymmetries might be useful in explaining a 
singular case, the cogency of the asymmetry argument for the entire ACP region, or even for 
the African regions alone is disputable since there is little literature that presents a 
comprehensive coverage or attempt at comprehensive (ACP wide) explanations. This study 
attempts such an overarching theoretical or conceptual hypothesis that could explain ACP-
wide outcomes.  In addition, tests done to examine the relationships between the outcomes 
and the factors of asymmetry do not reveal any compelling patterns on the impact of 
asymmetry apart for the common initialing of 2007.  One other weakness of the existing 
literature is that it tends to gloss over the definition of negotiation success or loss. In this 
regard, while some studies do point out to the EU’s objectives, there is little exposition of ACP 
blocs’ pre-negotiation objectives and what was eventually conceded or won. Thus claims of 
one or other party’s greater success or loss without a credible establishment of the pre-
negotiation baseline remains weak. In my view, the primacy of establishing pre-negotiation 
preferences has been largely ignored. 
 
Thirdly, I will set out additional theoretical considerations, which I perceive as relevant in 
explaining ACP-EU EPA outcomes but which present research on EPA outcomes has not 
incorporated empirically. This is seen as a way to contribute to theory building regarding 
explanatory variables for the outcomes of economic negotiations. 
2.1 The fuzzy Divide in Rationalist IR Theories: Negotiation and Bargaining within 
Liberalism and Realism 
IR theory can be broadly classified into two broad theoretical groupings: rational choice and 
constructivist theories.  The cleavage among these broad classifications lies primarily in the 
conception of structure as either existing relatively objective of the actors (rational choice) or as 
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actors and structures as being mutually constituted (constructivism). The contestations 
between these two groups and its relation to my research will be dealt with at depth at the 
beginning section of my methodology chapter where I present a reflection on the ontological 
standpoints relating to this study.  The section below will exclusively examine rational choice 
theories in understanding or explaining negotiated outcomes between states. It is preceded by 
a short introductory outline of the three major ‘schools’ of analysis with regard to causation of 
negotiated outcomes within rational choice and constructivism. 
 
Realism and liberal theory paradigms of international relations have different assumptions 
about the state of the international structure, the essence of power, the use of power by states 
and the foundation of preference formation by states whenever they interact. In explaining the 
outcomes of economic negotiations between states, the fundamental divide between realism 
and liberalism11 regards the emphasis placed on explaining the outcomes as either as an 
outcome of the ‘configuration of capabilities’ or a ‘configuration of preferences’ respectively. 
This distinction is similarly characterized as a difference of view between realism and 
liberalism on the primacy of asymmetries in actors capabilities vs. asymmetries in the salience 
attached to a negotiation’s influence (Schneider, 2005: 699). Thus in trying to neatly 
characterize the theoretical divide in causal variables we can roughly attribute outcomes to 
two sets of variables:  Realism attributes negotiation outcomes to the asymmetries in states’ 
capabilities and emphasizes the actors’ preoccupation with maximization of relative gains and 
how the negotiator uses their capabilities to extract concessions from the rival negotiator. 
Realism also places more emphasis on an intractable structure to which states can only 
                                                 
 
 
11 Liberalism, in this section is used to strictly mean the liberal theory of International Relations and not as an 
economic or political ideology.  
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respond. In IR a structure is regarded as ‘a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the 
behavior of a state’ (Hopf, 1998: 172). In a trade negotiations, a key structural element of power 
in realist consideration which is regarded as almost intractable is market power ( Shadlan, 
2008; Farrel, 2005; Haus, 1991; Dur and Mateo, 2010; Ravenhill, 1985; Dwyer and Orville C. 
Walker, Jr).Liberalism attributes the outcomes either to the preferences of the most powerful 
domestic constituency, the negotiation dexterity or to asymmetrical interdependence of the 
negotiators in an issue. 
 
In explaining the causation of a dyad’s negotiation outcomes (dependent variable), the 
explanatory (independent) variable that scholars have most relied on can be broadly grouped 
into three categories. In International Relations, the realist/liberal theory divide concerns itself 
with the extent to which outcomes can be explained as a function of either the configuration of 
power (realists) or the configuration of preferences and interdependence (liberal theorists). The 
fundamental traditional contestation in IR, in explaining the efficiency and distribution 
properties of outcomes of negotiation for economically asymmetrical states regards the 
centrality on which causation is attributed to the asymmetry in material resources or the 
negotiation process itself. Scholars within a more traditional and broad view of International 
Relations have tended to interpret negotiation outcomes from a material resources standpoint. 
In the liberal theory camp this is the basis of Nye and Keohane theory of asymmetrical 
interdependence (or complex interdependence) as the determinant of distribution properties 
of states’ negotiations. This thinking is supported by theoretical suppositions of (Farrell, 2005; 
Heron, 2012; Hurt 2003; Elgstrom, 2005; Stevens, 2008 and the ECA, 2007). These theoretical 
suppositions however, have hardly been followed by empirical verification. Broadly, realists 
on the other hand attribute wins or losses to the configuration of power (as elaborated in 
section 2.2. below). 
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A second category of liberal theorists’ research (fronted by John Odell, 2000, 2006, 2010 and 
Amrita Narlikar, 2013, 2011, 2010) seeks to explain states’ negotiation outcomes as a function 
of the negotiation capabilities. For this group, the negotiating dexterity of each party is key in 
influencing the outcomes. Contra such suppositions of the manifest inevitability of outcomes 
in negotiation fomented by power asymmetries or dependencies, scholars within negotiation 
analysis (Bayne and Woolcok, 2003; Brown, 2002; Bilal and Stevens, 2009: Odell, 2000; Odell, 
2006; Odell, 2010; Narlikar 2003; Lorenz, 2012: Putnam, 1988; Narlikar, 2006; etc) contend that 
the outcomes of a negotiation are partially if not fundamentally predicated on the negotiating 
process itself. As Odell argues, small and medium states are not necessarily at the mercy of 
economic Goliaths in international interactions and that they ‘have been able to achieve some 
gains in trade negotiations with the powerful’ (Odell, 2010:1) Assuming that the gains or losses 
of a negotiating round are measured based on the pre-negotiation objectives of each party, my 
quest is therefore to (a) compare the distribution properties of the outcomes to the pre-
negotiation aspirations/objectives of each party and (b) to examine/explain what engenders 
losses, gains or the efficiency of the negotiation round and (c) determine if the explainers 
conform or diverge from prevailing suppositions. Looking at the outcomes of these 
interactions, and in consideration of the nature of their bargaining objectives, what can we 
learn of the patterns and factors that shape the outcomes? This view of the primacy of the 
negotiation process itself as crucial in determining outcomes is important in this dissertation 
because as shown later, the negotiating success of the ACP states has been remarkable in 
defending against the EU. Why have these (ACP) states been so uniquely successful?  
 
The third category of theorists - institutionalists and constructivists - (and this is where this 
research most proximally falls) seek to explain negotiating outcomes as a function of the 
relationships and institutions that govern and constrain the negotiating dyad in question. This 
third group regards negotiation outcomes as being predicated on (whether as causal or 
intervening variables) the regimes that govern the interactions between these parties. For such 
scholars (Krasner, 1982a, 1982b; Caporaso and Stone Sweet, 2001; Diekmann, 2004; Thomas, 
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2010; Jupille, 1999; Inkeberry and Kupchan, 1990; Danielson, 2002; Barnett and Duvall, 2005) 
regimes, norms, institutional procedures and relationships are critical in determining the 
outcomes we end up with in international negotiations. In their suppositions for instance, the 
extent of formalized relationships that a state has with another, shapes and constrains both 
parties’ actions in their negotiations. In my view these explanations ought not be necessarily 
exclusive and thus even though a scholar maybe labeled or categorized as belonging to one or 
other category, such categorization is not deemed irrevocable. As such, this work does not 
expressly regard or seek to promote or discount any one view of analyzing negotiated 
outcomes. Its neither pro-rationalist nor against constructivism, rather if one considers the 
broad array of potential variables in attributing negotiated outcomes, only fuzzy divides exist 
between these ‘schools’. The following section reviews the contentions and overlaps within 
these broad paradigms in explaining or interpreting the outcomes of states’ bargains 
2.1.1  Realism and Negotiated Outcomes 
Realism has been one of the two most compelling paradigms in international relations. As 
Barry Buzan has proclaimed, ‘no other tradition of thought in the field of International 
Relations can begin to compete with the distinguished pedigree claimed by Realism’ (Buzan, 
Jones and Little, 1993:3). This may be contested of course, but part of the lure and durability of 
realism in explaining interactions among states is its crisp assumptions about states’ behavior 
and the international system. According to this paradigm the international system is anarchic, 
states are the major actors in this system and are rational, homogenous power seekers 
primarily concerned with security and survival. Accordingly, the anarchic nature of the 
system itself is perceived as determining the outcomes of international interactions. Although 
bound by these few assumptions about the nature of states, interstate relations and the 
international system, the paradigm is further divided by contending theories or propositions 
of what motivates and drives states to act the way they act in the international system. In his 
1948 seminal book Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Han’s Morgantheu’s 
set out what was to become the foundational elements of realism. His classical realism asserts 
that states are driven by struggle for power in an anarchic international system. In 
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Morgenthau’s view therefore, ‘power’ is not just a means of achieving a preference, but 
aggrandizement of power is the end in itself. According to his proposition states seek power 
because they are driven by animus dominandi - the innate human need to dominate. Classical 
realism’s human nature argument was later more persuasively augmented by Kenneth Waltz 
structural realism. In his book Theory of International Politics (1979), while agreeing to 
Morgenthau’s idea on states’s unfettered lust for power, Waltz explains that the competition 
for power among states is precipitated by the anarchic nature of the international system 
where states can only depend on themselves for protection and survival in case of threats from 
other states. This state of uncertainty and insecurity about a states’ survival and the lack of an 
overarching protector leads states to want to have as much power as a bulwark necessary to 
protect themselves. Thus, as (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72) puts it, while for “classical realists, power 
is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is 
survival”.  Mearsheimer is himself a proponent of defensive realism’s balance-of-power theory 
where he argues that states do not always seek absolute power but a relative stability in power 
configurations. This notion of maintenance of power configurations provided the linchpin for 
Charles Kindleberger’s, Robert Gilpin’s and Stephen Krasner’s hegemonic stability theory.  But 
as suggested by such cleavages between Morgantheu and Waltz on the state’s motivations one 
hand and Mearsheimer and Gilpin on power balance or maximization, realism itself is beset 
with many contending threads. The bottom line for realists as far as explaining the outcomes 
of interactions at the international level is the extent to which states are the main actors, 
rational and power maximizing or balancing with regard to their international interactions. 
 
However, most realist theories of IR were conceived with explaining the interaction between 
states with the causes of the great World Wars in mind and their application and relevance to 
modern economic relations arguably has obvious limitations. Primarily, due to the 
phenomenal development of a widely embraced international regime of international trade 
since the end of World War II, [the WTO/GATT system in the case of international trade], it is 
doubtful the extent to which we can apply structural arguments based on arguments of a 
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completely anarchic system. As Alice Landau observes, “economic issues are nested within 
regimes or international arrangements that are defined as sets of principles, standards, rules 
and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge (Krasner 1983:2) 
Regimes or international arrangements have effects on state behavior giving them a sense of 
predictability in global interrelationships, providing information and a framework for 
interaction (Keohane 1984) and locking countries’ behaviour in a constrictive framework and 
forcing them to adapt policies they would not have adopted otherwise” (Landau 2000: 10). 
 
In a broad comparison between ‘security’ and ‘economic’ negotiations therefore, the range of 
maneuver in economic negotiations is narrower. The level of anarchy is mitigated and the 
regime setting is more integrated and constraining. In FTA negotiations for instance, there is 
an extensive WTO regime that constrains the range of bargaining maneuvers and thus makes 
the outcomes less unpredictable. As I contend throughout the thesis, understanding the 
measure and effect of such constrains on EU –ACP negotiations is crucial because only by 
having a crisp understanding of the range of the win set or possibility frontier in the 
negotiation, can we judge the interplay of gains and losses by any single party. By assuming a 
weak or an absent international regime that constrains the behavior or range of outcomes in a 
FTA negotiation, realist theories fail to capture a salient feature of a Free Trade Agreement 
negotiation such as the one between the EU and ACP. 
 
Notwithstanding this realist weakness in explaining economic negotiations, the concept of 
power maximizing as the driver of international economic relations has been taken over by 
political economists too in explaining the nature of economic relations among states. Since 
security-inspired realism theories assume the absence or general irrelevance of supranational 
regimens it was left to political economists in IPE to refine the relationship between structure 
and outcomes. Influential political economists such as Krasner, Kindleberger and Hirschman 
however, have tended to reverse the causation. Instead of assuming an intractable 
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international system which shapes or constrains state’s interests, political-economy theorists 
have tended to explain how the international structure results from and is reflective of the 
configurations of power among states. In his 1945 book National Power and Structure of Foreign 
Trade, Albert O. Hirschman illustrated the political consequences of asymmetrical trade 
relations between two unequal economies. Hirschman showed how asymmetrical trade 
relations between a bigger economy (Germany during Hitler’s reign) and smaller economies 
(Eastern and Southern Europe) ended up strengthening Germany’s political influence in the 
smaller states. Hirschman’s argument has since had many offshoots including Ken Shadlen’s 
concept of political trade dependence.  Hirschman’s contribution was not so much to emphasize 
the use of material power by the superordinate state to further its interests but to observe the 
incidental role of an open international trading economic system in inadvertently increasing 
the power of bigger economies over smaller ones. Without a rapid diversification of their 
export destinations to counter reliance on one single bigger market, the smaller states become 
dependent on the bigger state and are thus more susceptible to political influence of the bigger 
state – what Ken Shadlen’s12 refers to as political trade dependence. Without intending it, 
Hirschman unwittingly made empirical demonstration of the bases of asymmetrical 
dependency and thus stoked the flourishing critical dependency theory.  
 
Two decades later, in his “Beyond Asymmetry: Critical Notes of Myself as a Young Man and 
on some other old Friends”, Hirschman discounted the potency of the idea that made him a 
force in international relations theory. As he put it, in emphasizing the structural sources of 
                                                 
 
 
12 In Ken Shadlen. 2008 ‘Globalisation, power and integration: the political economy of regional and bilateral 
trade agreements in the Americas’ 
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political influence of a stronger economy on the smaller one, he had failed to capture the 
conceptual shortcoming of the possibility of countervailing, where power asymmetry 
produces stronger opposite dialectical forces to oppose the asymmetry among the smaller 
economies (Hirschman, 1978: 1).  Thus in this later reflection Hirschman himself starts to chip 
away at the realist putative notion of the centrality to market power in determining negotiated 
outcomes. 
 
Notwithstanding this weakness, Hirschman’s contribution on the role of structure and 
economic asymmetries has compelling insights for any assessment of negotiation outcomes 
between North and South countries. EU and the ACP economic relations today, just like those 
between Germany and Eastern European nations before the Second World War, are steeped in 
market asymmetry. Hirschman’s contribution in today’s analysis of economic negotiations 
between North South economies lies in his pointing out what may be referred to as 
inadvertent outcomes of power asymmetries.  These are outcomes not intentionally pursued 
by a bigger (more powerful economy) but arrived at inadvertently and which are reflective of 
power configurations even though the bigger state does not consciously, deliberately seek to 
expand or assert its power over another state. The import of Hirschmanesque interpretations 
on the role of structure for EU-ACP negotiation outcomes is to draw a difference between the 
coercive use of power by a big economy and inadvertently achieved outcomes (mostly) 
favorable to all parties but which advance the influence of the bigger state. Although 
negotiation outcomes could disproportionately expand the influence of the bigger state, such 
disproportion of outcomes does not necessarily reflect the bigger state’s use of its power in the 
negotiation to wring out these disproportional benefits from the smaller state. Such 
disproportion of outcomes is more a function of the dependency engendered by the structure 
but not reflective of a coercive use of power. In addition, such disproportion in outcomes does 
not necessarily reflect the negotiation dexterity of the bigger economy. In this sense, although 
using structural explanations, rather than endorsing a realist perspective, Hirschmanesque 
interpretations boost liberal interpretation because they explain the (trade dependency) 
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foundations of the smaller country’s preferences. Rather than assuming an intractable 
structure, they emphasize on the foundations of the preferences of a negotiating party. 
Hirschmanesque interpretations thus inform a more nuanced and refined liberal conception of 
power and what liberalists refer to as asymmetrical interdependence. As Hegemonic Stability 
Theory13 intimates, in a global system with a preeminent hegemonic state, smaller states could 
prefer to ‘free ride’ on the leadership of the dominant state and thus leap from the stability 
engendered by the hegemony. Such free riding could for instance involve the smaller state 
agreeing to the hegemony’s wishes in order to gain market access of the bigger economy. Such 
free riding (essentially agreement with or support for the hegemony’s agenda) is again not a 
coerced capitulation by the smaller state, but a considered preference of the smaller state based 
on their considered benefits of such affiliation with the hegemony or on normative agreement 
with the hegemon’s objectives. 
 
As Snidal goes on to credibly suggest, such strategic agreement by the smaller state to a 
hegemony’s objectives in installing a given structure, could even benefit the smaller state more 
since the smaller state ‘bears none of the costs of provision yet shares fully in the benefits. In 
Olsen’s terms the “small exploit the large” and the traditional view of hegemony in the 
international system is turned on its head’ (Snidal, 1985: 581).  Thus one of weakness of realism 
in its emphasis on capabilities is therefore how it misconstrues such (enthusiastic!) free riding 
as capitulation to the bigger power’s objectives rather than as a considered preference of the 
smaller state. By privileging means to ends, structural theories lack an explanation of 
preferences and assume that all that states want is power maximization or balancing. Such 
                                                 
 
 
13 For an extensive discussion of Hegemonic Stability Theory see, Duncan Snidal’s “The Limits of Hegemonic 
Stability Theory”. International Organization, 39,4 Autumn, 1985 
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disregard for a rigorous attribution of states’ preference is reflected by Hubert Zimmermann 
who, in trying to characterize the EU as realist negotiator contends that, ‘realists therefore 
deduce the preferences of international actors from the constrains of the international system, 
which is an anarchic environment.’ (Zimmermann, 2007: 815). Of course, apart from an 
anarchic system, states have other factors determining their agreement or disagreement in 
international interactions such as ideology and beliefs and the tradeoffs for disagreement. As 
Powell has put it, ‘structural theories take the units preferences over possible outcomes as 
given and, consequently lack a theory of preferences over outcomes’ (Powell, 1994:318). It is 
only by rigorously outlining the (divergent) objectives of rival negotiating actors prior to a 
negotiation, that we can show how power has been used to change the objectives of one party 
by another.   
 
The import of outlining and linking Hirschmanesque structural interpretations and the 
Hegemonic Stability Theory - as espoused by Krasner, Kindleberger, Gilpin and Keohane in 
one form or another- is twofold. One, it highlights the theoretical fuzziness in classification of 
structural interpretations as essentially realist14. Although structural interpretations have a 
realist foundation in attributing states’ motives and actions to a state of international anarchy, 
by examining the preferences of states, one could arrive at a liberal interpretation which places 
                                                 
 
 
14 Keohane and Kindleberger are often classified as liberalists who attribute a collective goods interpretation in 
explaining the sources of stability in the presence of hegemony. Hubert Zimmermann regards Gilpin and Krasner 
as realists with Hirschman as their ‘godfather’. This classification is most explicitly used in Zimmermann’s 
‘Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China and Russia’s WTO Accession’ (2007, p. 815). 
Gerald Schneider on the other hand (Schneider, 2005: 667) seems to regard Hirschman as ‘development theorist’ 
who is not a realist. Buzan himself is now closely associated with fuelling enhancements of constructivism.  
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greater emphasis in explaining states’ preferences and not taking preferences as automatically 
shaped by the structure. This fluidity has been recognized even by avowed structural realist 
Barry Buzan who has observed that theoretical fluidity between realism and liberal theory is 
already visible in the works of Keohane and Gilpin as well as in the work of Hedley Bull (1977) 
whose categorization swings between institutionalism (Liberal Theory) and realism.  This 
fuzziness is further amplified by structural realists (especially by Buzan, Jones, Little) who 
criticize Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism for ignoring the state (unit) level analysis and portraying 
the state as though it were an ‘undifferentiated mass’ (Buzan et al., 1993: 49).  Structural 
realists argue that by referring to an anarchic international system, neorealism is usually 
referring to two things: the attributes of the units (states) and the Interactions between them. And 
in explaining the meaning of ‘attributes of the units’, Buzan observes that, ‘attempts to explain 
behavior in terms of the preference functions of units- whether they seek power, security, 
welfare or cultural values as their primary objective’ (Buzan, et al, 1993: 48) would fall within 
structural realism interpretation. This is theoretically fuzzy because liberal theorists such as 
Powell (quoted above) and Moravcsik have criticized realists in general for discounting the 
primacy of preferences and privileging means as the primary driver of states’ interests. That 
Buzan does seem to recognize the importance of role of state preferences moderates 
Moravcsik’s and other liberal theorists attack on neorealism. However, by recognizing the 
many differentiated sub-state groups and interests, what Moravcsik refers to as ‘coalitions of 
social actors’ within a state, then structural realists in the Buzanian scheme do close ranks with 
the liberal  theorists in the Moravcskian scheme by discounting the monolithic nature of a 
state. Still the cleavage remains, because while structural realism would explain states’ 
preferences as driven or primarily shaped by the structure, liberal theory sees states 
preferences as determined and driven by the interests of the strongest domestic constituency.  
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Second, both liberalism’s asymmetrical interdependence and Hegemonic Stability Theory15 
suggest that when asymmetrical economies are pitted in a negotiation, the negotiation 
outcomes are not inevitably more favorable to the larger economy, and even if they were, the 
relatively bigger gain is not necessary reflective of the larger economy’s interest or coercion to 
maximize its relative gains.  Although the outcomes in such a negotiation would inevitably be 
influenced by the positional relations of the units (states), the outcomes themselves do not 
necessarily reflect the structure relations. Although the influence of structure is undeniable, a 
more persuasive and thorough analysis would need to explain the unit preferences.  In 
essence, structure is not destiny and as Keohane observes while structural realism may be a 
good starting point for explaining the outcomes of bargaining situations because of its, ‘logical 
coherence and parsimonious theoretical framework, its tendency to deduce the interests of 
states from the system structure renders it weak and unsuccessful’ ( Keohane, 1986: 189-190). 
Theoretical openness, such as Keohane’s, I contend should inform the explication of EU-ACP 
FTA outcomes.  
 
To cap the review of the realist perspective in negotiation, one might ask the question: Is the 
EU (or the ACP states for that matter) realist negotiators who are operationally distributive in 
their external negotiation strategies? The almost uncontested power of the European 
Commission in external trade negotiations has been described as one of the most permeated 
                                                 
 
 
15 HST suggests that cooperation and order in the world system depends on a hub-and –spokes structure where 
the hub is a hegemonic state which provides certain public goods while shaping the rest of the spokes in norms 
and materially. Cooperation depends on existence of a dominant hegemon which essentially a realist argument. 
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and “federalized”16 and thus one open to systematic study.  This has led to attempts to give 
broad characterizations of how the EU Commission negotiates; the possibility that the 
commission has a definite and distinct negotiating mode possibly guided by a consistent 
pattern of cooperation or competition with its negotiating partners.  In trying to explain how 
the EU negotiates, some proponents of realism have tried to cast the EU as a realist power, 
primarily concerned with propagation of its relative gains in economic negotiations. Casting 
the EU as essentially realist in its economic negotiations, (using a multilateral case) Hubert 
Zimmermann for instance argues that the EU is, ‘motivated by geo-economic and mercantilist 
consideration, specifically the interest to maximize EU wealth relative to other powers’ 
(Zimmermann, 2007: 813). He uses the multilateral cases of China and Russia’s accession to the 
WTO to suggest that the EU’s positions and preferences on China and Russia’s accession were 
predicated on mercantilist concerns. Although trying to be more nuanced in discounting views 
of the EU as a ‘reactive, conservative…inflexible negotiator’ (Elgstrom and Stromvik, 2005: 
117-127)  also fall into this capabilities approach where they see the EU’s negotiation success as 
a function of its objectives17  depending on if the EU is acting ‘ as reformist or a status quo actor’. 
They also see the EU negotiation success as depending on its relative capabilities vis a vis 
those of its negotiating partner (a symmetric or asymmetric negotiation). This view is 
supported by Christopher Stevens who claims that EU obtained the EPA agreements from the 
ACP states by, ‘one or other form of imposition’ (Stevens, 2008: 217).  However, contrary to the 
views of Stevens and Elgstrom, John Ravenhill has shown that sometimes, the greater the 
perceived relative power of the EU with regard to the ACP group, the more the ACP group 
has been successful in extracting more from the EU. In other words, the negotiating success of 
                                                 
 
 
16  By Alberta M. Sbragia for instance in ‘Institution-Building from Below and Above: The European Community 
in Global Environmental Politics’ ( 1198:284) 
17 Although they use the term context. 
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the ACP has at times been positively linked to EU’s strength.  As Ravenhill observes, ‘ in the 
context of the Lome agreement the weaker the ACP group, the more successful it may be in 
extracting further concessions from the Europeans’ (Ravenhill, 1993: 45).  This is in line with 
Hegemonic Stability theory’s idea on the dominant hegemon predisposition to virtue as in 
when the EU has been more malleable to the ACP’s solicitations, when it has felt itself more 
powerful. The astounding 1975 success of the ACP group in extracting a legally binding, 
institutionalized Lome I agreement founded on ‘equal partnership’ with preferential trade and 
commodities support mechanisms from the EU is often mentioned as one such example of 
ACP triumph in its negotiations based on EU’s putative feeling of strength.  Such assertions, if 
evidenced would go to annul any fixed views of EU’s negotiating mode as being fixed or 
necessarily competitive, extractive or averse to cooperation.  
 
Zimmermann’s contention nevertheless, does persuasively suggest that the EU is usually 
concerned by positional competition and balancing (particularly with the US) and is often 
trying to outcompete the US in multilateral gains. However, it is would be a stretch to cast the 
EU as undeviatingly realist (chiefly concerned about greater relative gains) in all its economic 
negotiation, especially in negotiations with weaker economies such as the ACP.  Based on this 
indeterminate mode of the EU’s character in negotiation, it would be heedless to simply 
assume that in negotiating with weaker economies, the EU would be either necessarily be a 
power wielding distributive negotiator or a cooperative, integrative negotiator. The outcomes 
of each negotiation should be explained on the merits of that specific case.  Due to the dearth 
of research on ACP regions’ negotiation history it would be difficult to characterize the 
negotiating style of ACP states. At this point one cannot even assume that ACP regions or 
states have a common negotiating disposition towards the EU. Notwithstanding this dearth of 
ACP wide research, John Ravenhill has observed and described ACP’s successful negotiating 
associative strategy as that he labeled as ‘collective clientelism’ (Ravenhill, 1985). Elgstrom 
calls ACP states  ‘demandeurs or supplicants’ (Elgstrom, 2005:185) and reckons the ACP group 
as poor negotiators with few if any negotiation resources for exchange with the EU. This is of 
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course a gross misunderstanding by Elgstrom and it is taken up in subsequent sections of the 
dissertation. 
 
The implications for realists assumptions on negotiated outcomes of bargaining process as 
those between the EU and ACP would thus be as follows: States in a negotiation will get as 
much as their power allows them to. Or that the outcomes will necessarily be a reflection of the 
balance of power between the two parties. If the negotiating preferences between two states 
are conflicting, the share of the pie (outcomes) that each member of the dyad ends up with will 
be a function of the balance of the power between the two. If this proposition were accurate in 
the case of the EPA negotiations, we would then expect ACP EPA outcomes to vary in relation 
to the different power capabilities (GDP, GDP per capita, market dependence, negotiating 
dexterity, etc) of different ACP states.  This is not empirically reflected in current EPA 
outcomes as chapter four of this dissertation shows. Similarly, if as a whole the EU has been 
unable to drive a breakthrough to EPA ratification in a relatively shorter period, then does this 
reflect a hitherto unaccounted for rise in power resources for the ACP states?  
 
Due to the weaknesses outlined above of realism’s explication of negotiation outcomes 
through an unrestrained emphasis on the inevitability of outcomes that reflect asymmetries in 
capabilities, it is my contention that liberal theory is more empirically illuminative and 
analytically vigorous in explaining the outcomes of economic negotiations such as those 
between the EU and ACP states. The intention here is not to dispute the usefulness of realist 
interpretations, but to discount the cogency of realism in EPA negotiation analysis. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, the fundamental divide between realism and 
liberalism regards the emphasis placed on explaining the outcomes as either as an outcome of 
the ‘configuration of capabilities’ or a ‘configuration of preferences’ respectively.  Liberal 
theory is suitably open to a more expansive field of factors (beyond capabilities and anarchy) 
in explaining negotiation outcomes. 
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2.1.2 Liberal Theory’s Complex Interdependence in Negotiated Outcomes 
Liberal theory has been one of the two major contending approaches in International relations 
and compared to realism has often been (misunderstood) as less cogent in furnishing 
compelling assumptions on what engenders conflict or cooperation when states interact. 
Because of its discounting of the realist assertion of states’ proclivity for conflict, liberal theory 
has had to counter perceptions of its being analytically hollow and naively idealistic. One of 
the most robust elucidations and defense of the liberal theory in recent times is given by 
Andrew Moravcsik’s 1997 paper ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics’. This work is particularly relevant because not only does Moravcsik seek to outline the 
core tenets of liberal theory as a systemic theory but also because he pertinently delves into the 
intersection of liberal theory and negotiation. In it, Moravcsik sets out what he regards as the 
three core assumptions of Liberal theory, assumptions which I think more cogently inform any 
analysis of negotiation outcomes. These are: One, that societal interest is varied and not 
automatically unified into a coherent single ‘state preference’. In effect state’s interest should 
not be assumed to be necessarily unified and static over time. Two, that what emerges as state 
preferences in an international interaction are only representative of certain segments of that 
society based on a process of intra-state aggregation and three, that the propensity for 
cooperation or conflict is based not simply on each actor’s preferences [though it is] but on the 
policy interdependence between two (or more) actors’ preferences. Liberal theory therefore 
expands on the explanatory variables for negotiation outcomes by explicating on the concept 
of power, the nature of actors and the role of the international interaction in exposing the 
policy interdependence. 
 
As is often misleadingly conceived (thanks mainly to Carr’s 1939 the Twenty year Crisis, 1919-
1939,) where he cast power as an essentially realist variable, power as a compelling force in 
international relations is not a variable exclusive to realism. Moravcsik has thus gone on to set 
out a persuasive case why a conception of power within Liberal Theory is more fitting to 
negotiation analysis. As he argues,  
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‘The liberal conception of power is based on an assumption more consistent with basic theories 
of bargaining and negotiation than those underlying realism: namely that the willingness of 
states to expend resources or make concessions is itself primarily a function of preferences, not 
capabilities. In this view-the foundation of Nash bargaining analysis, which has been extended 
to IR by Albert Hirshman, Keohane, Joseph Nye, and others-bargaining outcomes reflect the 
nature and relative intensity of actor preference. The "win-set," the "best alternative to 
negotiated agreement," the pattern of "asymmetrical interdependence," the relative opportunity 
cost of forgoing an agreement-all these core terms in negotiation analysis refer to different 
aspects of the relationship of bargaining outcomes on the preference functions of the actors. The 
capability-based power to threaten central to realism enters the equation in specific 
circumstances and only through linkage to threats and side-payments.’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 523) 
 
The import of Moravcsik’s extension on the definition of power is to qualify how mere 
absolute economic or even market power does not wholly define negotiation outcomes. The 
relative economic power of a negotiator is affected by other factors, such as the alternatives to 
the negotiations as well as the negotiation competence of the other party. In trade negotiations, 
Diana Tussie and Marcelo Saguier see power as being encapsulated within four factors; the 
relative size of market, the type of negotiating coalitions created, the role of domestic actors in 
supporting a government’s position and what they call the particularities of domestic 
institutions (Tussie and Saguier, 2011: 14).  ‘Power can also be conceived in terms of control 
over outcomes’ (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 11-12).  This entails the definition of asymmetrical 
interdependence and the extent to which a negotiator is either merely sensitive or vulnerable to 
policy changes induced by actions of the other negotiator. A key enhancement on the 
conception of power within liberal theory therefore is that power is not understood as merely 
the objective absolute or relative power of the negotiators, but the salience which they attach to 
an issue in a negotiation. As broached in the introduction chapter, asymmetric 
interdependence provides an insightful way to look at the EU-ACP FTAs since in spite of the 
EU’s greater economic power, the EU might have been more sensitive to conclusion of an FTA 
since many ACP LDCs did not really need a reciprocal agreement due to the already existing 
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legally binding Cotonou preferential agreement as well as the EU’s GSP Everything But Arms 
(EBA). 
In addition since it was the EU’s idea at first to institute trade reciprocity, it might have had 
more pressure to conclude the deal than the ACP states whose commitment to an EPA 
conclusion was lackluster.   Article 37 (6) of the Cotonou Agreement already legally bound the 
EU to provide ‘ a framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation…and in 
conformity with WTO rules’ to any ACP state that did not enter into an EPA. ACP states that 
did not sign an FTA with the EU therefore had - at least legally - an alternative fall back 
alternative to a negotiated agreement that was to be no worse than the existing preferential 
exporting terms prior to the EPA initiative. It is thus plausible that the EU had greater need for 
an EPA agreement than some ACP states, especially due the exigency to preempt the stringent 
obligations set out by article 37(6) of the Cotonou Agreement. The salience on urgency and 
alternatives to a negotiated agreement for the EU might thus have been theoretically worse 
than those of the ACP states. 
 
The section below elaborates on why the broad foundation of explanation of negotiation 
outcomes as done in this work would more proximally fall with Liberal theory as outlined by 
Moravcsik. First, unlike in realism, LT18 does not assume a static, monolithic state. LT 
recognizes the existence of diverse domestic constituencies, lays more emphasis on the 
possible divergent preferences of such groups and pays attention to the intra-state aggregation 
in creating a ‘unified’ state preference. These assumptions correct for and moderate the 
classical realist view of a monolithic state with almost permanent fixed objectives and 
                                                 
 
 
18 Liberal Theory. This format will be used from time to time. 
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interests. These assumptions have led to the Putnamian view of any international negotiation 
as really being a two-level-operation which involves agreements not only at the international 
level (level I) but also at the domestic level (level II). As Moravscik puts it, ‘the state is not an 
actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction 
and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors’ (Moravscik, 1997: 518). This view is more 
consistent with economic negotiations such as EPAs where the multiplicity of domestic 
interests within the EU and within all ACP regions was legion. What eventually emerges as 
regional or national position is only a representation of either an aggregated mix of interests or 
is a representative preference of the most dominant group. Generally, economic interests tend 
to be more varied and more widely distributed within various groups within a state (or 
region) than say security interests where national security policy is almost entirely controlled 
by a few state security agencies. Liberal theory explores this multiplicity of interests and its 
influence on the negotiated outcomes more vigorously. Therefore although this study does not 
examine this multiplicity of domestic interests within each ACP state or region it is very alive 
to such aggregation of interests before the ‘state’ or regional position was arrived at. 
 
Secondly, Liberal theory seems to be more up-to-date in qualifying the meaning of anarchy in 
the international system especially in the dimension of economic interactions. This update 
regards the manner in which scholars within liberal theory understand the logic and limits of 
anarchy in economic conflicts unlike in security studies. Anarchy, in the realist sense seems to 
place states ever on the brink of war or violent conflict in case of a breakdown in a bargaining 
or negotiation situation. For instance, in Joseph Grieco’s effusive defense of realism in ‘Anarchy 
and the limits of Cooperation’ he defines anarchy as state where, 
‘there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of 
violence to destroy or enslave them. As Kenneth Waltz suggests, wars can occur, “because there 
is nothing to prevent them”, and therefore “in international politics, force serves not only as the 
ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one” ((Waltz, 1959:232; Waltz, 1979: 113) Grieco, 
1995: 160) 
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This realist view of the logic of anarchy as placing states ever on the verge of violence 
whenever a negotiated agreement is not reached because of fears of non-compliance or a 
disparity in relative gains is anachronistic for trade and economic negotiations where 
alternatives to a negotiated agreement are hardly violent or militarized. In the last decade, 
failed FTAs include those attempted between the US and Mercusor (the FTAA), the US and 
South Africa, the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, the EU and ASEAN and 
EU and Mercusor. Similarly within the EU-ACP EPA process many ACP countries have failed 
to sign the agreements within the originally envisioned time frame. Today, prolonged US-
China tensions over the perceived undervaluation of the Chinese currency have not led to a 
war. Even, historically, greater powers have not necessary gone go to war over failed economic 
agreements as Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner19 show with regards to the thrice failed 
attempts for a treaty of reciprocity between the USA and the Kingdom of Hawaii between 1848 
and 1875. Liberal theorists (mainly Moravcsik) have thus refined the meaning of anarchy 
today (within economic negotiations as opposed to strictly militaristic understanding) by 
trying to formulate a states’ proclivity for a violent settlement based on its willingness to accept 
the costs and risks of such violent conflict. The threshold for willingness for armed interstate 
conflict due to a failure in an economic negotiation- based on historical evidence of the many 
failed negotiations – is very low. Thus Grieco’s depiction of the state of anarchy as meaning 
that states deem the use of force as ‘first and constant’ is anachronistic. The understanding of 
anarchy as the propensity and readiness of states to use force therefore needs qualifying by 
realism. Or even more fundamentally, a complete re-think of the socio-political immutability 
of the very concept of anarchy as Wendt (1992) has proposed. Liberal theorists have at least 
                                                 
 
 
19 Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner In ‘Strategy, Economic Relations, and the definition of National Interests’ 
Security Studies volume 9. Issue 1-2  1999: 119-156 
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attempted this qualification by applying concepts such as complex interdependence (Keohane 
and Nye) and policy interdependence (Moravcsik) particularly in the dimension of economic 
interactions. 
 
In addition, with regards to anarchy, liberal theory suitably underscores the role of regimes in 
determining states’ behavior. The foundational work on the role of regimes has mostly been 
articulated by Krasner who defined regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are 
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscrip-tions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective choice (Krasner, 1982: 186). While seen not as causal 
but intervening variables, the recognition of the role of regimes fits well with a rigorous 
analysis of any WTO constrained negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement. There is a highly 
functional set of international regimes that constrains and inform the behavior and 
expectations of states in economic negotiation. In Keohane and Nye’s definition, regimes are 
‘accepted procedures, rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity that regulate and control 
interstate relations’ (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 5). In the case of the EU-ACP EPA negotiations, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a formidable organizing regime, whose demands to 
put up with its rules, precipitated the EU-ACP EPA negotiations in the first place. Regimes, by 
guaranteeing stability of the system to a certain degree moderate the desire of states to have to 
‘self-help’ and be irascibly competitive in the Waltzian or Grieconian sense. Part of the realist 
weakness has been the extent to which regimes are regarded as only nested within the system 
and hardly having autonomy of their own. As shown in empirical studies on the impact of 
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regimes on negotiation processes and outcomes ( Davis, 2006: 219-256; Smith, 2006: 257 -288)20 
regimes, in constraining the behavior of even much more powerful states through legal 
framing, have an independent and positive influence in moderating conditions for 
negotiations under asymmetric power. In these studies, developing countries (Peru and 
Ecuador) negotiating within the WTO framework have scored victories over disputes with the 
EU. Vietnam on the hand (a then non-member of the WTO), was unable to unable to score a 
victory against the United States over a dispute in market access for catfish exports from 
Vietnam partly due to the its inability to leverage on the constraining regime of the WTO. As 
this dissertation demonstrates in later sections (section 4.6 mostly), the very principle of EU-
ACP ‘special relations’ or partnership has itself produced a clear set of constraining norms 
(standards of behavior deemed appropriate) which guide and constrain each party’s 
propensity to act competitively in line with its preferred preferences. 
 
Thirdly, in giving a vigorous foundation for state preferences, LT address structural 
approaches’ lack of a theory for preferences as in Zimmermann’s contention that states’ wishes 
are assumed to only and automatically derive from the constrains of the international system, 
an anarchic environment. LT is thus more vigorous and unassuming about the basis of the 
preferences that states have. Similarly the very consideration of the role of the negotiating 
process discounts the realist emphasis on the primacy of the capabilities and structure on 
outcomes. If all that counted in an international interaction was the relative power and objectives 
of states, then negotiations would be almost useless since the outcomes would inevitably 
                                                 
 
 
20 Christina L. Davies. ‘Do WTO Rules create a Level Playing Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and 
Vietnam’ and James McCall Smith. ‘ Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Dispute’ in 
Negotiating Trade.  Odell, J. (Ed) 2006:  
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reflect the capitulation of the weaker state to the objectives of the more powerful party. 
However, as John Odell has put it, negotiation analysis begins with the simple assumption 
that, ‘variations in the [negotiating] process make a significant difference to outcomes’ (Odell, 
2000:2). By striving to propose and uncover other factors (beyond capabilities and 
asymmetries) by looking at aspects of the negotiating process such as negotiation strategies, 
Liberal theory is more suitably rigorous, in not only deriving the preferences of states, but also 
in showing how negotiating processes impact the achievement of those preferences. Among 
others, Odell (2010) and Panke (2012) have shown five mechanisms21 of how small states use 
the negotiation process to improve their success and moderate the extractive power of bigger 
states. Odell’s additional contribution in defining negotiation success is to highlight that 
success does not necessarily entail an absolute win over a rival, but also includes how well a 
state minimizes its losses. This entails what Sharp, et al (2000) and Few, (2002) have described 
as resistance as a concept of negotiating power.  Success is not strictly defined by the share of 
the pie one gets but more primarily by the gap between pre-negotiation aspirations and the 
negotiated outcomes. Thus in examining a states negotiating success Odell defines gains and 
losses ‘in terms of a governments own objectives and relative to what would have happened if 
it had accepted the others decision’ (Odell, 2010: 545). Part of the importance of analyzing the 
negotiating process is that it is during the negotiating process that states are exposed to the 
constraints imposed by the policy interdependence (Moravcsik’s term) faced by both parties. 
Liberal Theory thus enriches negotiation analysis by examining the role of the negotiation 
process itself and the role of a shared regime in informing preferences and constraining 
behavior of states in reaching outcomes. This notion of constraints to preferences and 
                                                 
 
 
21 See Odell, 2010: 553-555 
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outcomes of a negotiation has actually been further broached by the theory of normative 
institutionalism and is taken up in the penultimate section of the dissertation. 
 
A liberal theory interpretation of negotiating outcomes would therefore attribute negotiation 
outcomes to the following: One, asymmetric interdependence – the importance a negotiator 
attaches to an issue. It is noteworthy here to point out that in the case of the EPAs, 
asymmetrical interdependence has been almost entirely reduced to ACP material dependence 
(trade and aid) on the EU (Lempereur, 2009; Heron, 2010; Elgstrom, 2005; Bilal and Stevens, 
2009; Stevens, 2007). Unlike a realist understanding of the constraints imposed by trade 
dependency, in liberal theory, a state of the asymmetric interdependence is determined not 
only by overarching dependencies, but also by the constraints imposed by their best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). Two, domestic politics and core domestic 
preferences and the negotiation space or independence the negotiator has with regard to ratification of 
agreements made at the international level. Three, the negotiation dexterity of a negotiator 
including in coalition formation and how well they can defend and claim (be integrative or 
distributive) in achieving not only their preferences, but in pursuing an agreement that is 
closest to Pareto-optimal. These broad theoretical foundations are used in a review of existing 
literature specific to explaining EU-ACP EPAs in the section below. 
2.2 Explaining EPAs 
 There is relative scarcity of research that provides theoretically coherent empirical evidence to 
explain the outcomes achieved in EU-ACP EPAs. This relative scarcity is of course in 
comparison with numerous presuppositions about the main expected explanatory variables 
for the outcomes we have. Section (2.1) above has examined what the broad overarching 
theoretical dispositions in IR (Liberalism and Realism) regard as critical variables in attributing 
causation of outcomes. This section reviews some of the existing attempts to attribute 
causation in EPA outcomes.  This review is divided into two sections. Section one explores 
literature that makes speculative theoretical suppositions on causation of expected outcomes.  
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The second section details the more concrete (but fewer) empirical studies that have tried to 
systematically explain the EPA outcomes. While examining this literature the considered 
weakness and strengths of each is explicated and as corollary the conceived contribution of 
this work outlined. 
 
From the onset it is reasonable to point out that the ‘configuration of  capabilities’ view 
informs most conjectures about what is expected of EU-ACP negotiations. Having spent the 
section above looking at broad characterization of negotiation outcomes within major IR 
approaches above, a natural point of departure in explaining EPAs is Mary Farrell’s ‘A 
Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa’ 
where she contends that that 
‘EU–Africa relations have, from the beginning, been characterised by the realist tendencies of 
individual European states and that, under the current EU policy, similar tendencies are driving 
the proposals of the Cotonou Agreement with the on–going negotiations on economic 
partnership agreements between the European Commission and groups of countries within the 
ACP’ (Farrell, 2005: 265) 
 
Farrell goes on to explain the conjectured realist EU objectives as the attempt by the EU ‘to 
secure for itself continued market access and privileged economic status in the continent’s 
[Africa] emerging markets’ (ibid). 
 
I would contend however that Farrell’s contentions are erroneous on two accounts. First, a 
theoretical depiction of a state’s self-interested behavior as essentially ‘realist’ is theoretically 
misleading. The contention between realism and liberal theory is not if states act out of self-
interest, but the extent to which cooperation or conflict happens within the constraints 
imposed by different states’ self-interests. The very notion of an international bargain denotes 
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that the parties involved have differing interests in the first place, but also possibilities for 
cooperation. Beyond classical realism, the contention between realism and liberal theory is not 
essentially what motives shape states behavior but what conditions inhibit or catalyze 
cooperation. Second, Farrell’s suggestion is factually debatable. Contrary to her insinuation, 
what really precipitated the initiative to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements between the EU 
and the ACP was not the EU’s intentions to hog Africa’s market, but the need to make EU-
ACP trade treaties WTO legal and permissible. As outlined in section 1.2 (above) the move 
from preferential trade to reciprocity was driven by the twin factors of the EU trying to 
respond to the differential terms for LDCs brought out in the ‘banana wars’ and the sweeping 
economic liberalization norm of the early 1990s.  As Christopher Stevens has put it, reciprocity 
was precipitated by, ‘trade provisions of Cotonou’s predecessor (the Lome Convention) that 
were subject to adverse rulings during the 1990s, first in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and then in the World trade Organization (WTO)’…since ‘the EU was 
discriminating in favor of some developing countries and against others in ways that cannot 
be justified under WTO rules’ (Stevens, 2008: 212). The EU was thus not principally motivated 
by the need to access ACP markets, although a reciprocal treaty would certainly enhance its 
possibility to expand its markets there. As of 2012, the EU share of exports to the ACP as a 
percentage of its total exports was only 5.1% and 5.5% for its imports from ACP states thus 
representing a rather small fraction of EU trade22. This is further reflected in the EU’s 1996 
Green Paper on Relations Between the European Union and ACP Countries which although 
admitting to the failure of development within Lome, and stating the EU’s wish to legally 
embed its treaties with the ACP within WTO, did not out rightly call for reciprocity. 
                                                 
 
 
22 See ACP- EU Bilateral Trade with the World  (2013) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113340.pdf 
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In his work explaining the success of EU negotiators in international economic negotiations, 
Lempereur (2009) introduces the role liberal institutionalist view of relationships as being 
consequential to outcomes of a negotiation. As he puts it, ‘the negotiation is more likely to 
succeed when both parties are interested in a consistent common denominator. It is easier to 
negotiate with countries that are already bound by a privileged trade or economic agreement with the 
Union, or with States that are about to join the Union... The upholding of a relationship of 
partnership becomes more important than the result of a negotiation (Lempereur, 2009: 560). 
Lempereur here makes an interesting observation which may be contrary to the findings of 
this research and contrary to Ravenhill’s observations on clientelism. What is the influence of 
an associative relationship? Does an existing associative relationship expedite or complicate a 
negotiation round?  ACP states have of course been in a privileged trading agreement with the 
EU since the Treaty of Rome and more so after Lome 1.As explicated at length in section 4.6 
existing relationships may in fact work in the opposite direction as the one Lempereur 
suggests. Thus while agreeing with Lempereur on the theoretical role of relationships, 
especially associative relations, the empirical findings from this work point to opposite 
conclusions on their influence on efficiency of a negotiations round. 
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In his paper ‘The Cotonou Agreement: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact of Norms’ 
Ole Elgstrom introduces what he regards as a constructivist23 element of the role of norms in 
influencing negotiation outcomes. As he plausibly argues, the Lome Convention EU (EC) 
preferences were driven by a EU desire to promote what he calls a European partner identity. 
This comprised the belief in, ‘special ties between the EC and Africa, in a special responsibility 
for the EC in economic complementarity and possibility of mutual benefits, and in 
interdependence between rich and poor’ (Elgstrom, 2005:188). The role of transnational norms, 
ideologies and beliefs as factors in negotiations and state preferences is one that has become 
increasingly recognized especially in explaining intra-EU governance and one that is 
explicated at length in chapter 5 of the dissertation. Thus Elgstrom’s is a compelling insight. As 
the 1990s ebbed and the EU was caught in a global shift towards free trade and ‘good 
governance’, its norms towards the ACP changed. As WTO membership has produced 
expectations of fair treatment of all Least Developed Countries, the EU was pushed to embed 
its treaties within the WTO and thus eliminate preferential and differential treatment of some 
                                                 
 
 
23 The word constructivist is here introduced and is used very cautiously and deliberately. I use it deliberately 
because Elgstrom himself refers to his notions of norms in informing preferences as being consistent with 
‘constructivist ideas’. However, contrary to Elgrstom (2005) or Björkdahl (2002), my view of norms in this 
dissertation is one where norms are not regarded as an exclusive province of constructivists. Rather my use of 
norms as a variable is based on a more liberal institutionalism understanding of norms in the fashion of Krasner, 
(1981), Mitchell and Keilbach, (2001), Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2010), Thomas, (2008), Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet (1998), Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein (2001), Slapin, (2010) and Donnelley (2010). The central 
controversy between constructivists and rational choice theories is no longer if norms matter. This is agreeable. 
The more difficult question for constructivists has been to provide compelling, measurable and identifiable 
markers of innate belief. However, from an institutionalism interpretation, norms are powerful not because they 
are innately powerful as ideas, but because actors consider them useful for the sustained viability of political 
institutions. In other words norms are a function of identification (in Kelman’s 1958 terms) in as far as they induce 
behavior which is consistent with a satisfying expectation of a relationship. Thus accordingly these institutionalist 
interpretations are very much rooted in principles emanating from membership of a certain political group and 
how these principles in turn influence decisions and outcomes within the group. 
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LDCs. The Cotonou agreement outcomes are therefore seen by Elgstrom as primarily shaped 
by two factors namely; the immense asymmetries between the two parties and the rigidity of 
the EU to make concessions once an internal EU common position has been reached. Elgstrom 
conjectures that due to the huge economic power disparities between the EU and ACP states, 
the latter would be reduced to ‘demandeurs or supplicants’ who would only be seeking favors 
from the EU during EPA negotiations.  In recalling the liberal notion of the a negotiating 
party’s ability to give concessions, Elgstrom sees the EU as a ‘difficult negotiating partner’ due 
to the rigidity faced by the European Commission in adjusting a common position reached by 
all EU members. Based on these two factors Elgstrom thus opines that, ‘the prediction must be 
that the expected outcome in any EU negotiation with any weaker countries will be closely 
linked to the initial position of the European Union’ (Elgstrom, 2005: 187). As indicated below, 
this view is shared by Christopher Stevens and Sanoussi Bilal. 
 
Elgstrom’ analysis is indisputably refreshing. It borrows from and cuts across the theoretical 
spectrum in attempting causation, a la Keohane. He attributes outcomes to asymmetrical 
interdependence (liberal theory), objective material resources (a realist bent) and of course the 
role of norms and ideologies. In addition he makes theoretically sound (though untested and 
incomplete) assumptions. Part of Elgstrom’s weakness is in explaining why and how the ACP 
states gained ‘concessions in many areas’ as he readily admits the EU conceded. Although he 
attributes these concessions to the ACP’s states evocation of the ‘partnership ideology and 
moral consciousness of the rich countries’ this explanation is unpersuasive because it doesn’t 
explain why we have variances in ACP regions outcomes. Would his argument then imply 
that the EU applied it’s so called moral consciousness differentially among different ACP 
regions? In other words, Elgstrom’s notion of norms fails to recognize the particular political 
environment - membership of a distinct group - which produces norms as legitimate 
principles. 
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Secondly, although Elgstrom theoretically casts the EU as the head-above-shoulders winner in 
the EPAs negotiation, the extent of EU’s win can only best be gauged based on a clearer 
knowledge of ACP losses. If one uses Gerald Schneider’s definition of negotiating success as ‘ 
how small own concessions are in comparison to the concessions of other actors’ (Schneider, 
2005: 667), then a credible means of evaluating the EU and ACP success or losses would 
involve assessing the concessions made by both parties. Elgstrom does not venture into 
assessing the ACP preferences and their concessions. Neither does he explain ACP’s unique 
resistance power against the EU. It is possible that Elgstrom does not seek to expressly explain 
the EPAs. Although his hypotheses are reasonable, they remain hypothetical and incongruous 
with the patterns of outcomes that have emerged from the EPA negotiations.  Empirical 
streamlining of these assertions is dealt with in this research in the empirical chapter. 
 
Another factor informing a theoretical supposition of EPA outcomes relates to the importance 
which the ACP states themselves attributed to their collective negotiation in enhancing their 
strength against the EU. That is the role of coalitions. According to these states, collective 
bargaining, as opposed to individual bargaining was supposedly taken as likely to improve 
their outcomes. Similarly, in its support of regional frameworks for negotiation, the EU was 
also obviously supportive of this notion although perhaps the EU embraced the regional 
coalitions more as a way of reducing the complexity of the negotiation. As the ACP’s 2002 
negotiating mandate observed, 
‘…the ACP should be guided by the overriding principle of unity and solidarity in their 
approach to the EPA negotiations. On issues of common interest to all ACP States, it will be 
easier for the ACP to secure a better deal from the EU if they negotiate collectively than if they 
negotiate at an individual, regional or sub-regional level…the unity of the ACP Group is its 
force and its solidarity constitutes its negotiating strength’ (ACP/61/056/02, 2002:5). 
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The ACP group hence made put into consideration its numerical size as likely to improve the 
outcomes. Theoretically, this could have been based on a belief that together, the ACP was 
likely to increase not only its putative economic power but also perhaps enhance its 
negotiation dexterity. 
 
However, as has been argued and shown (Tussie and Saguier, 2011; Narlikar, 2006; Odell, 
2006; Odell, 2000) although coalitions can be helpful, they are not necessarily helpful and as 
chapter four shows, there is little evidence that the distribution outcomes of ACP states varied 
much based on the strength of coalitions. Even ACP states such as Ghana or Cameroon which 
negotiated more or less individually (outside of the regional cluster) ended up with outcomes 
similar to those states that had more cohesive regional negotiations such as the EAC or the 
BLSM (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique) group. The utility of a coalition is 
determined not only by what Odell refers to as the tactical sequence of coalition formation - 
everybody first, bilateral first or most influential first- but also by its ability to prevent 
fragmentation. As the ACP states realized during the EPA process their institutional and 
policy coherence was not solid enough to prevent disintegration. This had already been 
predicted by John Ravenhill who in 2004 observed that, ‘ the differences in economic 
structures among countries of various regional groupings in Africa makes it highly unlikely 
that they will be able to reach agreement on a common approach for negotiations with the EU’ 
(Ravenhill, 2004: 135-136). Eventually, national interests triumphed over regional interests and 
one of the interesting puzzles to pursue empirically is to investigate if bigger and more 
cohesive coalitions (such as the EAC or Cariforum) did indeed achieve more bargaining 
success than individual countries or smaller coalitions. Of course, as indicated by several 
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scholars ( Elgstrom et al. 2001; Elgstrom, 2005), coalition formation within the EU24 is a 
reasonable source of its negotiators strength due to the rigidity inherent in any commonly 
agreed coalition (regional) position. While coalitions make it more difficult to arrive at a 
common external position within a group, once that position is reached, it becomes better 
locked and gives negotiators a bulwark against conceding. Inflexibility however could be a 
negotiating strength or weakness. 
 
Moving on to the more empirical work explaining EPAs, Tony Heron and Norman Girvan are 
two scholars who have attempted some systematic explanation of EPA outcomes. Both of them 
focus on CARIFORUM region. Grivan’s analysis mainly attributes the outcomes to the 
negotiation capabilities and asymmetrical interdependence as relates to the CARIFORUM’s 
states greater vulnerability if the EPAs were not signed before 200825. Girvan shows the EU’s 
negotiation strategies (value claiming- threats and framing tactics) and how they contribute to 
EU’s putative good performance. The EU framed the issue of WTO compatibility as 
incorporating the EU’s Global Europe agenda into the and thus for instance pushed the 
Cariforum region to accept a comprehensive economic agreement that went beyond WTO 
requirements to include the so called ‘Singapore’ issues. In Girvan’s terms, the instrument of 
force by the EU on ACP states was, ‘the threat of withdrawal of duty free market access for 
ACP exports to Europe’ (Girvan, 2009: 99). Most Cariforum states being non-LDCS, 
capitulated. This framing is similarly supported by (Hurt, 2003). Girvan’s explanation is 
plausible. However,  if we accept that the Cariforum capitulated to a comprehensive EPA 
                                                 
 
 
24 Although EU commission is considered a single negotiator it comprises many national interests. 
25 In which case the mostly non-LDC Cariforum states would have resorted to exporting to the EU under the less 
advantageous GSP tariffs. 
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because of the pressure of possible market loss, one wonders how the African non-LDCs states 
such as Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Botswana and others have resisted the same pressure. Or 
does he suggest that the Cariforum states had more pressing market dependencies than the 
African and pacific states? Granted, the Caribbean may have had different sectoral priorities 
(services) from its African counterparts. But the pressure faced by all non LDCs was real and 
as chapter 4 shows, it is in fact the African states which were more vulnerable in trade and 
potential tariff re-imposition under the GSP. 
 
Accordingly, Tony Heron (2010) similarly disputes Girvan’s argument about the role of EU 
force or threats in changing the Cariforum’s choices. As he points out, the decision by 
CARIFORUM to sign a WTO-plus agreement was determined by the regions own internal 
aggregation of interests. He attributes the overall outcomes to CARIFORUM’s trade 
dependence on the EU as well as an intra- CARIFORUM bargain that favored comprehensive ( 
goods and services) EPA to an interim basic FTA. In Heron’s case the main puzzle is on how to 
explain the CARIFORUM’s unique acceptance to sign a comprehensive FTA unlike other ACP 
regions. Heron’s work in ‘Asymmetric Bargaining and Development Trade-offs in the 
CARIFORUM European Union Economic Partnership Agreement’ is insightful because it is 
one of very few works that have gone on to examine ACP regions preferences. While many 
studies have explored the EU’s preferences, not much has been published regarding the 
African regions or individual state preferences. Lacking such a picture of these regions 
preferences, then it becomes difficult to examine the nature of the concessions made. 
 
As Heron outlines, the Cariforum’s preferences for a comprehensive FTA were driven by three 
factors; an intra-regional aggregation of competing state preferences meant that negotiating for 
a WTO plus agreement was less contentious than a goods only agreement. Two, in signing a 
WTO plus agreement, Cariforum states wanted to give a ‘strong signal’ (Heron, 2010: 26) of 
their commitment to economic reform.  And thirdly, in a clear disregard for the ACP solidarity 
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principle, Cariforum wanted to be the ‘first’ to bandwagon into the EU wishes for a WTO-plus 
agreement in order to possibly lure the EU to concede more in ‘Mode IV26, delayed 
liberalization schedules and product exemptions, and – most importantly – preferential access 
to development finance’ (Heron, 2010: 23). I agree with many of Heron’s observations and 
particularly on Cariforum’s use of the EPAs as a ‘signal’ for its commitment to economic 
reform. This factor was in fact independently confirmed by Cariforum negotiators in my own 
interviews. 
 
However in citing these reasons, Heron treats all these disparate factors as sub-factors of 
asymmetry. As he puts it, these factors are given to show, ‘in what ways power asymmetry 
shaped the political bargain of the Cariforum-EU EPA’ (Heron, 2010: 17). While agreeing with 
the Heron’s proposition on the role of a ‘political bargain’ as an explanation of the WTO-plus 
CARIFORUM agreement, his argument unfittingly gets captured by the axiomatic notion that 
if we have power asymmetry between negotiators then power asymmetry automatically 
becomes the critical factor in explaining outcomes. Political bargain is only an indicator of the 
intersection of EU and Cariforum’s preferences, calculations and asymmetrical 
interdependence. The closest the paper comes to showing EU’s use of power is in justification 
no. 4 where Heron contends that the Cariforum ‘believed’27 that signing a WTO- plus 
agreement ahead of other blocs would favorably predispose them to extracting more 
financially from the EU’s EDF package. Hence in seeking these preferential closer ties, the 
                                                 
 
 
26 Temporary movement of natural persons: when independent service providers or employees of a multinational 
firm temporarily move to another country 
27 See (Heron, 2010: pp 21) 
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Cariforum can be seen as having tried to use the concept of clientlism to ally itself more closely 
with the EU and this way extract more material benefits.  However, this belief did not produce 
much success as there is no evidence that Cariforum extracted more financial benefits than 
other blocs. In any case, while such a belief indisputably demonstrates the role of asymmetric 
expectations, it can only be most appropriately interpreted as Cariforum’s basis for a 
preference (or concession) rather than a coercive move on the EU’s part. This then shows a 
good example how or why the mere existence of power (EU EDF funds) isn’t evidence for use of 
the power, although negotiating parties could make moves based on perceptions of the other’s 
power.  Notwithstanding these faults Heron’s analysis does make a constructive and insightful 
foray into examining the preferences and negotiation calculations of an ACP region. In this 
case, the potential role of belief is actually highlighted although perhaps inadvertently. 
 
Moving outside of the Caribbean and getting into the core cases studies, one of the most 
detailed work done on explaining the EPA process and outcomes in Africa is Bilal Sanoussi 
and Christopher Stevens’ 2009, The Interim Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and 
African states: Contents, Challenges and Prospects. The work offers a comprehensive outline of the 
negotiations outcomes from various African regional groups and individual states, makes 
comparisons of African regions outcomes, gives scattered snippets into the nature of the 
negotiating process – negotiator preferences, feelings and strategies - and most importantly 
gives a provisional assessment of the negotiation outcomes as primarily a function of the 
African regions negotiation capabilities and EU interests. In their view, ‘the picture that 
emerges is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that countries have a deal that reflects their 
negotiating skills and the EU’s interests: that countries able to negotiate hard, knowing their 
interests (which were not incompatible) with those of the European Commission have 
obtained a better deal than those lacking these characteristics’ (Bilal and Stevens, 2009: 4). Bilal 
and Stevens’ work makes the most geographically comprehensive job so far of trying to give 
order to the ‘mess’ (Steven, 2008: 211) that EPAs are deemed to be. This ‘mess’ as Christopher 
Stevens calls it, is not only in discerning the utility of the agreements themselves but in making 
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sense of why different regions or states have the outcomes they have. What explains the 
variances in outcomes? 
 
Insightful about Sanoussi and Stevens’s depiction of the negotiation outcomes is their 
attribution of the importance of negotiation capabilities in causation of the outcomes. Their 
analysis however remains anecdotal and has several fundamental shortcomings which make 
their conclusions about the outcomes spurious. One of the core disagreements with Bilal and 
Steven’s analysis is their lack of a clear definition of what they regard as ‘successful outcomes’. 
Do they refer to the distribution characteristics or to the efficiency? As shown in chapter four 
although this study does recognize substantive differences in efficiency, we do not see 
substantive differences in distribution characteristics of outcomes of different ACP states. The 
distribution characteristics are more or less the same for all African states and slightly different 
for the Cariforum states. Thus in my opinion the more substantive outcomes and variations to 
be explained is on the efficiency. Bilal and Stevens are however not specific on this 
assumption.  While acknowledging the existence of a zone of cooperation between the EU and 
the African regions (the interests of the two were not entirely incompatible, they say) they 
seem to suggest that ‘countries able to negotiate hard’ achieved more successful outcomes. This 
would suggest that distributive28 bargaining was more effective in getting results.  However, 
although there are references made to the EU use of threats (especially by the EU’s trade then 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson), and the feelings that such threats elicited from the ACP 
negotiators, Sanoussi and Stevens do not delve into the negotiation strategies or responses of 
the African regional groups. They also do not show, or discuss why such strategies as the said 
                                                 
 
 
28 See Odell, 2000: 224-226 for a crystallization of the character of distributive negotiating  
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EU threats have different results in different ACP states and regions. Were some states more 
cowed by the threats than others?   Their silence on African regions and states’ negotiation 
moves of course implicitly implies almost totally responding to the EU’s moves. This might 
have been the case, but even if it were, it’s not been really explicated and shown. We are only 
left to imagine that this is how it was. If, as Sanoussi and Stevens contend, some African 
regions got better outcomes than others due to their ‘hard’ negotiating dexterity, then we 
would need to see evidence of this hard negotiating styles employed by the more successful 
group(s). Sanoussi and Stevens make contentions, but present no systematic evidence on the 
causes of variances in outcomes. A more compelling explanation of variances in outcomes 
would have necessitated a presentation of the variances in negotiation capabilities to show 
causation in line with their argument that negotiating prowess made the differences in 
outcomes. 
 
In spite of these faults Sanoussi and Stevens make important contributions. Overall, their work 
provides a detailed, exploratory look at the EPA outcomes and gives a glimpse into the role of 
negotiations in the outcomes. First they deal with the outcomes of the EPAs negotiation at the 
two levels of negotiation- the all ACP level and at the regional level. For the negotiations at the 
all ACP level, (Sanoussi, 2011: 45-88) does show that ACP states were successful in extracting 
useful concessions from the EU. These included the desire by the ACP states to have the EU 
provide special and differential treatment within the ACP group, greater flexibility in 
liberalizing/transitional periods and non-binding EU commitment to provide EPA adjustment 
related development assistance. Sanoussi thus highlights the balanced, give and take 
integrative nature of negotiations at the EU-ACP wide level. 
 
On explaining the intra-ACP variances however, Sanoussi and Steven’s assertions have not 
been substantiated. Although not starting out with an express analytic intention to compare 
and explain the relative success of various groups, they provide indicators (based on the ACP 
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and EU negotiating mandates) of evaluating success of outcomes the nature of concessions. 
These indicators29 include;  liberalization schedules and exclusion percentages (for WTO 
compatibility), effects on regional integration (for regional integration), loss in revenues and 
possible compensations (development) and if the EPA result in better or worse trading terms 
than the existing pre-EPA preferences (for Lome Acquis). 
 
Finally, one of the most compelling attempts at explanation of EPA’s (preliminary) outcomes is 
the one given by Ulrike Lorenz (2012) where she describes the two-tire puzzle of ACP strength 
in defending against the EU as well as variances within the ACP regions distribution 
characteristics of the outcomes. In an attempt at a cogent explanatory variable, Lorenz argues 
that the variances and ACP strength can be explained by the negotiating structures of different 
ACP regions and the role of ACP regions regional hegemons. Her arguments are taken up in 
section 4.6. 
 
Table 4, below, gives a summary of the different hypothesis, theoretical suppositions and 
expectations on the patterns of wins and concessions when the EU is pitted against the ACP 
states as outlined in section 2.2 above. Some of these indicators will be used in evaluating the 
ACP regions states (and regions) preferences before the international negotiation and after the 
negotiations. 
  
                                                 
 
 
29 These indicators were actually outlined by the ACP states themselves as their objectives for the EPAs. 
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Table 4: Suppositions on determinants of Outcomes of ACP-EU economic negotiations 
 
Scholar Argument Theoretical 
leanings  
Explanatory 
variable 
M. Farell, 2005 EU’s realist interests - ‘to secure 
for itself continued market access 
and privileged economic status in 
the continent’s [Africa] emerging 
markets 
Realist Economic power 
Elgstrom, 2005: EU driven by desire to promote a 
partner identy – ‘special ties 
between the EC and Africa, in a 
special responsibility for the EC in 
economic complementarity and 
possibility of mutual benefits, and 
in interdependence between rich 
and poor’ 
 
‘the prediction must be that the 
expected outcome in any EU 
negotiation with any weaker 
countries will be closely linked to 
the initial position of the European 
Union’ (Elgstrom, 2005: 187) 
Constructiv
ist 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
theory  
 
 
 
Economic power 
asymmetries 
 
 
 
 
 
Coalition 
inflexibility 
Lorenz (2012) ‘..the negotiations were rather 
determined by regional dynamics, 
different negotiation structures of 
individual EPA configurations, 
and the role of regional hegemons 
than by the EU’s actions and 
positions.  Lorenz (2012: 4) 
 Negotiation 
structure, 
 
 
Regional hegemons  
ACP and EU 2002 ‘the ACP should be guided by the 
overriding principle of unity and 
solidarity in their approach to the 
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EPA negotiations. On issues of 
common interest to all ACP 
States, it will be easier for the ACP 
to secure a better deal from the 
EU if they negotiate collectively 
than if they negotiate at an 
individual, regional or subregional 
level…’ ACP Negotiating 
Mandate 
 
 
Coalition size 
Ravenhill “Economic weakness constrains 
the range of negotiating tactics 
available to the ACP states” 
 
Liberal 
theory 
Asymmetrical 
Interdependence  
    
Heron, 2010 Political bargain, signaling and 
band-wagonning  
Liberal 
theory 
Domestic politics,  
and economic 
dependency  
Girvan, 2009 Dependency and EU’s threats for 
market withdrawal  
Liberal 
theory 
Negotiation 
dexterity, 
 
Asymmetrical 
interdependence 
Bilal and Stevens, 
2009 
‘the picture that emerges is 
entirely consistent with the 
hypothesis that countries have a 
deal that reflects their negotiating 
skills and the EU’s interests: that 
countries able to negotiate hard, 
knowing their interests (which 
were not incompatible) with those 
of the European Commission have 
obtained a better deal than those 
lacking these characteristics’ (Bilal 
and Stevens, 2009: 4) 
 
 
Liberal 
theory 
 
 
 
 
Negotiation 
competence 
 
 
Asymmetry 
Tussie and Saguier 
(in Bilal, 
Lombaerde and 
Tussie 2011)  
“We argue that that the 
bargaining power of states in trade 
negotiations relies on at least four 
dimensions:” 
Liberal 
theory 
Relative market size 
 
Type of coalition 
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State, labor, civil 
society alliances 
 
Domestic 
institutions 
Alain Lempereur It is easier to negotiate with 
countries that are already bound 
by a privileged trade or economic 
agreement with the Union 
  
Relationship 
 
2.3 Beyond Asymmetrical Interdependence 
From the sketchy work done on explaining African- EU EPAs (both theoretical and empirical) 
a few points can be made which I will go over briefly in this ultimate section on the theoretical 
chapter. These observations on extant hypotheses and suppositions on EPAs are used as 
foundations for my empirical work in chapter four. One, there remains a scarcity of empirical 
research on African states’ and regions’ intra-regional preference formation and negotiation 
dexterity.  While Bilal and Stevens have made some observations about what they call ‘hard 
bargaining’, there are no studies on the typologies of negotiating strategies and successes of 
ACP states in EPA negotiations. 
 
Two, there appears to be a divergence between theoretical clarity and empirical inexactness in 
the variables attributable to causation of outcomes. This understandably complicates attempts 
at some neat generalization of outcome causation. Thirdly, and most importantly for this 
research, since asymmetrical interdependence (trade dependence and tariff vulnerability) 
emerges as one of the most hypothesized putative factor in attributing causation, a question 
arises as to if empirical cases validate these theoretical assertions. As seen above (section 2.1 
and 2.2), one of the most consistently occurring explanatory variable for negotiation outcomes 
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is asymmetrical interdependence.  According to Keohane and Nye’s widely abiding definition, 
the negotiating success of a region or state would most likely be inversely linked to that state’s 
(or regions) dependency on the counterpart negotiating state or region. The logic of 
asymmetric interdependence in EU-EPA negotiations would however imply that we should 
expect to see the ACP states’ level of negotiation success rise as their trade dependency 
decreased.  The logic of negotiation success based on dictates of asymmetrical interdependence 
would predict an inverse relationship between success and level of dependency. Does 
empirical evidence affirm this hypothesis? Christopher Stevens provides a very neat 
categorization of the putative dependency levels of ACP states and classifies them into three 
groups:  the preference dependent non-LDCs(most dependent); countries with a non-
reciprocity safety net - primarily LDCs (less dependent) and three, non-sensitive exporters-  
mostly oil exporters( least dependent). Countries less dependent on a reciprocal treaty (mostly 
the ACP LDCs) would for instance get better outcomes than those more dependent on 
achievement of a WTO compliant reciprocal agreement (the ACP non LDCs). 
 
However, if the outcomes do not confirm this prediction, as the outcome variation of ACP 
regions and states suggests, then we are compelled to re-think the cogency of asymmetric 
interdependence as a critical factor in determining outcomes.  Rather than, or in addition to 
asymmetrical interdependence we have to look for a better, more empirically grounded 
organizing pattern to these outcomes. The empirical task must address three questions: One, 
does the EU’s success corresponds to the variances in ACP regions’ economic dependency or 
negotiation dexterity? Two, do the variances within African states (or regions) correspond to 
the degrees of asymmetrical interdependence with the EU? And three, if the veracity of the 
questions above is discounted by empirical evidence, then what principle might we conjecture 
to provide a more compelling pattern of explanation?  Such a principle would most likely take 
us into examining the role of norms in attributing the outcomes. Is it plausible that the EU was 
driven by the need to balance two conflicting norms- the need to achieve WTO compliancy 
while still maintaining some special (non-MFN) relationship with the ACP states? Such a 
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conjecture would predict that the states which fulfilled these two factors optimally would then 
have better outcomes than those which did not. Exploring the exigency and contribution of 
norms in the EU’s preferences- particularly what Elgstrom calls the EU’s partner identity - is a 
task that existing literature does not delve into with regard to empirical assessment of EPA 
outcomes.  These concerns are taken up in the empirical chapter – chapter four. 
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3 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter I discuss aspects of methodology (and methods) and how I intend to answer the 
research question. The research question of the study is: What accounts for bargaining efficiency 
in EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements Negotiations? The research output is expected to 
unveil a discernible pattern that sheds light on why we ended up with the kind of agreements 
reached during the EU-ACP EPA negotiations. As has been elaborated and will be even 
further in subsequent sections of this chapter and the following chapter (empirical chapter) the 
main aspect of explanation here is the efficiency in completion of the EPA negotiations. As 
such even though technically some aspects of the EPA negotiations are still ongoing, we still 
have enough empirical differentiation of efficiency (dependent variable) to allow a substantive 
study. Bargaining efficiency refers to the time taken to reach an agreement (ratification) of an 
EPA. The research seeks to examine and explain what accounts for the variable speeds in intra-
ACP ratification of EPAs as well as what accounts for ACP states’ collective resistance power 
against the EU into a speedy EPA conclusion. 
 
The chapter is divided into several sections. The first section explores and muses on the 
ontological leanings of the research. This ontology is referred to as qualified positivism. 
Qualified positivism is an ontological disposition which avers that there is some relative 
stability to factors (social, regimes and material) that influence states’ decisions in international 
relations. However, such a disposition does not claim the immutable objectivity of explanatory 
variables from agency orientation. Causal variables in are subject to change through 
ideological re-orientation of interests, ideas and norms. As the section avers, what matters 
most then is the relative stability of the causal power of any variable.  Following this is a 
section that outlines the research design. The research is a disciplined configurative and heuristic 
case study that compares the efficiency performance of different negotiating ACP regional 
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dyads (all against the EU) and tries to locate the determinants of negotiating success (in 
efficiency and distribution characteristics of outcomes).  The third major part of the chapter 
concerns the description of the data analysis which examines the overall correlations between 
outcomes and putative determinants of negotiation outcomes and uses analytic induction to 
trace cogent connections between the variables for negotiation outcomes and its putative 
causal variables. 
3.1 Qualified Positivism – On Ontological Reflection 
In the introduction to his book, Agents, Structures and International Relations, Colin Wight refers 
to politics as a ‘terrain of competing ontologies’ and that ‘understanding the ontological 
differences that lie at the heart of competing visions of the world should be the aim of any 
properly conceived critical discipline of IR’ (Wight, 2006:2). It is therefore befitting to make a 
reflection on the ontological variations in IR and how these foundations affect negotiation 
analysis, before embarking on an outline of intended methods. Negotiation outcomes and the 
general evaluation of outcomes of conflicting state and business interactions have been studied 
from the perspectives of different disciplines, but mostly Economics (where game theory 
dominated for some years), Political Science (where the propensity of power was seen as the 
currency of negotiation) and more recently by Psychology (where the role of emotions, brain 
chemistry and social influence in negotiation outcomes is examined). Whether in Economics, 
Political Science, Sociology or Psychology, the objective of these disciplines’ study on 
negotiation processes and outcomes is often to identify patterns or tracks that link the 
negotiation processes and actors to the outcomes. The purpose has been the development of 
functional theories that illuminate on a causal relationship between the outcome and the 
process and actors which produce them. The ontological foundations in all the different 
disciplines could be positivist or constructivist, the preferred approach of the scholar being 
determined by their belief, their persuasion, about that most fundamental of ontological 
contest on the accurate relationship between structure and agency. Therein of course lies our 
first problem with regard to such definitive ontological distinctions in social science enquiry – 
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the idea that the ontological orientation that one assumes is dependent on their belief30 rather 
than an objectively verifiable persuasion. In this short reflection on ontology, I outline the 
ontological foundations of my research as well as outline why I think the view of rationalist-
constructivist approaches as being ontologically exclusive is unnecessary and hence often mere 
academic intransigence. While the two views may certainly call for distinct differences in 
methodology, their existence as exclusive categories of ‘what truth is’ is questionable. As I 
argue, the separation of ontologies into positivism and constructivist reflects an irresolvable 
question in social science of if there is, or what is the most elemental, atomic cause or 
explanation of social behavior. 
 
Most scholars in the philosophy of social science make reference to the two dominant strands 
of ontology in IR, positivism and constructivism. In Agents, Structures and International 
Relations Colin Wight has made a bold broach into what may be a third ontology – scientific 
realism. But Jonothan W. Moses and Torbjorn L. Knutsen, in Ways of Knowing: Competing 
Methodologies in Social and Political Research see scientific realism as a fledgling ontology that is 
yet to make a ‘noticeable impact in the practice of social science’ (Moses and Knutsen, 2007:11). 
A less pithy classification is that of Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (2006) who 
outline four separate ontologies which in addition to positivism and constructivism have what 
they call humanistic and interpretivist ontologies. 
 
My discussion will focus on the substance of the positivist-constructivist differences. As 
Wendt observes, ‘all theories of international relations are based on social theories of the 
                                                 
 
 
30 A belief is defined as an acceptance that a statement, supposed fact, etc., is true; a religious, philosophical, or personal 
conviction; an opinion, a persuasion (from the Oxford Dictionary of English). 
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relationship between agency, process, and social structure’ (Wendt, 1992: 422). The essential 
distinction in positivist vs. social constructivism ontological disputes is the agent-structure 
problem and the independence of each from the other. Here I emphasize that this is the 
putative view which I actually think misconstrues the real divergence between constructivism 
and rational choice. While positivism is thought to regard social enquiry from a belief of there 
being an objective truth that is independent of our knowledge or manipulation of it -what 
Wight calls the distinction between facts and values (Wight, 2006: 20), - the constructivist 
contend that there is no independent reality that exists outside of our view of reality but that 
reality is discursively and socially constructed and hence changes from time and place. In 
international relations, a good illustrative example of the disputation in this debate has been 
the question raised by Alexander Wendt, a stalwart of social constructivism; does anarchy 
exist outside of and irrespective of states perception of it? While rational choice theories have 
assumed that such an ‘objective’ thing as anarchy exists, social constructivism avers that 
anarchy does not exist outside of states’ willful conception and utilization of the concept. Thus 
in constructivists view, anarchy is only a ‘social fact’ and not an objective reality that exists 
outside of states’ view of it. 
 
 
 
How do these contentions influence work in negotiation analysis? The basic contention 
between positivist31 and constructivist ontologies is on the independence of structure from 
                                                 
 
 
31 In this chapter, the tem positivist is used very cautiously. In my case the chief binding ‘positivist’ attribute held 
is the aspiration for finding certain stable causal regularities. In this case my work might be described as 
positivist.  And while the work does aspire to the possibility of uncovering a Deductive-Nomological (D-N) 
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agent. Colin Wight refers the positivist position as encompassing four beliefs namely: (1) the 
unity of science, (2) the distinction between facts and values, (3) the belief in regularities and 
(4) commitment to an empiricist epistemology (Wight, 2006: 20). As Andrew Moravcsik sees it, 
‘what distinguishes rationalist and constructivist analyses is not, therefore, the simple fact that 
state and societal actors hold ideas consistent with their actions, but the causal independence of 
those ideas—their source, variation, and the nature of their link to policy’ (Moravscik: 2005: 
227). Moravcsik therefore emphasizes element number 2.  However, as Jeffrey Cherkel puts it, 
constructivists dispute such supposed putative independent existence of structure out of the 
manipulation of the agents.  ‘Constructivists emphasize a process of interaction between 
agents and structures’, where the ontology ‘is one of mutual constitution’ (Cherkel, 1998: 326). 
From a constructivist point, the structures we use to explain human behavior are therefore not 
factually objective, as positivists might contend, from how we are socialized to regard them. 
 
This ontological distinction is not always clear. It is often depicted (Barnett, 2008:162-3, Smith 
and Owens, Meyer and Strickmann, 2011, Dessler, 1999: 123- 137) as though the main 
constructivist contention is on the role of norms and ideas in driving policy (behavior) which 
rationalist are supposed to dispute. As Dessler puts forth the argument, Social Constructivism 
is the study of norms and identities. This view is given more credence by Wendt (in Wendt, 
1992: 392) who criticizes rationalist approaches for having a static view of state’s identities and 
interests. This is not the case. In rationalist approach, ideas and norms too are important and 
Cherkel’s contribution has been to clarify the fundamental assumptions of constructivists and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
model of explanation, it does not claim, As Wight avers positivists do that such a model of explanation is the only 
valid way of establishing or demonstrating truth. Thus while this work may feel or sound positivistic, it is 
primarily so in aspiration and not necessarily in its belief as an exclusive and superior account of scientific 
ontology. 
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divergence with positivist approaches as being the belief about the mutual constitution of 
agents and structure. As Cherkel points out, at issue is not the role or import of norms in 
influencing state behavior. At issue between positivists and constructivists is if norms merely 
constrain state behavior (positivists) or if beyond constraining behavior norms also constitute 
actor interests and identities (Cherkel, 1997: 473). As misleadingly depicted (even in the debates 
of Cherkel and Moravscik) therefore, the divergence of belief between these ontological 
dispositions is not on what variables (interests vs. norms, or preferences vs. ideas, or interests 
and power vs. identities and ideas and norms, etc.) that we use to explain state behavior, but 
the extent to which explanatory variables in social science are regarded as being factually 
independent of agent manipulation or orientation. Or in the words of J. Samuel Barkin, the 
extent to which ‘what actors do in international relations, the interests they hold and the 
structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas rather than by 
objective or material conditions’ (Barkins, 2003: 326). Thus using, isolating or highlighting 
norms as causal variables – as this work does- does not mark any work or scholar as 
constructivist.  Norms are not an exclusive province of constructivists. What marks one as 
belonging to one or the other of these ontological dispositions depends on their explanation of 
the foundations of the normative preferences that a state may hold – are they constraining or 
constitutive? 
 
In my view however, the positivist-constructivist contention about the independence of 
structure from human agency is one steeped in factional intransigence. The exigent ontological 
question is not one of the independence of structure from agency but one of how to regard 
(ontologically) the stability of structure from agent influence or vice versa. Reality in social 
science is based on human behavior which is changeable over time. In this sense I agree with 
Wight who disagrees with positivist’s ‘separation of ideational content from the material 
conditions of possibility’ (Wight 2006:15). After all, many aspects of what are regarded as 
aspects of structure in social science  - states, fear, competition, currencies, aggression, 
alliances, cooperation, identities, rational instrumentalism, beliefs and so on, - are obviously 
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based on human understandings and socialization. Positivists cannot therefore credibly 
entirely divorce such aspects of structure from agent construction.  But on the other hand, 
there is regularity in human behavior? Human behavior is not necessary capricious. It has 
stability, an order to it, predictableness. Social human behavior can be relatively stable and 
predictable conditioned (or socialized, if you will) based on the reliability of response and 
consistency of expected outcomes when exposed to certain stimuli (threats, interests, 
references, common norms, identities, friendly overtures, anarchy, etc.). So, while the structure 
is most certainly not entirely independent of human design or manipulation, still there are 
seemingly consistent patterns that define the relationship between structure and agency over 
time and hence some seemingly ‘established’ regularities of causation. However, such patterns 
of regularities are not timelessly ‘immutable and independent’ from the outcomes they cause. 
In a scientific sense therefore what establishes the force of a given regularity is the cogency of 
its bearing and its durability. Over a long time, such durability of influence of certain law-like 
regularities in procuring expected outcomes becomes regarded as the ‘normal’ or structure. As 
Parpora defines it, structure is a, ‘patterns of aggregate behavior that is stable over time…or 
law-like regularities that govern behavior of social facts’ (Wight, 2006: 127).  Positivist 
ontology avers this ‘normal’ state through empirical elaboration on the correlations that 
produce such regularities. However, even when a stable law-like regularity is established, the 
explanatory strength of such a pattern is not its immutability, but its durability. In a sense 
therefore, what might appear as competing ontological dispositions can be seen as quite 
usefully related. 
 
One can make an argument that states are socialized to behave as they do, (See for instance 
Zurn and Cherkel, 2005: 1045-1079). But if states are seen to act in a certain predictable manner 
over time, then it becomes incontestable that state behavior can be explained based on certain 
foundations- whether these foundations be preferences, interests, norms, identities, threats or 
altruism. It is these foundations that positivists refer to as structure – due to their stability and 
predictability. For positivists however, it is intransigent to proclaim the factual independence 
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of these variables (structure) from agency when many aspects of structure in economics and 
political science, such as instrumentalism, anarchy and fear, profit and loss, competition and 
domination, states, stock markets, democracy, militaries, and so on are based on social 
constructions and expectations and thus not entirely independent of human agency. On the 
other hand, since society is not in a constant state of upheaval everyday with new norms or 
ideas taking over, there is a stability of patterns of causation which positivistic approaches can 
usefully broach on. The question then is what determines the durability and potency of a given 
pattern of causation. While the positivist endeavor is to find the laws that govern social 
behavior so that we reach stable structures, the constructivist endeavor is to show how human 
socialization foments the formation or change in structure. As constructivists might aver, 
rhetorical framing might be one way of understanding the process of forming or changing 
structures. The constructivist endeavor might be thought of as more primal; what is the source 
of human persuasion? Essentially, what beliefs underlie the laws of human behavior and at 
what point can we be confident that we have reached the most atomistic cause/determinant of 
human behavior? 
 
The rationalist-constructivist divide therefore is not one of exclusivity of beliefs but one of 
degree of the stability of a given structure-agency relationship. The dominant strands of 
International Relations theory, realism, marxism and liberalism, for instance are putatively 
regarded as being of a positivist orientation. However, using an example from classical and 
structural realism in international relations one can show why, if one goes to the primal 
question of what is the most nucleus essence of structure, we are left with unclear answers 
about the independence of structure from human agency. The father of classical realism Hans 
Morgenthau attributed states’ disposition to conflict and war to animus dominandi - the innate 
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human need to dominate (Morgenthau, 1948).  If one takes the meaning of innate to be ‘arising 
from the intellect or constitution of the mind, rather than learned through experience’32, Hans 
Morgenthau and other classical realists would therefore be more foundationalist than say 
Kenneth Waltz (in Theory of International Politics, 1979) who attributes the same disposition for 
conflict to the fear engendered by anarchy. While the ‘innate need to dominate’ is an 
immutable biological characteristic as Morgenthau thought and hence not socially constructed, 
clearly Waltz’s explanatory variables (anarchy and fear) are rooted in social constructions. The 
fear that states feel emanates from the social construct of anarchy and the expectation of how 
one state thinks of another. Fear therefore is a socialized response to a feeling of threat. Since 
anarchy is a socially constructed outcome of the division of people into sovereign territories 
called states and anarchy begets fear in states, Waltz’s explanatory variables (fear and anarchy) 
are clearly more socially constituted than the supposed biological predilection for domination. 
Structural realism therefore does have an element of constructivism in as far as we can 
ascertain that the fear engendered by the structure is through human design. For instance, in 
his critique of the democratic peace thesis Waltz concedes that ‘conformity of countries to a 
prescribed political form may eliminate some causes of war; it cannot eliminate all of them’ 
(Waltz, 2000: 7-8). In this concession even Waltz, a consummate rationalist, tacitly admits that 
democracy, a ‘prescribed political form’ and human construct does mitigate states’ 
predisposition to war. This bolsters a view of the structure not as objectively independent but 
as subject to human construction and subjectivity. 
 
                                                 
 
 
32 Dictionary.com definition of innate.  Italicized to emphasize the non-learning. 
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Even more straightforward admission of the constitution of ideas and values in the structural 
influences has been made by rational liberalists such as Moravscik in (Moravscik 1997: 525) in 
a variant of liberal theory he calls ideational liberalism. In ideational liberalism a state’s 
preferences are directly attributed to social identities and values, and thus other things being 
constant, conflict or cooperation, can be predicted on the basis of convergence of such values 
and identities. Thus in real usage, it seems like even putative rationalists like Moravcsik do not 
deny some level of mutual constitution in structure and agency. 
 
Constructivists too have been plagued by what are primarily methodological (rather than 
ontological) weaknesses of establishing a cause and effect relationship. In as far as establishing 
causal mechanisms is a critical pursuit of social science this has presented some problems for 
constructivists and some are even seen as abandoning such aspirations and contesting the 
centrality of causation in social sciences33. A weakness in the extent to which the causal effect 
of constructivist variables is demonstrated has been a criticism widely leveled against 
constructivists. As Björkdahl has observed, the three most compelling models of constructivist 
causation proposed have been socialization, learning and propaganda (Björkdahl, 2010: 12). 
This lack of prove of agency becomes the constructivist Achilles heel. As Cherkel has 
observed, constructivism is plagued by ‘empirical ad hocism’ and lacks ‘mid-range theories of 
agency’ (Cherkel, 1998:325). This methodological weakness does not discount the cogency of 
the constructivist ontology. However, since causation remains a central tenet in social science, 
if any contention aspires to be scientific credible then it must aspire to some considerable level 
of empirical demonstration (not necessarily verification) of causality. Positivists are right in 
                                                 
 
 
33 See Björkdahl, 2010 for instance. 
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their emphasis on empiricism and more empirically compelling in making predications or 
generalization. Constructivist inspired methodologies can on the other hand usefully trace 
process of ‘construction’ of a social phenomenon. 
 
In the case of this dissertation, the quest is not to assert the universal existence of some 
immutable laws in asymmetrical negotiations, but to establish if indeed some law-like 
regularity does exist in the patterns of EU-ACP EPA efficiency. Similarly the quest is not to 
demonstrate any process of socialization or ‘construction’ or learning of any norms. 
Methodologically therefore, my approach is bound to be more positivistic, not because I 
discount the constructivist ontology but because of the empirical aspiration for finding 
credible patterns of causality – or structure. 
3.2 The Research Design 
3.2.1  Case Selection and methodological justification: ACP-EU EPA negotiations as a 
Heuristic Case Study 
As in the definition of Keith Punch, the research design here is intended to situate the research 
‘work into the empirical world’ (Punch, 2005:63). In order to set out the research design and 
the empirical process that I intend to use for this work, I will reiterate the research question 
and set out the considerations which informed the selection of the case. As a heuristic case, the 
EU-ACP EPA negotiation is used to help illuminate on new (normative) variables that might 
be more causally cogent in explaining the negotiation outcomes. 
 
The research question in the dissertation is: What accounts for bargaining efficiency in EU-
ACP Economic Partnership Agreements Negotiations? As clear in this question the empirical 
material for consideration is the case of EU negotiations for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. The negotiations 
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began in 2002 and are still ongoing. This section seeks to elaborate on the case and why the 
EU-ACP case is a theoretical minefield worthy of the most elaborate scholarly analysis. While 
the negotiation with some regions and states are still ongoing as has been intimated before, the 
main aspect under consideration (efficiency in completion) of the negotiation can be analyzed 
without being compromised by the incompletion. This is because at present, ACP states are 
already grouped into the three categories of initialing, signing and ratification, which will 
remain as such since those that have ratified are ahead anyway and the rest will only try to 
catch up. The EPAs between the ACP states and the EU are important for analysis for three 
main reasons:  
 
a) They represent one of the oldest, lasting dyad of formalised North-South economic 
relations. It’s a rich case for development of theory of asymmetrical negotiations.  
Upon coming into effect of the EU’s Treaty of Rome in 1957, the then EEC states established 
what they called ‘special relations’ with the conglomerations of states that came to be known 
as the ACP. The uniqueness of the EU-ACP relations has been the deep level of formalization 
with the two partners establishing multi-year conventions (Yaoundé, Lome, Cotonou) to guide 
their relations.  Although the EU has economic and political relationships with other 
developing former colonial states such as India, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and many 
other states, the ACP- EU relations have been considerably more formalized not only with the 
legally binding international agreements, but also through a centralized ACP secretariat (in 
Brussels) and also through regular institutional interactions such as the joint Parliamentary 
Assemblies of ACP MPs and European Parliament MPs. Thus the EU-ACP relationship 
inarguably represents the most institutionalized form of what has been referred to as North-
South Cooperation.  The state and conduct of EU-ACP relations to an extent not only reflects 
but also shapes the conduct of other attempts at North –south relations (for instance EU-North 
Africa cooperation). How states in such an asymmetrical relationships therefore relate, how 
they aggregate their interests, how the institutions they form constrain their preferences and 
behavior, what informs the attitudes of their interactions and how eventually asymmetrical 
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economic relations change, are all fascinating lines of enquiry that could very well be pursued 
through the study of EU-ACP relations. The high level of institutionalized relations (what 
Ravenhill calls clientelism) is also very relevant for this study since it’s a case in which the 
dyads have a great level of historically institutionalized relations.  This is why I regard the case 
as a rich one for development of theory of asymmetrical economic relations and negotiations.  
 
b) Two, they rank high in pioneering of region-to-region FTAs and thus have – 
Implications on the conduct and future of supranationalized-bilateral economic 
negotiations. 
While Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and other forms of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
have become ubiquitous, there are only few cases of region-to-region FTAs. Most of these 
region-to-region have the EU as one partner. Examples of these include the EU-Central 
America, EU-Colombia/Peru and EU-Overseas Countries and Territories. The EPAs (at least 
as it was conceived) were also meant as a region-to-region FTA between the EU and respective 
ACP regions therefore will rank high in the evolving development of region to region FTAs. 
Negotiation of region to region FTAs is only pioneering and as can be deduced from the case 
of ACP states, regionalized negotiations present unique challenges in the aggregation of 
regional preferences. While the EU has been rather successful in converging all member states 
interests under the tight guidance of the Commission, such levels of discipline in locking all 
states in a region into a single coherent voice is difficult to develop.  As the EU itself has 
experienced attempts at regionalized negotiations with both the ASEAN and Mercusor have 
failed. Regionalised negotiations with the ACP group have also largely failed with the 
exception of the Cariforum group which maintained a highly supranationalised negotiating 
college throughout its negotiation with the EU. Even the highly acclaimed initial solidness of 
the EAC group in 2007 is under a severe test. All other regions in the ACP have resorted into 
very loose regionalized negotiations with each state at the helm and driving its objectives. 
Eventually, (with the exception of the Cariforum 15 states) actual negotiation, signing and 
ratification is done by each of the ACP state’s governments. Thus the case of EPAs presents an 
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interesting study into the pitfalls and prospects of regionalized negotiations. Why are some 
economic regions able to hold supranationalised negotiations while others fall apart? What are 
the pre-conditions for successful supranational negotiations? The EU-ACP case can be 
instrumental in answering these questions. 
 
c) Since the ACP has 7 negotiating regions (sub-dyads), EPA negotiations provide a richer 
case of intra-dyad comparison. 
For purposes of systematic comparison of negotiating dyads with the objective of establishing 
some possible causal patterns, the ACP-EU dyads offer an excellent case. The EPA case is in 
fact not just one with 7 regions but one where the EU is simultaneously negotiating a big 
number of states that are loosely joined. We are able keep the EU on one side as a constant, 
and thus see how the differences in the ACP regions and states produce differences in 
outcomes. The EU-ACP case can be seen as a two-tier case study. Tier one explores the 
comprehensive EU-ACP super–dyad as a whole and tries to answer the question of what 
explains ACP’s relative strength in resisting the EU in spite of its putative material weakness? 
Tier two examines the variances within ACP groups and tries to account for these variances in 
efficiency. In addition examining and using the entire super dyad (EU vs. 7 ACP regions) 
avoids the pitfalls inherent in a using a single EU-ACP dyad (e.g. EU-Cariforum or EU-West 
Africa) as a basis for generalization on the entire ACP. This does not of course eliminate the 
pitfalls associated with possible representativeness and generalization with regard to other 
asymmetrical negotiations. The case is ‘complete’ in as far as it includes all the ACP regions 
and their respective negotiations with the EU. 
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ACP Dyads against the EU 
 
 
 
This research is conceived as a disciplined configurative and heuristic case study which uses the 
case of EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreement negotiation to examine and compare the 
theoretical cogency of existing theories in explaining the outcomes of these negotiations. ‘A 
disciplined configurative case study uses established theories to explain a case’ (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 75). As George and Bennett observe, beyond mere explanation, a disciplined 
configurative case can contribute to theory testing or impugn established theories, ‘if theories 
ought to fit it, but do not’ (George and Bennett, 2005: 75). Inevitably therefore, the study has a 
formative deductive bent which seeks to empirically thrash out the cogency of some existing 
theoretical suppositions on outcomes of asymmetrical economic negotiations. Chief of the 
supposition under scrutiny is the putative role of asymmetrical trade dependence in procuring 
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an expeditious (hence efficient) negotiation.  The study is a disciplined configurative case with 
regard to its interest in the relative explanatory power of two broad theories [complex 
interdependence vs. normative institutionalism] in explaining the outcomes of these 
negotiations. The study is heuristic in as far as the empirical data and analysis seek to propose 
an alternative hypothesis on potential causal mechanism of EPA outcomes beyond 
asymmetrical interdependence as most scholars so far have averred. Beyond asymmetrical 
interdependence, an alternative hypothesis offered is that rather than asymmetrical 
interdependence, the success of the EU in getting an ACP state to ratify can be predicated on 
the ACP states’ degree of institutionalization of the credibility (belief) that EPAs would lead to 
better economic fortunes for the concerned state. (This is based on the findings already 
established from the data analysis process and discussed in detail in chapter 4.) 
 
By bargaining effectiveness we simply mean bargaining success of respective parties based on 
how well the EPA outcomes reflect each party’s pre-negotiation objectives on a number of 
what were the most contested issues in the negotiation. A description of the research design as 
it involves definition of the dependent variable; the design of testing kits for asymmetrical 
dependence vs. institutionalization will be described below. However, the immediate 
following section explains further on the merits of the research question base on the research 
gap that existing in explaining EPA outcomes. 
3.2.2 Method: Variables, Data and Data Collection 
The empirical process proceeds in five phases as described below. 
- Phase One: Lay out the dependent and independent variables – section 4.2. 
 
- Phase Two: Test regularities in correlations of the deductive variables in question 
[relationship between asymmetry and intra-ACP variance] – Section 4.3. 
 
- Phase Three: Conduct conceptual interviews based on which new explanatory variables 
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are established or existing suppositions affirmed- Section 4.4. 
 
- Phase four: Through use of standardized (Subjective Value Index) surveys examine intra-
ACP variations in hypothesized new variable [degree of intra-ACP convergence in EPA 
utility] from main EPA negotiators. Section 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
- Phase five: Use analytic induction to analysis the data and make inferences 
 
The section below outlines each of these four steps. In the elaboration, part two and three are 
joined into one (section b). 
3.2.2.1 Phase One: Mapping the Negotiation Zone: The dependent variable and defining success: 
The central objective of mapping out the zone of negotiation over the main contested issues in 
EPAs is to establish the centrality of efficiency (rather than distributional) outcomes as the key 
intra-ACP variance in EPA outcomes. Because it is found that there are no significant 
differences with regard to distribution characteristics of EPA outcomes among the ACP 
states/regions, this highlights the justification for examining intra-ACP efficiency differences 
as the most poignant intra-ACP puzzle in outcome causation. 
To operationalize ‘negotiation success’ I map out the negotiation zone by isolating outcomes in 
eight key areas of what were most contested issues in the negotiations. To frame an outcome 
as a win for one or the other party, the outcomes in each of these areas is compared to 
respective regions’ pre-negotiation objective. Table 5 below shows the tablet used to create the 
negotiation zone. As the table 5 shows, the distribution characteristics of EPAs are based on a 
set of eight most contested issues in EPAs between the two parties. This issues largely defined 
the ‘pie’ that was to be shared. By outlining the pre-negotiation (or initial) bids that both 
parties in the dyad placed for each of these issues, and comparing these pre-negotiation bids to 
the final agreements (as per the Interim EPA), we can deduce the nature of concessions and 
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wins for each of these issues.  Data on the final outcomes is derived mostly from the texts of 
the EPA agreements. 
 
Table 5: Tablet for Creation of the Negotiation’s Zone of Agreement 
 
Key Contested 
Issues in EPAs 
Negotiation 
ACP pre-
negotiation 
position 
EU pre-
negotiation 
position 
Final 
agreements 
Who wins? 
Why? 
1. Substantially all 
trade in % 
   
What party’s 
pre-negotiation 
position is in 
most agreement 
with final 
agreement?  
 
2. Duration of 
FTA  liberation 
   
3. Liberalization 
Compensation 
   
 Elimination of 
Export taxes 
   
5.. MFN     
6. Non-execution 
clause 
   
7. Negotiating 
time frame 
   
8. EPA 
comprehensivity 
   
     
 
Data on the initial (pre-negotiation position) is mostly derived from the negotiating mandates 
of the EU and the ACP states as well as other document which record respective parties 
evolving position over the course of the negotiating process. 
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 Independent Variables: Trade asymmetry and Tariff vulnerability vs. belief convergence in EPA 
Utility 
A primary deductive contestation which drives this study is to examine the role of material 
dependency on the propensity of ACP states to concede. Do those states that were more 
materially dependent or vulnerable concede faster than those that were less vulnerable? This 
supposition, as elaborated in the theory section would be the main argument of efficiency by 
complex interdependence theorists. Is this the case? The role of trade dependency in 
influencing acceptance of EPAs is compared to the variance in degrees of states’ belief 
convergence on the credibility of EPA objectives.  Belief convergence is a ‘new’ variable of EPA 
outcome explanation that emerges from my initial conceptual interviews with the negotiators. 
This section thus introduces the two independent variables.  Their influence (correlations 
regularities) is tested in the empirical chapter. 
 
Asymmetrical interdependence (or dependence) is measured using ACP states level of export 
dependence on the EU (percentage of exports to the EU as percentage of total exports). This 
measure has previously been used by among others Hirshmann (1945), Crescenzi (2003) 
Keohane and Nye (1977), Barbieri (1995, 1996, and 1998) and Gartzke (2003).  This is to show 
the degree of asymmetrical dependence and vulnerability. Theoretical supposition of the 
asymmetrical dependence thesis is that the more trade dependent states would capitulate 
fastest. Data on trade dependence is derived from the European Commission Directorate of 
Trade (DG, trade) statistics portal. The degree of vulnerability due to tariff re-imposition under 
the GSP system is measured by the percentage tariff increase as a proportion on total export 
value expected in case of loss of Cotonou preferences. The data on tariff jumps is obtained 
from the 2007 Overseas Development Institute (ODI) report ‘The Costs to the ACP of 
Exporting to the EU under the GSP’. 
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The degree of belief convergence is measured using an adjusted questionnaire survey known 
as the Subjective Value Index (SVI) designed by Jared Curhan to measure the values that 
negotiators consider most important in a negotiation. SVI was originally created to evaluate 
what values negotiators privilege in the negotiation process. Curhan set out to measure the 
emphasis that negotiators placed on four factors namely; instrumental benefits, self-regard, 
suitability of process and relationship. My adjusted SVI is designed to measure Credibility of 
Negotiation Objectives (belief convergence on suitability of EPAs among the ACP states), the 
variances in intra-ACP degrees of satisfaction from instrumental benefits and variances in intra-
ACP states degree of asymmetrical expectations. More on the SVI questionnaire is outlined in 
section 3.2.2.4. The hypothesis on the connection between these three attributes is that it is 
those ACP states which have greater levels of belief convergence with the EU, that are likely to 
not only accept an EPA faster (ratify an EPA faster) but are also likely to feel more satisfied 
with the putative instrumental benefits of the outcomes. 
3.2.2.2 Phase Two: Test Cogency of Independent Variables Correlation to the Dependent Variable 
Using very basic statistical tools (Scatter plot graphs on excel) the correlations between the 
dependent variable (speed to ratification) and independent variables (% of export dependence 
and percentage in tariff jump under GSP) are tested. Having found little evidence that 
ratification (after 2007) was highly predicated on economic vulnerability the research then 
seeks to establish explanations on potential explanatory variables for the intra-ACP speed to 
ratification of EPAs through conceptual elite interviews. This is done in Phase three. 
3.2.2.3 Phase Three: Semi-Structured Conceptual Elite Interviews to map out new variables 
Initial semi-structured conceptual mapping interviews were conducted in order to establish 
from the negotiators what their main motivations were in either plunging ahead with an EPA 
or withholding ratification/notification. The semi-structured interviews were done with EU 
officials and negotiators as well as ACP officials and regional negotiators. The main thrust of 
the interview questions for the EU officials was on if they thought that there were regions or 
states which had better prospects of signing on to EPAs faster, and if so why were those 
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regions/states more disposed to accepting EPAs? For the ACP officials and regional 
negotiators, the question was on what were their main motivations for entering into an EPA or 
being opposed to it. It is from the conceptual mapping interviews that the variable on belief 
convergence on EPA utility was identified as a potentially strong indicator/variable for 
explaining variance in ACP states’ propensity to accept an EPA. Table 6 below lists the officials 
who were interviewed as part of the conceptual mapping elite interviews on formulating new 
variables on explanation of EPA efficiency outcomes. 
 
Table 6: List of Elite Interviewees for Conceptual Mapping 
Elite interviews Regions Position 
   
Shaheen Ali Fiji/ Pacific PS, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Fiji. main 
negotiator, EPAs 
Christian Friis Bach EU/ Denmark Danish Minister for Development Cooperation 
Sunil Boodhoo ESA/Mauritius Deputy Director, Intl. Trade Div. 
Guillaume Gerout ESA/Seychelles   
Morgan Githinji ACP, Secretariat Trade Expert, ACP 
Peter Kiguta EAC/EAC Secretariat DG, EAC Customs and Trade Directorate 
Myra Laporte Seychelles  
Junior Lodge Cariforum Negotiating 
Machinery 
Senior Coordinator WTO matters Caricom 
Loius Michel EU Parliament Co-President of EU-ACP Parliamentary group 
Poul Nielsen EU/ Denmark Former EU Commissioner 
Angelique Omulisa EAC Secretariat Regional Trade Policy Adviser, EAC 
Jana Popelkova EU Commission EU, negotiator, Pacific 
Athanisia Rammos EU, Commission EU negotiator, EAC 
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Yaya Sow West Africa ECOWAS representation in Brussels 
Remco Vahl EU Commission Deputy Head of Unit, on EPAs 
 
Elite Interviews 
 
The objective of an elite interview is to generate data for analysis and possibly to contribute to 
theory development. Elite Interviews are defined as those where the interviewees are well 
informed individuals, ‘who hold or have held a privileged position in society and as such, as 
far as a political scientist is concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political 
outcomes than general members of the public’ (Bogner et al, 2009:98).  As far as this definition 
goes, the most important consideration was that those persons I interviewed should have been 
involved in the EPA negotiation process at some point in its 11-year history, and should be in a 
position to speak authoritatively on behalf of either an individual state, (state officials) or a 
regional economic community (RECs/EU). This latter specification thus eliminates those that 
may have been well versed with EPAs but were from civil society groups. 
 
In cases where the interviews were conducted in person (and recorded) I would describe them 
as falling proximally in the typology of the interviewer as co-expert, based on the typology 
developed by Bogner and Menz (2009)34.  Bogner and Menz isolate five other typologies which 
are: Interviewer as lay person, interviewer as authority, interviewer as accomplice and 
interviewer as critic (Bogner and Menz, 2009: 68). Since I had already read quite a good deal of 
                                                 
 
 
34 In Bogner, Littig and Menz (2009). Interviewing Experts. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Hampshire.  
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literature on the EPAs at this point, I was not totally uncritical to the responses of the 
interviewees. However, at this point my ideational disposition to the interviewee responses is 
as much as possible neutral. Even if I disagreed with them based on a contradiction or conflict 
in their information and another source, at this point I did not seek to challenge too strongly. 
In cases of direct or interview by phone, of course clarification would be sought or 
contradictions observed and then the interviewee would respond as they saw fit. Thus in 
classifying my interviews as co-expert, the emphasis is on the qualification, proximally. This is 
because from the interviews I was at times an accomplice, a critic and at times a lay person. In 
addition to collecting data, I was also sensitive to building trust in order to have access to them 
for the more substantive survey interviews. Moreover, my main concern at the conceptual 
level was to collect as many views on causation of outcomes as possible, then systematize 
them and derive the most plausible testable variable(s) and subsequently further examine 
those new variables more  substantively using SVI questionnaires. The concerns, objectives, 
applications and potential pitfalls of an interview with interviewer as co-expert are outlined by 
Bogner and Menz are shown on table 6, below.  
 
Table 7. A Typology of Interviewer as co-expert  
 
Dimensio
n of 
typificatio
n 
Indications of 
the 
communicatio
n situation 
Preconditio
ns for the 
interviewer  
Interview 
and question 
style 
Possible 
advantage
s 
Possible 
disadvantag
es 
Main area 
of 
application 
       
Specialist 
competenc
e 
Symmetrical 
interaction 
Mastery of 
specialist 
vocabulary, 
knowledge  
Oriented 
towards 
dialogue, 
repeated 
supplementar
y questions 
and rapid 
exchanges 
High 
density of 
facts 
Interview 
remains 
within 
interviewees 
professional 
frame of 
reference 
Explorator
y 
systemizin
g expert 
interviews 
Source: Bogner and Menz, 2009 
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In terms of sampling of the elite interviews, I aimed to speak to at least two individuals from 
each of the seven EPA negotiating regions.  In the conduct of the interviews, the interviews 
were given non-standardized lead questions and given a considerable leeway to explain their 
view of the EPA negotiation and outcomes. It was then my job as interviewer to distil from 
their responses, testable variables that were emerge from these interviews and that – when 
juxtaposed with other documentary evidence- seemed to have a bearing on the outcomes. 
Most of these interviews were recorded, while some of the respondents (such as Poul Nilson) 
choose to respond to the interviews in writing.  Attached below is an example of an email sent 
on the 14th of August to an elite interviewee, Mr. Poul Nielson ( a former EU Commissioner for 
Development) requesting his opinion on how to explain variances in ACP states/regions 
outcomes. As this email shows (and from the subsequent interview response received) the 
conceptual interviews focused on seeking the interviewee’s reflection on the possible 
explanations of variance in EPA outcomes. The interviews are not limited to any particular 
variable. Although the interviewer could, in some cases seek their view on a certain variable. 
On the whole the conceptual interviews went well, although from my evaluation of the 
substance of the negotiations, technical negotiators were ‘better’ experts, more informed and 
balanced than their political colleagues (RECs, ambassadors). 
 
Box 1: Email Request for an Elite Interview  
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3.2.2.4 Phase Four: Standardized Survey through use of the SVI Questionnaire 
From the conceptual interviews two key factors are established as having the greatest bearing 
on if a state/region was willing to conclude an EPA or not. These are: (a) A state’s degree of 
suasion on the desirability of EPAs as economic catalysts, and (b) a state’s degree of 
inflexibility on the demand to have the EU compensate such a state due to the fiscal losses 
from import tariff liberalization. The standardized questionnaires are thus conceived to 
measure (in a readily comparable manner) ACP and EU negotiator attitudes these two 
attributes in addition of course to the attribute on both parties (EU and ACP) degree of 
institutional entrapment. While semi-structured interviews are good for initial exploration 
explanatory variables, comparing responses from semi-structured interviews can be relatively 
difficult. To triangulate and in search of more readily comparable responses, the study chose 
to use a standardized questionnaire to measure the negotiator belief convergence. The 
questionnaire in use is adapted from the so called Subjective Value Index (SVI) questionnaire 
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developed by MIT (Massachusetts Institute Of Technology) Professor Jared Curhan. Subjective 
value refers to the social and emotional consequences of a negotiation (Curhan, Elfbein and 
Xu, 2006:4). Curhan invented this index to measure the subjective feelings of negotiators on 
four key domains of negotiation that his research established as ‘measures of value’ for 
negotiators. Curhan’s SVI is then used to measure these four domains – (i) feelings about 
instrumental outcomes, (ii) feelings about themselves, (iii) feelings about the process and (iv) 
feelings about relationships that inform negotiators evaluation of the success of a negotiation 
process. It is instructive that the SVI is a very convenient tool for evaluating negotiations due 
to its standardized Likert-scale answers ranging from 1-7.  As Dane Bertram defines it Likert 
Scale is a ‘psychometric response scale primarily used in questionnaires to obtain participant’s 
preferences or degree of agreement with a statement or set of statements. Likert scales are a 
non-comparative scaling technique and are one-dimensional (only measure a single trait) in 
nature. Respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreement with a given statement by 
way of an ordinal scale’ (Bertram, 2006). Unlike the broad responses of the conceptual semi-
structured interviews, here the interviewee responses and perceptions are more suitably 
constrained into a standardized form. Moreover, the four domains are also very suitably wide 
ranging so that they take into consideration elements that would be naturally considered by 
political scientists (feelings about instrumental outcomes for instance) as well as those factors 
that may be easily ignored by political scientists (feelings about themselves, for instance) yet 
which may have an important bearing on the negotiated outcomes. 
 
One of the key aspects of the research question which is not addressed in antecedent sections 
of method thus far has been the question of an empirical investigation into explaining tier-one 
(EU-ACP dyad as a whole) efficiency outcomes. What accounts for ACP’s inordinate resistance to 
EPA conclusion from the EU considering the EU’s putative power dominance in the negotiation? The 
Standardized questionnaires are therefore conceived with two objectives in mind. One, the 
questionnaire is conceived as an encrypted measure of the degree of institutional entrapment 
of the EU in these negotiations so that the ‘usual’ rules of commercial engagement don’t apply. 
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The second purpose is to measure the intra-ACP variance with regard to belief convergence 
and attitude to continued asymmetrical economic relations. This relates to the second tier 
(various EU-ACP regions dyads) question of what accounts for the variable speed in EPA 
conclusion between the EU and various ACP states? 
 
Two slightly dissimilar questionnaires were sent to the EU and ACP negotiators. The EU 
negotiators received a shorter questionnaire (9 questions) which was primarily aimed at 
measuring the negotiators disposition towards institutional constrains of negotiating with the 
ACP states (institutional entrapment). In addition to institutional entrapment, the ACP 
questionnaires were aimed at measuring instrumental satisfaction and belief convergence with 
the EU’s normative framing of the objectives and putative benefits of the EPAs.  Attached 
below are the two (ACP and EU) SVI questionnaires used to measure the three key domains of 
my interest: (i) Feelings on instrumental outcomes - IO, (ii) Convergence in negotiator beliefs 
on EPA utility -CNO, and (iii) Negotiator feelings on institutional entrapment during the EPA 
process -NOI.  SVI (a) was sent to ACP negotiators while SVI (b) was for EU negotiators. All 
sections of the SVI deliberately hold more questions than barely essential as a measure for 
confirming the consistency of the answers. On the following section, I further elaborate on the 
coding of the SVI questions under these three domains of interest.  
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An adjusted Subjective Value Index (SVI). 
The Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) 
 
SOURCE: 
Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Xu, H. (2006).  What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping 
the domain of subjective value in negotiation.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 493-512. 
[Also featured in Thompson (2005) and Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders (2007).] 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Four studies support the development and validation of a framework for understanding the range of 
social psychological outcomes valued subjectively as consequences of negotiations.  Study 1 inductively 
elicited and coded elements of subjective value among students, community members, and 
practitioners, revealing 20 categories that theorists in Study 2 sorted into 4 underlying subconstructs: 
Feelings About the Instrumental Outcome, Feelings About the Self, Feelings About the Negotiation 
Process, and Feelings About the Relationship.  Study 3 proposed a new Subjective Value Inventory 
(SVI) and confirmed its 4 factor structure.  Study 4 presents convergent, discriminant, and predictive 
validity data for the SVI.  Indeed, subjective value was a better predictor than economic outcomes of 
future negotiation decisions.  Results suggest the SVI is a promising tool to systematize and encourage 
research on subjective outcomes of negotiation. 
 
ADMINISTRATION NOTES: 
Items can be presented in any order.  However, the order presented here is recommended.  No 
headings should be used (e.g., Instrumental Outcome, Self, etc.).  The attached version is intended to 
be used for negotiations involving two or more individuals.  When the focal negotiation involves only 
two individuals, the words “counterpart(s)” and “outcome(s)” should be changed to “counterpart” and 
“outcome,” respectively. 
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SCORING: 
Items 3 and 5 should be reverse-scored (i.e., a response of 7 becomes 1, a response of 6 becomes 2, and 
so forth).  Next, items within each of the four sub-scales should be averaged (with equal weightings) to 
yield four sub-scale scores (i.e., Instrumental, Self, Process, and Relationship). If desired, a Global 
score can be calculated by averaging (with equal weightings) these four sub-scale scores. A Rapport 
score may also be calculated by averaging scores for Process and Relationship (with equal weightings). 
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The Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) for ACP States 
 
IN EU-ACP ECONIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATION 2002-2014 
 
 
On the request of Elijah N. Munyi, 
PhD Fellow Aalborg University, Denmark 
munyi@cgs.aau.dk 
 
General Instructions: For each question, please circle a number from 1-7 that most accurately reflects 
your opinion. You will notice that some of the questions are similar to one another; this is primarily to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire. Please simply answer each question 
independently, without reference to any of the other questions. 
 
Important:  If you encounter a particular question that is not applicable to your negotiation, simply 
circle “NA.”  Even if you have not reached a definitive final agreement, please try to answer as many 
questions as possible. In your answers use the most up-to-date form of the EPA agreement that has 
been mutually agreed between your region/state and the EU.
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IO 
1. How satisfied are you with the current EPA outcomes—i.e., the extent to which current state of  the 
agreements reflects your original EPA objectives? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Very 
satisfied 
 
 
2. As negotiators to what extent do you feel that the EPA current outcomes broadly reflect the wishes 
of  (and are thus acceptable to) your most dominant domestic constituency (politicians and business)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly 
acceptable 
 
 
3. Do you feel that EPA outcomes are consistent with the principles of legitimacy laid down by EU and 
ACP negotiating mandates?  (e.g. ACP-EU partnership, differentiation, regional integration and 
enhancement of development.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly 
consistent  
 
 
4. As negotiators, to what extent do you feel that EPA outcomes accepted by your region were driven 
more by time constraints in negotiating deadlines rather than by a mutually agreeable consensus 
between the parties?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly 
driven 
by time 
 
 
5. In view of  the trade reciprocity between the ACP and the EU induced by EPAs, do you feel that  the 
label of  EU-ACP ‘special relations’ as conceived by the Treaty of  Rome is now less relevant in 
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actual economic sense?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Less 
relevant 
 
 
CNO 
6. For your regions negotiators, how strong was the view that reciprocal EPAs were the best option in 
resolving EU-ACP Cotonou Agreements WTO inconsistency? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Very 
strongly 
 
 
7. To what extent were you of  the view that a reciprocal EPA between EU and your region/state 
would generally promote exports, export diversification and competition for your state/region 
better than the preferential Cotonou Agreement?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Strongly  
 
8. After 2007, how important was an expeditious conclusion to the EPA negotiation (i.e as matter of  
time how important was legal compliancy with WTO) to your region? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Very 
important 
 
 
9. To what extent were your region’s negotiators of  the view that EPAs would be economically 
detrimental to your state/region’s economic competitiveness in the long term? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Very 
much 
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10. To what extent were your negotiators of  the view that to accomplish the ‘development’ dimension, 
the EU ought to compensate ACP states for fiscal losses due to EPA liberalization?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Very 
much 
 
 
NOI 
11. To what extent were your negotiating preferences driven by a desire to diminish your region/state’s 
dependency on unilateral EU-ACP preferential market access regimes (GSP or EBA)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Very 
much 
 
 
12. To what extent do you feel that EU negotiating positions and attitude during EPA negotiations were 
informed (or constrained) by historical roles and expectations brought over from previous EU-ACP 
negotiations (Yaoundé, Lome, Cotonou)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
13. As an ACP negotiator did you feel that the EU’s negotiating positions/offers on the FTA aspects of  
the EPAs (eg. in trade liberalization duration, volume of  liberalization, negotiating timeframe, RoO, 
etc) were more generous than for other recent EU’s FTAs with developing countries?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   More 
generous  
 
        
        
14. If  so on question 13, (4 - 7) do you feel that such generosity was informed by a strong sense of  EU’s 
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special historical responsibility for ACP states’ development and good economic performance in their 
quest to integrate into the global trading system?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly 
so  
 
 
15. How much was your desire for extension of  negotiation deadline from (2007 to 2014…and possibly 
beyond) informed by a motive to have mutually acceptable EPA agreements through consensus, even 
if  it took more time beyond the initial WTO imposed deadline to do so, rather than agreements 
(GSP or EPAs) largely dictated by time constraints? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   strongly  
 
16. In your experience, to what extent was speed of  negotiations held back by EU or your region’s 
negotiators sensitivity to breaking-up, or perceptions of  breaking-up of  regional coherence in your 
region? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
 
17. In your experience, to what extent was EU willingness to extend the negotiating period beyond the 
WTO mandated 2007 deadline, informed by EU negotiators sensitivity not to undermine (or avoid 
accusations of  antagonizing) the stability of  EU- ACP relations/partnership? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
18. To what extent do you feel that aspects of  EU-ACP historical, formalized (Yaoundé, Lome, Cotonou) 
and preferential economic relations were an asset in fomenting a cooperative spirit during the EPA 
negotiations process?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
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Not at 
all 
  Moderately   strongly  
 
19. How influential was the idea of  maintaining EU-ACP ‘special relations’ important in informing your 
negotiating objectives, preferences and attitudes? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
20. Were you surprised by the EU’s interest in and expenditure of  €20 million in capacity building in 
support of  ACP states’ negotiating capacity for EPA negotiations?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
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The Subjective Value Inventory for the EU 
IN EU-ACP ECONIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATION 2002-2014 
 
On the request of Elijah N. Munyi, 
PhD Fellow Aalborg University, Denmark. 
munyi@cgs.aau.dk 
 
General Instructions:  For each question, please circle a number from 1-7 that most accurately reflects 
your opinion.  You will notice that some of the questions are similar to one another; this is primarily to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire.  Please simply answer each question 
independently, without reference to any of the other questions.  
 
Important:  If you encounter a particular question that is not applicable to your negotiation, simply 
circle “NA.”  Even if you have not reached a definitive final agreement, please try to answer as many 
questions as possible. In your answers use the most up-to-date form of the EPA agreement that has been 
mutually agreed between yourself and respective ACP region or state
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NOI 
        
1. To what extent were the EU’s negotiating objectives driven by a motive to diminish ACP 
dependency on unilateral EU-ACP preferential market access regimes (GSP or EBA)?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
2. To what extent do you feel that ACP negotiating preferences and attitudes during EPA 
negotiations were informed by historical roles and expectations brought over from previous EU-
ACP negotiations (Yaoundé, Lome, Cotonou)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
3. As an EU negotiator did you feel that the EU’s negotiating positions/offers on the FTA aspects of  
the EPAs (eg. in trade liberalization duration, volume of  liberalization, negotiating timeframe, 
RoO, etc) were more generous than for other recent EU’s FTAs with developing countries?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   More 
generous  
 
        
4. If  so on question 13, (4 - 7) was such generosity informed by the ACP-EU special relations and the 
EU’s sense of  special responsibility for ACP states’ development and good economic performance 
as these states (ACP) integrate into the global trading system?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly 
so  
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5. How much was the extension of  negotiation deadline from (2007 to 2014) informed by an EU 
motive to have mutually acceptable EPA agreements through consensus, even if  it took more time 
beyond the initial WTO imposed deadline to do so, rather than have agreements (GSP or EPAs) 
largely dictated by time constraints? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   strongly  
 
6. In your experience, to what extent was speed of  negotiations held back by EU negotiators 
sensitivity to breaking-up, or perceptions of  breaking-up of  regional ACP regions coherence, or 
outright lack of  coherence among ACP regions? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Seriously  
 
7. In your experience, to what extent was willingness to extend the negotiating period beyond 2007 
informed by EU negotiators sensitivity not to undermine (or avoid accusations of  antagonizing) 
the stability of  EU- ACP relations/partnership? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
8. To what extent do you feel that aspects of  EU-ACP historical, formalized (Yaoundé, Lome, 
Cotonou) and preferential economic relations were an asset in fomenting a cooperative spirit 
between the EU and ACP regions during the EPA negotiations process?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   strongly  
 
9. How influential was the idea of  maintaining EU-ACP ‘special relations’ important in informing 
your negotiating objectives and preferences? 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
ON VALIDITY AND CODING OF THE SVI 
 
It should be made clear from the very start that while I highlight some questions in this short section, 
all the questions in each respective domain are used in calculating the ACP or EU normative or 
institutional convergence or entrapment. The highlight is given as an exercise in establishment of 
validity in the connection between the questions asked, and the variables that the questions seek to 
probe. The ACP SVI is divided into three sections. Section IO (questions 1-5) seeks to evaluate the 
feelings on negotiator satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) from the instrumental outcomes – hence the code 
of IO. While we have five questions in the section the two key questions which precisely are set to 
measure satisfaction are questions 1 and 2: 
 
How satisfied are you with the current EPA outcomes—i.e., the extent to which current state of the 
agreements reflects your original EPA objectives? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Very 
satisfied 
 
 
As negotiators to what extent do you feel that the EPA current outcomes broadly reflect the wishes of 
(and are thus acceptable to) your most dominant domestic constituency (politicians and business)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
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Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly 
acceptable 
 
 
Section two the ACP SVI is titled CNO and it comprises questions 6-10. CNO stands for 
Convergence on Negotiation Objectives and these questions set out to assess ACP negotiators 
levels of persuasion on the putative benefits and objectives of EPAs as framed by the EU 
during the negotiation. The EU negotiating mandate frames35 the EPAs as being tools of 
enhancing economic development and competitiveness.  As section 2.2 of the 2002 mandate 
outlines, EPAs were established for the purpose of enlarging ACP markets, increasing trade 
flows and competitiveness and thus aiding in economic development. The EPAs were framed 
as developmental FTAs that would enhance export diversification and general economic 
competitiveness of the ACP states. How persuasive was this framing on the objectives of EPA 
for the ACP negotiators? To what extent were ACP negotiators of this EU mindset on the 
objectives of EPAs? The three most important questions here are 7, 9 and 10. 
 
To what extent were you of the view that a reciprocal EPA between EU and your region/state would 
generally promote exports, export diversification and competition for your state/region better than 
the preferential Cotonou Agreement?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Strongly  
 
                                                 
 
 
35 EU negotiating mandate 2002, section 2.2 
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To what extent were your region’s negotiators of the view that EPAs would be economically 
detrimental to your state/region’s economic competitiveness in the long term? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Very 
much 
 
 
To what extent were your negotiators of the view that to accomplish the ‘development’ dimension, the 
EU ought to compensate ACP states for fiscal losses due to EPA liberalization?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Very 
much 
 
 
Questions 7 and 9 test the negotiator persuasion on the supposed putative benefits of an EPA. 
Question 10 crucially, tests the ACP states view on the role of asymmetry.  The greater the 
feeling amongst an ACP state’s negotiators that the EU ought to compensate them for their 
liberalization losses, the greater we can deduce a clientlist attitude fuelled by a higher degree 
of asymmetrical expectation and relational exchange. Those states which do not seek or expect 
compensation show a higher propensity for more ‘equal’ relations where the exchange is more 
purely commercial than relational. Such states – we would aver- would be more likely to 
accept an EPA faster even if the EU doesn’t give material incentives to catalyze their 
acceptance. 
 
The third category of questions in the ACP SVI (11-20) is under the code NOI which stands for 
Normative Institutionalism. Questions 11-19 in the ACP SVI are same questions as the EU’s 
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SVI question 1-9. Question 20 in the ACP questionnaire was not deemed pertinent on the EU’s 
side and was thus left out. Hence unlike the ACP’s SVI which is longer and which is used to 
examine satisfaction and belief convergence in addition to institutional constraints, the EU SVI 
evaluates EU negotiators only on feelings of institutional constraints.  This is because EU lead 
negotiators imposed stringent demands on a scaled-down, shorter SVI and thus I sought to 
measure only those aspects of the EU position that could not be gleaned from other sources of 
literature. In both cases (EU and ACP questionnaires) the questions under NOI are designed to 
evaluate negotiator feelings about the role of institutions and EU-ACP historical relations in 
constraining the behavior and preferences and consequently outcomes of the EPA 
negotiations. How intensely do the norms of EU-ACP historical institutions and relations 
affect the conduct and outcomes of the EPA negotiations? These norms include: 
 
A norm of consensus in negotiation (question 15 and 17) 
How much was the extension of negotiation deadline from (2007 to 2014) informed by an EU motive 
to have mutually acceptable EPA agreements through consensus, even if it took more time beyond the 
initial WTO imposed deadline to do so, rather than have agreements (GSP or EPAs) largely dictated 
by time constraints? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   strongly  
 
In your experience, to what extent was EU willingness to extend the negotiating period beyond the 
WTO mandated 2007 deadline, informed by EU negotiators sensitivity not to undermine (or avoid 
accusations of antagonizing) the stability of EU- ACP relations/partnership? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
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Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
Norms of fostering regional integration (questions 16) 
In your experience, to what extent was speed of negotiations held back by EU or your region’s 
negotiators sensitivity to breaking-up, or perceptions of breaking-up of regional coherence in your 
region? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
 
Norms of ‘special responsibility’ and ‘special’ allegiance  
As an ACP negotiator did you feel that the EU’s negotiating positions/offers on the FTA aspects of 
the EPAs (eg. in trade liberalization duration, volume of liberalization, negotiating timeframe, RoO, 
etc) were more generous than for other recent EU’s FTAs with developing countries?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   More 
generous  
 
 
If so on question 13, (4 - 7)  (above) do you feel that such generosity was informed by a strong sense of 
EU’s special historical responsibility for ACP states’ development and good economic performance in 
their quest to integrate into the global trading system?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at   Moderately   Strongly  
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all so  
 
How influential was the idea of maintaining EU-ACP ‘special relations’ important in informing your 
negotiating objectives, preferences and attitudes? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
Were you surprised by the EU’s interest in and expenditure of €20 million in capacity building in 
support of ACP states’ negotiating capacity for EPA negotiations?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Strongly  
 
 
Having explained the coding of the SVI questionnaire as was used in the survey, the next few 
paragraphs briefly expound on the linkage between the survey questions and the research 
question and the preliminary research suppositions. 
 
On Satisfaction: Satisfaction as affect, conditional on belief 
Questions 1-5 of the ACP SVI sought to measure the general satisfaction of ACP negotiators 
with the process and outcomes of EPA. The responses on these questions can tell us at the least 
who is most (or least satisfied) with the process and outcomes. However based on the working 
outcomes and assertions of this work from section 4.2 that there are no significant differences 
in the distribution characteristics of the ACP states’ outcomes, based on the responses issued 
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here we are forced to ask the question of why are some ACP regions or states are (or feel) more 
satisfied than others? Why do those who feel satisfied feel so? The question of satisfaction is 
one seen as an incidental corollary affirmation to the idea of belief convergence and efficiency 
in EPA ratification. The hypothesis would be that those states that had greater belief 
convergence with the EU were more likely to express satisfaction. Being incidental to the 
primary tasks of this work it is not deeply pursued beyond the answers provided in the SVI. 
 
On Credibility of Negotiation Objectives (belief convergence)  
This is absolutely key. This attributes seek to test the relationship between belief convergence 
and efficiency in conclusion of negotiation. The hypothesis is that the greater the belief 
convergence between the EU and a respective ACP dyad, the greater the propensity to ratify 
by that ACP region and vice versa.  As part of the analysis Question 9 and 10 are isolated as 
the most relevant to testing the belief convergence between the two parties as they relate to 
precisely the two key issues in the EPA negotiations: EPAs as instruments to spur economic 
competitiveness and an ACP state’s perception on EPAs as either strengthening or weakening 
EU-ACP asymmetrical relations. Question 9 deals with the purported economic objective 
(utility) of EPAs. Question 10 deals with the development aspect of EPA and what it was 
perceived to entail since EPA were framed as supposed to be developmental in some way 
(asymmetry). In my interpretation, this being a Free Trade Agreement where the objective is 
inevitably some degree of trade liberalization by both parties, an expectation of financial 
compensation by one party to the other on the basis of the latter’s loss due to liberation is an 
indication asymmetrical expectation.  Thus by evaluating the degree of expectation of financial 
compensation on the ACP states, we can tell their disposition towards asymmetry. 
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On Normative Institutionalism: EU-ACP negotiations as ‘Special’ 
This section of questions examines the negotiator feelings on how they are constrained by the 
historical EU-ACP institutions. If the negotiators show a high level of having felt constrained 
(in behavior, preferences and predisposition) then we can deduce the role of the EU-ACP 
special relations as it impacts the negotiation.  Rather than the intra-ACP regions/states 
variances, the questions in this section are primarily designed to evaluate why negotiations in 
the super dyad (EU-ACP wide) have been very slow and protracted. In essence why has the 
EU had to put up with the protraction even though it could simply have relegated all non-
ratifying ACP states into the GSP in 2008? 
 
Key Negotiators and the Process of Soliciting for Negotiator Responses 
One of the key consideration and element in the survey interviews was the problem of 
identifying who the key negotiators for each ACP state were. While the key Cariforum and EU 
negotiators were easy to identify (from the EU’s Directorate of Trade rooster on management 
of bilateral Trade relations)36  key negotiators from the ACP are not overtly apparent. The 
approach in identifying these individuals was therefore guided by the references I was given 
by each of these states (or regional secretariat) personnel from the Ministries of Trade, Foreign 
Affairs or these states Brussels Embassy offices. In the case of all SADC responses the 
                                                 
 
 
36 The Cariforum College of Negotiators was a clearly constituted and publically known group of supranational 
negotiators from the cariforum states. See 
http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=99&0872a8d70c6252b7726
1d45b4779477d=9e61c804b7002b34ec4611dbfe6d2dd2 
Those from the EU could be identified from here. See 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/august/tradoc_144247.pdf 
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respondents were met face-to-face at a negotiation round in Brussels in May 2013. In this case, 
(as in others) the responses would often be done by the team of three or four negotiators. In 
cases where more than one response was availed (such as from the Cariforum group or the 
EU), the position of the lead negotiator would be considered in the analysis. 
3.2.2.5 Data Analysis: Analytic Induction 
Using the data derived from the qualitative data set, use analytic induction to determine the 
factors that seem to have played the most prominent role in determining the nature of 
concessions, efficiency and wins. The hypothesis here twofold: Efficiency (in terms of how fast 
the ACP regions accepted and subsequently ratified an EPA) could be attributed to several 
variables which are all evaluated in SVI questionnaires using a set of four main categories of 
normative persuasion. These are: (i) a state’s degree of normative persuasion on utility of 
EPAs, (ii) a state’s normative persuasion (compliance vs. internalization) of EPA ratification, 
(iii) a state’s feelings of fairness in process and satisfaction with outcomes and (iv) a state’s 
degree of asymmetrical expectation from the EU. Is there a relationship between the efficiency 
(EPA ratification) and each of these attributes? How does each of these attributes affect a 
state’s propensity to ratify an EPA? 
 
The focus of Analytic Induction is the exploration and unveiling of regularities in the social 
world. As Keith Punch asserts in quoting Kelle, this method of data analysis involves a ‘series 
of inductive and deductive steps whereby data driven inductive hypothesis generation is 
followed by deductive hypothesis examination of the purpose of verification’ (Punch, 2005: 
196). As explained by both W.S. Robinson (in Bryman and Burgess, 1999) and Punch (2005) 
Analytic induction fits very well with the process and purposes of this work which is finding a 
regularity that fittingly explains the propensity of ACP states to accept a free trade agreement 
with the EU. As Punch details the process follows four key steps: 
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- A definition of the phenomenon to be explained- (EU-ACP EPA outcomes). 
 
- Some cases of this phenomenon are examined and potential explanatory features 
identified- (variance among the 33 initialing states). 
 
- A hypothetical explanation is framed on the basis of analysis of data designed to identify 
common factors across the cases. 
 
- Further cases are investigated to test the hypothesis and this leads to a process of testing 
and reformulation of hypothesis until validity of hypothesis is affirmed among all cases. 
(Punch, 2005: 197) 
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4 THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTER 
4.1 Introduction 
The two sub-questions questions in this dissertation are what explains the variances within 
ACP regions in their propensity to sign an EPA agreement? And two, what explains ACP’s 
inordinate ability to defend against the EU in this 12-year negotiation in spite of the patent 
material asymmetry between the two parties?  Both questions deal with the element of 
efficiency in negotiation analysis, (as opposed to the question of distribution characteristics).  
They are thus sub-questions to the principal question. Negotiation efficiency refers to the time 
taken for completion of the negotiation. 
 
In order to deal with the question of efficiency persuasively, the initial sections of the empirical 
section are used to demonstrate the minimal variances in the distribution characteristics of EU-
ACP dyads. These variances (in distribution characteristics- how the pie is shared) being found 
to be minimal, then establish a sound foundation for examination of efficiency as the more 
compelling element of variance in outcomes and hence this dissertation’s main focus. Thus 
section 4.2 is actually used to deal with the distribution characteristics of the various ACP-EU 
dyads. The idea behind this section is the argument that with regard to the most contentious 
issues of the EPA negotiations, we actually do not have major variances in distribution 
outcomes among the various ACP regions or states. Thus although there are patent economic 
variations in different ACP regions/states (in terms of economy size, GDP per capita, export 
diversification, and experience in trade negotiations,  etc.) all these factors do not seem to 
produce any substantive differences in how well ACP states defend or successfully claim from 
the EU. As section 4.2 shows, the pattern of distribution outcomes of EPAs across the ACP 
regions and states is quite standard. The uniformity of results from distribution outcomes for 
all ACP regions therefore suggests that the EU inordinately influenced these patterns and thus 
most ACP states simply carved to the EU preferences. One caveat on this uniformity is the case 
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of the Cariforum region which from a purely distributional point of view (in other words 
without considering the foundations of its preferences) seems to have ‘lost’ comparatively 
more aspects of policy space than the African or pacific regions. This is an interesting ‘loss’ for 
the Cariforum and one which merits our interest. Does this loss mean ‘loss’ mean negotiation 
ineptitude on the part of the Cariforum negotiators, or does it suggest a greater (than the 
African and Pacific states) normative agreement with the objectives of perceived policy space 
loss? In addition, if the distribution outcomes of different ACP states and regions are indeed 
more or less uniform (as we show) then this will equally suggest the irrelevance of coalitions 
in the negotiations. If the outcomes among ACP regions with different clusters end up being 
uniform, then it suggests that the composition of the clusters was irrelevant to the outcome. 
This is partly why the coalition’s hypothesis is not seriously pursued at an empirical level. At 
any rate section 4.2 is intended to showcase the final EPA distribution outcomes based on each 
parties initial preferences, and eventually show the widespread uniformity in these outcomes 
across the initialing (or ratifying) ACP states. 
 
Having established the relative uniformity in distribution outcomes from section 4.2, section 
4.3 then delves into the two deductive theoretical foundations of the research question. How 
compelling is material dependency (trade) a factor in explaining variances in efficiency?  Is 
trade dependence the most compelling factor that explains why some regions conceded or 
failed to concede to the EU’s objectives?  Is the role of believe and norm convergence 
discounted as a variable in explaining how fast a negotiating dyad reaches its agreement?  The 
objective of the empirical chapter is to present empirical data from the EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements negotiations which begin the process of answering the research 
question. The first section of the empirical section broaches on a description of these variances. 
Based on the empirical outlay presented here further theoretical inferences will be drawn in 
subsequent analysis chapters. A key aspect of section 4.3 is to show that contrary to  theoretical 
suppositions about the primacy of trade dependence in compelling an agreement, this 
supposition does not appear be affirmed in the EU-ACP EPAs.  Norm convergence (or 
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ideational liberalism), a variable arrived at after initial elite interviews with ACP and EU 
negotiators seems to be a more cogent explanatory variable for inter-state cooperation in 
asymmetrical negotiations. To present my arguments the empirical chapter will be geared 
towards an empirical demonstration of three key negotiational outcomes of ACP- EU EPA. 
 
i. One, to show that the EU ‘wins’ on key contested (distributional) issues of the 
negotiation. By mapping out the zone of agreement on key negotiated issues, data on 
EPA outcomes at 2007 initialing stage show that final distributional agreements are 
closer to the EU’s original objectives than they are to the ACP regions’ (and states) 
initial preferences. ‘Negotiation success’ is based on a clear definition of success or loss 
as the divergence between pre-negotiational objectives and the final agreements. 
However, even though the EPA initialing of 2007 shows a vindication of the trade 
dependence hypothesis, this win is only temporarily since many of the initialing states 
withhold ratification by up to six years.  Hence this trade dependence supposition 
doesn’t explain what happens after 2007 with regard to the propensity with which 
various ACP groups have ratified the EPAs. This is done in section 4.2 while 4.3 tests 
the deductive suppositions raised by trade dependence thesis. 
ii. Two, to show that there are intra-ACP variations in outcomes which range from full 
acceptance of comprehensive EPA to no EPA at all. These differences in fact constitute 
the main intra-ACP states differences with regard to this negotiations. As shown in 
section (a) most of the ACP regions agree to the EU’s objectives. But while some only 
seem to comply, others are veritably ‘converted’. What explains variances in efficiency 
(time) of EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements? The empirical evidence from 
interviews and surveys done show that these differences can be explained by the degree 
of state (or region’s) belief in the merits of EU objectives in spurring economic 
development as well as their view of EU-ACP asymmetry. This are arguments based on 
the empirical findings of elite interviews (section 4.4) and the SVI questionnaires 
responses (section 4.5) issued to negotiators of all initialing states. 
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iii. Three, to show that the ACP has a unique associative resistance power to the EU 
offensive. One, many of the ACP states successfully37 defend against a quick 
capitulation to accepting an EPA. These states delay ratification (legality and 
application) of agreements reached in 2007 (in spite of initialing). Consequently in spite 
of having the ‘interim’ agreements initialed, the EU has been forced to keep the 
preferential provisions of Cotonou beyond 2007 (possibly up to 2016) for at least 21 of 
the 36 states that initialed an agreement in 2007. Two, that the ACP states have been 
successful in pushing for a re-negotiation of some of the agreements reached in 2007. A 
big compromise for the EU in this regard has been to accept the goods only FTA 
contrary to their initial ambition of a comprehensive (goods and services) FTA. How is 
it that the EU has been pushed to agree a renegotiation by these ACP states which are 
putatively weaker and more materially dependent on the EU? This is done in section 
4.6. 
 
4.2 Mapping the Negotiation Zone: The Dependent Variable and Defining Success 
The variable of interest and the one whose explanation the study seeks is the EPA outcomes. 
Negotiated outcomes can be explained in terms of either distributional characteristics (who 
gets what, of the shared pie) or in terms of efficiency (how fast and Pareto optimal are the 
outcomes reached? This section deals with the distributional characteristics. To define gains 
and losses and delimit the definitions of measuring negotiation success for both parties (the 
                                                 
 
 
37 I argue that these states are successful because they regard the delay as a success which, as long as they can 
withhold the operationalization of the FTA, without leading to a breakdown of the negotiation, means that they 
can still maintain their preferential exports to the EU, while still applying tariffs to EU imports into their 
territories.  
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EU and the ACP) the study examines agreements on eight of what have been referred to as the 
most contentious issues of the EPA negotiation. Negotiating ‘success’ or ‘loss’ is measured by a 
comparison of the final agreements to the states’ original (pre negotiation) objectives. 
Negotiation success or loss can also be assessed by comparing the degrees of relative 
concessions. ‘Who concedes more on each issue and on the overall negotiation?  Simply put, 
negotiating loss or success in this work follows an Odellian definition of ‘…a government’s 
own objectives and relative to what would have happened if it had simply accepted other’s 
decisions’ (Odell, 2010: 545). It is equally important to note that negotiation success or loss 
does not refer to the actual impacts, positive or adverse, that the negotiated outcomes procure. 
This section therefore will present the selected contentious issues, the agreements reached on 
them, and juxtapose those final agreements with the regions’ (or states’) pre-negotiational 
objectives to show the direction and extent of concessions by each party. 
 
The main outcomes are predicated on selected 8 objectives which constituted what have been 
referred to as the most contentious issues of the negotiation. These contentious issues are 
therefore deemed as representing the core aspects of contestation and which defined what was 
at stake for both parties. The selection of these outcome variables is based not only on the 
stated pre-negotiation objectives of both parties’ negotiation mandates, but also on other 
elements of objectives introduced during the negotiating process. This is outlined in numerous 
publications that have identified what have emerged as the most contentious issues in the 
negotiation (South Centre, Analytical note SC/TDP/AN, 2013, Bilal and Lui, 2009; OPPD and 
the EU Parliament, 2011; Bilal and Ramdoo, 2010; South Centre, 2010; Sindzingre, 2011; Bilal, 
2002; Bilal and Stevens, 2009;). Together with other official EU and ACP documents such as the 
EU and ACP negotiating mandates, these publications comprise the major source of my data. 
 
Both the EU and ACP negotiating mandates outline, albeit fuzzily what each party considered 
to be the main objectives of EPA. As with any Free Trade Agreement the ends of what the 
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agreements ought to have achieved were agreeable. But contentions soon arose as to how these 
ends were to be achieved. These broad objectives from both parties negotiating mandates are 
briefly outlined here. Further, the specific contentious issues are then outlined and thinned 
into the eight core issues of contention. 
 
In order to introduce these contested issues, the following section briefly introduces the ACP 
and EU’s EPA objectives and common principles as were conceived by their negotiating 
mandates prior to start of the negotiations in 2002. Both the EU’s negotiating mandate 
[Commission of the European Communities. (2002) ‘Council Decision Authorising the Commission to 
Negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements with the ACP countries and regions] and the ACP’s 
negotiating mandate   [ACP. (2002) ‘ACP Guidelines for the Negotiations of Economic Partnership 
Agreements’] were in agreement on a number of broad objectives for EPAs as outlined below: 
 
a)  WTO compatibility 
Both parties’ mandates were keenly aware of the WTO litigation that had caused the EU to 
consider ending preferential treatment of ACP imports into the EU. The achievement of Free 
Trade Agreement was thus a shared objective. As the EU’s mandate stated, ‘EPAs must be 
compatible with provisions of the WTO…liberalization of trade in goods must therefore be 
undertaken, in particular, in conformity with the provisions of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994…’ (Commission of European Communities, 2002: 5)  Similarly, the ACP mandate, in its 
very first paragraph agreed with the 2000 Cotonou Agreement provision that the EU and ACP 
states should reach “new World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatible trading arrangements, 
removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas 
relevant to trade” (ACP, 2002: 1). As in any other FTA, the actualization of WTO compatibility 
requirements was actualised by negotiations on the degree of trade liberalization 
(Substantially all Trade within a reasonable period) that each party would undertake to 
achieve WTO legality. While contentious, agreement has been settled based on the EU’s 
benchmark of a minimum 80% trade liberalisation within 15 year period. 
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b) EPAs as generators for economic development 
Apart from safeguarding ACP-EU trade treaties through WTO compliance, both the EU and 
the ACP group regarded EPAs as very deliberately aimed at resolving some of the 
developmental and export deficiencies that ACP states were experiencing. For the EU 
particularly, having assessed the effect of its asymmetrical preferential trading treaties to the 
ACP as dismal in precipitating ‘a competitive private sector, the growth of investment or 
diversification of production’ (Commission of European Communities, 1996: xiii), the EPAs 
were seen as an opportunity to correct for this dismal performance of ACP states in export 
expansion. The EPAs were thus intentioned to stimulate growth of ACP states by among other 
things encouraging further openness and competition among ACP member states and 
introducing reciprocity in trade. As the EU mandate very strongly puts it, the ‘Partnership 
established by the Cotonou Agreement is "centred on the objective of reducing and eventually 
eradicating poverty, consistent with sustainable development and the gradual integration of 
ACP countries into the world economy". EPAs must serve this objective. They are therefore 
above all an instrument for development’38 (Commission of European Communities, 2002: 3). 
The ACP is similarly ardent in placing the developmental aspect of EPA at the core of the 
negotiation. Their mandate emphasizes that since many of EPA states were Least Developed 
states (LDCs) as of 2002, and that many people in these states lived below the poverty lines, 
‘development’ as an EPA objective had to ‘be at the core of EPA negotiations’ (ACP, 2002: 5). 
For both parties the centrality of development as an objective was never in question. However, 
the definition and actualization of what entailed the development components of the EPA has 
been one of the most, if not the most contested issue of the negotiation. While the ACP group 
                                                 
 
 
38 The EU mandate itself emphasizes this dimension.  
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had a concrete vision of development as meaning monetary compensation for liberalization 
costs, in consistence with previous EU-ACP negotiation rounds, the EU regarded the 
development concept as generally woven and embedded in the whole process of trade and 
services liberalization. 
 
c) Regional Integration 
Since the treaty of Rome, regionalisation and the encouragement of regionalization has been a 
keen objective of ACP-EU relations. Since 1957, the EU and ACP states have been perpetually 
lured by the prospect of having a Customs Union built on an agreement between a 
commercially integrated EU and an integrated ACP customs union. 
 
 
As such, both parties’ mandates underscore the need for the EPAs to help in consolidation of 
existing regional integration schemes among ACP states. As the ACP states expressed it, ‘EPAs 
should therefore support the ACP regional integration processes/initiatives based on the 
principle of sequencing and not undermine them (ACP, 2002: 8). This is supported by the EU 
mandate which similarly expresses the importance of using EPAs to consolidate and 
deepening ongoing regional integration processes among ACP states. While the intention at 
the beginning of the negotiations was to have regionalised negotiations and agreements, the 
ACP states have become fragmented and the EU has had to reach final agreements with 
individual states such as in the case of Ghana, Ivory Coast and Cameroon. Some big ACP 
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negotiating groups such as the East and Southern Africa (ESA) and the South African 
Development Community (SADC) have also splintered into camps. 
 
d) Differentiation (special and differential) 
Right from the start of the negotiations, the ACP group also made it clear that it expected 
asymmetrical (more lenient) treatment in the balance of liberalisation with the EU. As their 
mandate observed, ‘the provision of special and differential treatment to ACP States must be 
an essential consequence of the differentiation between the ACP and the EU based on equity 
and recognizing their different levels of development’ (ACP, 2002: 7). Thus, although the ACP 
was agreeable to eventually having reciprocal trade with the EU, it was expected that the 
process of liberalization would be asymmetrical in favour of the ACP states. This was because, 
the ACP argued, it had different, and in effect more dire economic needs than the EU. Thus the 
EU was urged to exercise flexibility, which it accepted. For the EU though, differentiation 
meant not only variances in speed of liberalization but also variances in expectations between 
the treatment of LDCs and non-LDC among ACP states. As such the LDC states within the 
ACP had less urgency to join in the EPA agreements since their preferential export schemes to 
the EU were not under threat. 
4.2.1 The Negotiation Zone: The Contentious Issues of the EU-ACP Negotiation 
The negotiating success or concession in this negotiation is predicated on the balance of 
concession that each party makes to the other party’s demands and aspirations. The issues 
described above simply set out the broad objectives of the EPA process. The determination of 
concessions is founded on agreements reached on a set of contentious issues. This section 
introduces, defines and describes the respective position in the select (most) contested issues. 
A number of these contentious issues (eight) are then selected and used to calibrate a zone of 
negotiation and possibility frontier around which the negotiated agreements fell. 
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The South Centre has documented39 at least 20 issues which it characterizes as being deemed 
contentious. However, some of the issues listed by the South Centre’s as contentious only 
affected one or other region but were not issues that were contested or controversial within the 
entire ACP. Since my study examines the intra-ACP divergences, it is therefore necessary to 
use issues that were roundly contentious among all the seven ACP negotiating groups. The 
study will therefore focus on a fewer number of contentious issues which were shared by all 
ACP regions as well as the EU. This particular smaller number of contentious issues have been 
most exactingly articulated and broached on by the European Centre for development Policy 
Management (ECPDM). They include; negotiations on (i) liberalization volume, (ii) 
liberalization duration (these two comprise SAT), (iii) Development support and liberalization 
compensation, (iv) infant industry safeguards, (v) export taxes, (vi) Most Favored Nation 
clause (vii) EPA legality and negotiation time frame and (viii) EPA Comprehensivity (goods 
only or goods and services).  These are the contentious issues used to map the negotiation zone 
and determine the nature of the wins and losses. 
 
These factors together constitute the main aspects of the “cake” to be shared although this is 
not a definitive list.40 The indicators comprise what were considered the most contentious 
aspects of the negotiation and in essence defined the ‘pie’ to be shared. By examining the 
outcomes in each of these objectives we can deduce the distribution characteristics of the 
outcomes. The indicators for success are based on three main considerations: First, (a) those 
                                                 
 
 
39 South Centre, 2010 ‘EPA Contentious Issues Matrix: State of Play, Key Problems and Recommendations’ 
40
 The negotiation objectives included many other aspects not included in these indicators such as if  commodity protocols 
would be maintained, the inclusion of bilateral safeguards, national treatment clauses in the EPAs, the establishment of a 
dispute settlement mechanism and agreements in services (mode 4). 
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indicators which were manifestly outlined in the pre-negotiation mandates for both the EU 
and the ACP41 and thus which show the regions’ privileged preferences. The three factors 
which come out as pre-eminent in the objectives were WTO compliance (liberalization 
exclusion and duration), EPA compensation packages and comprehensive agreements beyond 
trade agreements.  Secondly (b), the research examines factors which as much as possible 
featured in all the negotiations between the EU and the seven ACP negotiating groups and 
which constitute what have been regarded42 as the major contentious issues.  This means that 
the factors examined have an abounding relevance for all the ACP regions.  In addition, the 
contentious nature of all these preferences give us better chances of drawing comparison and 
examining how different ACP groups faired when pitted against the EU and how the EU 
faired when pitted against the different ACP groups. Some technical aspects of the 
negotiations, such as negotiations on sugar protocols or mode 4 services are left out because 
they had overwhelming exclusive importance only in particular regions. Third, (c) In order to 
have a suitably standardized comparison of the outcomes, the research sought indicators 
which would all fit into a continuous variable (quantitative measures) and a discreet variable 
measure (for the qualitative comparisons). 
(1) Substantially All Trade, and 
(2) Duration of Liberalization 
Under Article XXIV of WTO law, a Free Trade Agreement, such as the EU and ACP states 
wanted to achieve, has to fulfill two basic requirements: 
                                                 
 
 
41 ACP Guidelines for the Negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements. ACP/61/056/02. Brussels 5th July 
2002 
42 See Dan Lui and Sanoussi Bilal’s ‘Contentious issues in the interim EPAs.’ ECPM Discussion paper no. 89, 2009. 
http://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/contentious-issues-epa-eu-doc.pdf 
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a) A free trade area (as defined in article XXIV, 8 (b) of GATT) is an association that 
eliminates barriers to imports from members on “substantially all” trade among them. 
b) An agreement leading to the establishment of a free trade area should be reached within 
“a reasonable period of time” (Jackson, Davey and Sykes, 2002: 453). 
 
For the EU-ACP Free Trade Agreement to be compliant with WTO law, the contention in the 
negotiation therefore was over how much trade liberalization each party had to undertake for 
the EPA agreements to be accepted as WTO compliant.  As Jackson, Davey and Sykes observe 
however, the questions of what ‘substantially all trade’ or ‘reasonable period’ concretely meant 
was never given a clear answer. Regarding the liberalization time frame, this grey zone has 
been interpreted by the WTO to mean the length of time allowed for liberalization for the FTA 
agreement to be complete should only exceed 10 years ‘only exceptional cases’ (Jackson, Davey 
and Sykes, 2002: 454). Yet what constituted an exceptional case was left to interpretation. 
 
Table 8: Region’s Initial Positions and Final Agreements and Final Positions on SAT 
 
REGIONS Initial Proposals. Final (I)EPA Outcomes Comments 
 Liberalization 
Volume 
Liberalization 
Duration 
L.V. L.D.  
 
 
In all regions 
where SAT is 
EU 80% 15 years   
     
Central Africa 
Cameroon 
60% 20  
79% 
 
15 years 
ESA 70% 20 years   
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Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
80% 
80% 
15 years 
15 years 
contested, 
final outcomes 
reflect the 
EU’s pre-
negotiation 
thresholds of 
80% volume 
in 15 years. 
 
 
The EU has its 
way 
West Africa 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Ghana 
70% 25 years  
81% 
80% 
 
13 years 
14 years 
SADC 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Swaziland  
Mozambique 
Not opposed -  
86% 
86% 
86% 
81% 
 
 
4 years 
 
14 years 
EAC Not opposed - 82% 15 years 
CARIFORUM Not opposed - 82% 15 
Pacific 
PNG 
Fiji 
Not opposed -  
88% 
87% 
 
15 years 
15 years 
Sources: OPPD. (2011). Economic Partnership Agreements EU-ACP: Facts and Key issues. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_1/EPAFacts&KeyIssuesFinal-EN.pdf 
Bilal and Stevens. (2009). Interim Economic Agreements between the EU and African States. Contents, Challenges 
and Prospects. Bilal, Sanoussi., De Lombaerde, P., and Tussie, Diana. (2011) Asymmetric Trade Negotiations. 
 
As table 8 above shows, throughout the negotiation, the EU set out clearly and firmly that in 
its view the least acceptable threshold of substantially all trade (SAT) would be 80% over a 
maximum period of 15 years (Lui and Bilal, 2009; Bilal and Ramdoo, 2010; Remco Vahl 
interview, 2012). The EU did not concede any ground on this position throughout the 
negotiations. On the ACP side, there was variation among ACP groups as to what each region 
or even individual states viewed as the fair and WTO acceptable level of liberalization. Some 
states, such as Mauritius, were even willing to liberalize greater volumes of trade, faster than 
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the EU requested of ACP states. The aspired pre-negotiation liberalization duration and 
volume for some ACP regions however, was below the EU target of 80% in 15 years as table 8 
shows. 
(3) Development Support and Liberalization Compensation 
From the onset of these negotiations, the question of what entailed a developmental angle to 
the EPA free trade agreements was highly contested. While the ACP states saw trade 
liberalization as entailing a cost to their economies in tax revenue losses, the EU argued that 
trade liberalization was inherently developmental as it would automatically unleash economic 
competitiveness and export diversification. In addition, the EU argued that regionalized 
negotiations would automatically contribute to enhancing ACP intra- regional convergence 
and hence expand trade. Because of the anticipated tariff revenues losses from liberalization, 
the ACP states contention from the beginning was that the EU should compensate them for 
revenues lost due to liberalization. Under provisions for ‘development cooperation’, the ACP 
negotiating mandate indicated that since in many ACP states, ‘ import duties constituted an 
important part of government revenues, increased liberation of trade would imply loss of 
revenues’( ACP, 2002: 17). As such, the ACP states proposed several measures which would be 
used to defray the anticipated costs of adjustment. The core proposal on measures for 
addressing adjustment costs was that as part of EPA agreements, the EU ought to provide 
‘additional resources, over and above those available under the EDF’….and that these 
‘resources should be committed by the EU through a regular budgeting exercise rather than a 
voluntary basis as is the case currently under the EDF’ (ACP, 2002: 18). For the ACP states 
therefore, the actualization of a developmental aspect in EPA was primarily achievable 
through a legal commitment by the EU to provide more funds to the ACP states over and 
above what was already being provided under the 9th and 10th European Development Fund 
(EDF). Some regions, such as East and Southern Africa (ESA), West Africa and East Africa 
Community (EAC) went further to compute and present so-called developmental matrixes 
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that indicated the resources needed for EPA liberalization support. The initial and final 
positions of both the ACP and EU on development are outlined in table 9 below. 
 
Table 9: Initial Positions and Final Agreements on Development support and Liberalization 
Compensation 
 
Initial ACP Position  Initial EU position  Final EPA Agreements 
EPAs liberalization 
would be a cost in loss 
of revenues. This loss 
should be 
compensated 
 
A demand for a legally 
binding  
compensatory 
mechanism to defray 
liberalization costs of 
EPAs 
 
A demand for 
additional funds over 
and above the existing 
EDF. 
 
That the funds be 
provided in a legally 
obligatory manner, 
unlike the voluntarily 
given EDF.  
 
 EPA liberalization would 
enhance development by 
creating stable, predictable ACP 
economies which would trigger 
more investment, greater intra-
ACP trade, competitiveness and 
economies of scale. 
 
In order to defray economic and 
social costs of EPA 
liberalization, the EU would 
provide ‘appropriate’ support 
measures within the EDF for 
ACP 
 
Pushed further the EU 
commission claimed that it had 
no mandate to negotiate on 
development financing from 
member states.  
  
No legally binding agreement 
on any additional funding for 
mitigating EPA liberalization 
in ACP states. 
 
EU member states however 
committed themselves (under 
no legal basis) to give extra 
funding bilaterally as part of 
aid for trade 
 
The EU agrees to annex the 
regions’ development 
matrixes and make the ‘best 
endeavor’ to mobilize 
resources to support EPA 
related development projects 
and strategies.   
Sources: ACP negotiating mandate, EU negotiating mandate; Omulisa and Trade Negotiations Insight, 2006 
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As table 9 (above) shows, the ACP’s understanding/expectation on development was direct 
financial compensation from the EU as a result of trade liberalization. Faced with a demand to 
compensate ACP states, the EU at first flatly declined the proposal and claimed that it could 
not even discuss the matter of compensation because based on three purported factors: One, 
the EU argued that development financing was a subject of negotiation under the Cotonou 
Agreements and was not to be re-negotiated under EPAs. Therefore the EU resisted the 
introduction of liberalization compensation. Two, the EU argued that the Cotonou Agreements 
had provided for the 10th EDF which had been substantially raised to 22.7 Euros. The EU EDF 
allocations had risen from € 13.5 billion in the period 2000 - 2007 to € 22.7 billion in the period 
2008-2013. The EU was thus of the view that it had substantially increased funding to ACP 
states in the 10th EDF43. Thirdly the EU negotiators claimed that they had no mandate from 
member states to negotiate any details of liberalization compensation. (see Trade Negotiations 
Insight: From Doha to Cotonou 2006). 
 
Eventually, no additional funds over and above existing EDF funds – as the ACP wanted- 
were provided in the final EPA agreements. This represents a clear win for the EU and a loss 
for the ACP states. In a meandering approach the EU member states did however agree to 
provide extra funds bilaterally as part of Aid for Trade and that a substantial part of this 
bilateral assistance would go towards the EPAs negotiation process. In spite of this promise of 
increased funding, the EU remained noncommittal on EPA liberalization funding and the ACP 
goal of extracting a legally binding agreement on the EU providing additional resources over 
and above the EDF failed. Some regions (the EAC for instance) accepted the Aid for Trade 
                                                 
 
 
43 For more on EDF see 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/overseas_countries_territories/r12102_en.htm 
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approach and in return the EU agreed to annex these development matrix to the EPA 
agreement. Consequently the EAC drafted what it called an EPA Development Matrix which 
lists and prioritizes the projects and programs for funding under the EPA related funding. 
Similarly the West African region (ECOWAS) crafted a similar funding matrix known as 
PAPED (Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme). 
(4) Export Taxes 
The total elimination or limitation of the period over which the ACP states could use export 
taxes was another hotly contested objective introduced by the EC. The contention over export 
taxes between the ACP and the EC was not only over if or not to allow their use but  why the 
EC should seek to curtail the policy space of developing ACP states by seeking to limit their 
use of export taxes, a move that was seen as going beyond the exigency of WTO compatibility. 
The WTO makes no obligations on WTO member states against the use of export taxes or fees 
(Jackson, Davey and Sykes, 2002: 396) and therefore the ACP states argued that introduction of 
this quest to curtail use of export taxes by the EC represented violation of ACP states’ 
policymaking, especially in areas where the policy could be used to encourage domestic value 
addition. (See Third World Network, 2007, ‘ACP Ministers clarify their EPA principles and 
options’ and CUTs International, 2009 ‘Export Taxes and EPAs; another Policy Tool under Thr
eat from the EC?’). 
 
Since the mid-2000s, the EC has continually called for a complete ban on export taxes both at 
the multilateral (WTO) and bilateral levels.44 The EC’s broad policy objectives is its concern 
                                                 
 
 
44 See Communications from the EC: “Activity report on export taxes to the NGMA” (JOB(05)/321, 08 December 
2005), and “Negotiating proposal on export taxes” (TN/MA/W/11/Add.6, 27 April 2006). 
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that export taxes could be used by some states to stifle its access to what it considers important 
raw materials such as primary metals, energy resources, key agricultural raw materials and 
hides and skins. This policy and view was outlined by the EC in its 2006 trade policy 
publication, Global Europe45. As the EC has argued, export taxes are not only trade distorting, 
but that they have not been conclusively proven as developmentally useful (Bilal and Ramdoo, 
2010: 21). On export taxes, the EU was opposed46 to the use of these taxes and would have 
preferred to have the ACP states cease their use. Taxing exports is a policy tool that can be 
used to discourage exports –as in when trying to ensure domestic sufficiency- or more 
importantly for developing countries, to limit export of raw materials and thus encourage 
domestic value addition. Table 9 below shows the various ACP regions and EU positions on 
extended use of export taxes and the final agreements reached. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
45 See EC SEC(1230)2006: Secretariat Staff Working Paper: Annex to the Communication: “Global Europe: 
Competing in the world: A Contribution to EU’s growth and job strategy”. 
46 See, Peter Mandelson Speech ‘The Challenge of Raw Materials’ 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/467&type=HTML. In this Speech Mandelson 
points out the EU was opposed to any policy that distorted trade and prices of raw materials. As well as Dan Lui 
and Sanoussi Bilal, ‘Contentious issues in the interim EPAs’.  2009. Pg 13 
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Table 10: Initial Positions and Final Agreements on Export Taxes 
 
Region Initial Position Final position 
EC Eliminate Export taxes47  
   
SADC Temporary export duties can be 
introduced in case of: 
- protection of infant industry 
- protection of environment 
- specific revenue needs 
- Severe food shortage or to ensure food 
security; 
- for industrial development needs 
- Carve out for existing export taxes 
- SADC states may introduce 
temporary export taxes on a limited 
number of products in exceptional 
circumstances such as revenue needs or 
industry protection. 
- Agreement subject to review in 3 
years 
- Introduction of these taxes requires 
EC agreement 
EAC No specific proposal put forth, but 
expressed need for flexibility to allow 
use of ET in certain cases 
# The EAC and EC agree that the 
EAC could use taxes on a limited 
number of products to  
Foster industrial development 
Maintain currency value stability  
# EPA council must authorize the tax 
Ivory Coast  & 
Ghana 
No specific proposal put forth, but 
expressed need for flexibility to allow 
use of ET in certain cases 
-Agreement allows continuation of 
existing taxes but these taxes cannot 
be increased 
- Taxes can be introduced in case of 
specific revenue needs, protection of 
infant industry and protection of 
                                                 
 
 
47 From Dan Lui and San Bilal, Contentious Issues in EPAs. 2009: 13-14 
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environment 
 
- Any increase or new tax requires 
consultation with the EC 
Cameroon No specific proposal put forth, but 
expressed need for flexibility to allow 
use of ET in certain cases 
# Agreement allows continuation of 
existing taxes but those cannot be 
increased 
# taxes can be introduced in case of 
public finance needs or to protect the 
environment 
 
# the effectiveness of these taxes to be 
regularly evaluated by an EPA 
committee which includes EC officials  
 
ESA Proposes agreement to maintain 
existing taxes and possibility to 
introduce new taxes in case of food 
security needs, public finance, value 
addition and environmental protection 
# agreement settles on a list of 
products on which taxes can be used 
 
An EPA committee can request for 
review of this list of products. 
CARIFORUM Only few states used export taxes # Agreement abolishes use of ET in 3 
years. No exceptions 
Sources: Sanoussi Bilal and Isabelle Ramdoo, 2010-  original positions Dan Lui and San Bilal, 2009  - final 
positions 
 
The European Union argued that ‘in the context of the EPAs, elimination of export taxes and 
restrictions is necessary to meet the GATT article XXIV requirement for eliminating barriers on 
“substantially all trade”, which covers exports as well as import measures (Lui and Bilal, 2009: 
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13). For the EU, taxing raw materials is seen as inimical to easing importation of raw 
materials.48 
 
As table 9 shows, in their initial response to EU proposals the EAC, West Africa and Central 
Africa all asked for flexibility to allow their member states to have the possibility to apply 
export taxes. In their initial proposals ESA and SADC also asked that they not only maintain 
existing export taxes but also they outlined specific cases where export duties could be 
introduced. The final agreements reflect some sort of a middle way solution. The EU accepts a 
carve out for the existing export taxes for the SADC, Cameron, Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire as 
long as these taxes were subject to no increase.  Both the EAC and ESA also carve out the 
possibility to use export taxes for a small select list of products. And all regions except the 
CAariforum win a concession for the EC to allow introduction of export taxes in cases of 
serious public finance problems. In the case of the Cariforum states, they agree to completely 
phase out export taxes in three years.  In an important coup for EC, even in cases where ACP 
states can introduce new export taxes, these states must consult with the EC and the EC should 
consent to the increase. The EU therefore assertively injected its influence in use of export taxes 
by ACP states.  The fact that these states have to ‘consult’ the EU in a matter of national policy 
seems to be an unqualified success for the EU. 
(5)  The Most Favored Nation (EU quest for MFN) 
                                                 
 
 
48 For a further discussion on this see Richard Wattt’s ‘Export Taxes and EPAs: Another Policy Tool Under Threat 
from the EU’ 2009. CUTS-GRC 
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The concept of a Most Favored Nation is an important cornerstone of multilateral trade 
liberalization designed to prevent discrimination of some states products against others.  It is 
in fact article one of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). An MFN clause in a 
bilateral or multilateral trade agreement guarantees that any advantage granted in respect to a 
free trade agreement with any other third party must be equally extended to the contracting 
parties (equally) in the agreement. Although the use of MFN is mostly confined to a 
multilateral setting, the EU introduced this request during the EPAs and demanded that it be 
granted a bilateral MFN status by ACP states. A Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause would 
have required that subsequent to an EPA agreement, should any ACP EPA signatory state opt 
to give greater preferential treatment on trade matters to any ‘major trading economy’49 other 
than the EU, that advantage also had to be granted to the EU. The MFN principle would 
preclude the possibility that any other major trading state could get a more preferential 
treatment from the ACP states than the EU. It would essentially lock the EU and the ACP 
states into an indefinite most favored trading partners of each other. Table 11 outlines the 
initial vs. final positions for both parties on MFN. 
 
Table 11: Initial Positions and Final Agreements on MFN 
 
Region Initial position Final Agreement  
EU ACP should grant the EU MFN  
   
                                                 
 
 
49 A ‘major trading economy’ was defined as one whose share of world merchandise trade was more than 1%. 
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SADC Proposes consultation before granting 
MFN 
Automatic extension of MFN 
EAC Opposed to MFN in EPA 
negotiations 
Automatic extension of MFN 
Central 
Africa 
 Parties agree to extend MFN 
West Africa Opposed to MFN in EPA 
negotiations 
Parties agree to Extend MFN 
Cariforum Opposed to granting MFN Parties to consider if the EC can be 
denied the advantageous 
preferences  
ESA Open to an MFN that carves out all 
developing countries 
Automatic extension of MFN 
Sources: Dan Lui and San Bilal, 2009,  ACP negotiating mandate 
 
As table 11 shows, the final agreements show a suave reign of the EU in its objectives and a 
capitulation for the ACP states. In spite of their opposition, the EU does extract the right to 
have the MFN status from all EPA initialing states. Although some ACP states do carve out 
exceptions for regional trade agreements involving African states or other developing states, 
the overall thrust on the issue of MFN is that the EU wins since all ACP states would have 
opted not to grant the MFN status. 
(6) Inclusion of the Non-Execution Clause 
Non Execution clauses are agreements in the EC-ACP Cotonou Agreement (articles 11b, 96 and 
97) which grant either party the unilateral authority to impose sanctions and suspend trade 
agreements in case of violation of human rights, democratic principles or the rule of law by the 
other party. The non-execution clause has mostly been a policy instrument of the European 
Union to punish any state in the ACP that the EU felt was violating human rights or 
democratic principles.  This policy is however mostly invoked in cases where the EU regards 
the opposite partner as somewhat less democratic than the Union and in need of some 
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socialization into more democratic ways. As Roland Bartels has noted, the non-execution 
clause was first used as early as 1962, when the EU rebuffed Spain’s application to enter the 
Union on the basis that a then non-democratic Spain could not be considered a European 
country’ (Bartels, 2005: 9). The EU has since then invoked or tried to invoke such an argument 
(clause) in a few cases to curtail aid to states it deemed to be violating some human rights. The 
first such attempt was against Uganda in 1977, when the EU tried to cut Stabex funding for 
Uganda even though at that time the non-execution clause did not exist legally under the 
Lome agreement. Both parties having since legally consented to use of the non-execution 
clause in the subsequent Cotonou Agreement, the clause has been invoked twice, first in 
Zimbabwe in 2001, and later for Fiji, in 2007. In both cases, rather than suspending trade 
related obligations, only aid related obligations were suspended. 
 
Right from the beginning the EU expressly called for the insertion of the political dimension of 
the EU-ACP relationship into the EPAs. This would essentially maintain the EU’s power in 
influencing political developments in ACP states through use of its aid and trade preferences. 
As a foundation for EPA negotiations the EU negotiating mandate of 2002 stated that, ‘the 
respect of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law constitute essential elements of 
the Partnership Agreement. Good governance constitutes a fundamental element of this 
agreement. EPAs need to be placed in this context’ (Commission of European Communities, 
2002:3). Part of the EU’s motivation for placing what is clearly a ‘political dimension’ at the 
foundation of the EPAs is that while the EPA agreements would be perpetual (indefinite), the 
Cotonou Agreements (on which the current political influence is anchored) will expire in 2020 
and thus the EU will no longer have the political influence offered by non-execution clauses in 
the CA. 
 
During the negotiations, all ACP states and regions expressly rejected the inclusion of non-
execution clause in the EPAs (Bilal and Ramdoo, 2009:29). The ACP states resolved that 
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although the EU could still apply sanctions under the clauses in the Cotonou Agreements, ‘for 
avoidance of doubt articles 11b, 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreements will not apply to the 
EPAs’ (Lui and Bilal, 2009: 32). The ACP states therefore are successful in fending off EU 
offensive claims on inclusion of non-execution clauses. The inclusion of the clause, would have 
been contradictory to WTO compliance since a unilateral suspension of one’s trade obligations 
towards another party to protest violation of human rights or democratic principles would 
violate GATT Article XXIV. This realization, might partly explain the EU’s retreat. 
Nonetheless, the ACP states have a win in avoiding its inclusion in the EPAs as this was 
contrary to the EU’s initial preference. 
(7) EPAs Negotiation Time Frame 
The timeframe for the EPA negotiation has also been an issue of intense negotiation itself and 
one in which the ACP states have managed some significant triumph in pushing back. At the 
beginning of 2002, the negotiations were envisioned to end by December 2007 at which time 
the Cotonou trading treaties between the EU and the ACP under which non-reciprocal 
preferences in trade were provided expired. Following the establishment of the incompatibility 
of EU’s preferences to the ACP with WTO requirements, and to guard against further legal 
challenge, the EU sought a waiver from the WTO for maintenance of the preferences to the 
ACP states until end of 2007. For granting this waiver, the EU ‘had to compensate her trading 
partners that felt that their trading rights were being curtailed by the ACP-EU trading 
arrangement’50. The longer the negotiation duration the more costly it was for the EU. And 
                                                 
 
 
50 This is according to the EAC’s Briefing of on EAC –EC EPA Negotiations, 2012 
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therefore according to the decision51 issued by the WTO based on the EU and ACP states’ 
request the negotiations establishing the WTO compatible FTA should was expected to be 
complete by December 2007. Since the Banana case that prompted the complaints that led to 
the challenge of EU preferential export tariffs for ACP states was actually targeted on the EU, 
it is instructive to observe that the EU was under more intense pressure (than the ACP) to 
rectify the WTO incompatibility in order to avoid more litigation from the aggrieved Latin 
American developing states. 
 
At the time the EU trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson tried to frame the end of WTO 
waiver in 2007 as an irrevocable deadline. He claimed that if it was not met the EU would 
immediately revert to the les preferential GSP.  As he put it, ‘…that deadline is imposed by the 
expiry of the legal protection at the WTO for our existing trade agreements which are based on 
preferential access and break WTO rules. If we don’t have the new system in place we will 
have to fall back on alternative with less generous market access…So the importance of a new 
agreement by 2008 is not a threat – it’s a reality’(Mandelson, 2006). This as we now know 
turned out not to be the case. 
 
Table 12 below outlines the evolution of the EU concession on negotiating time frame and the 
attempts made by the EU to compel a deadline and the ACP’s successful defense against this 
quest.  The table shows the movement of both parties from a tentative completion date of 
December 2007, to a highly fractious deadline of October 2014 that was unilaterally imposed 
by the EU. 
                                                 
 
 
51 DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL: The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. WT/MIN(01)/15 
14 November 2001 
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Table 12: Time line of Negotiating Deadline 
 
Deadline Source ACP position EU position 
1st  31st Dec. 
2007 
WTO Waiver on 
Cotonou 
Agreement 
Agreed (Or 
resigned to it)  
Agreed  
2nd  Jan 2014  Instituted by 
regulation 1528: 
EU’s unilateral 
decision, 
Disagreeable52  Agreed 
3rd  Jan 2016 Proposed by ACP 
and supported by 
EU parliament 
ACP proposal Disagreeable  
4th October 
2014 
Enforced by EU 
council and 
Parliament 
Disagreeable Agreed 
Source:  WTO Doha Ministerial Conference.  WT/MIN(01)/15 (2001) /EC Council Regulation 1528 (2007)/ ACP 
SC on extension of regulation 1528 (http://www.acp.int/content/press-release-acp-secretary-general-reacts-
european-parliament-vote-market-access-regulation) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2013-112 
ACP Group calls on EU Parliament to not vote specific market regulation which can be considered as a pressure 
against ACP countries 
http://www.acp.int/content/acp-group-calls-eu-parliament-not-vote-specific-market-regulation-which-can-be-
considered-pr 
 
                                                 
 
 
52 See resolution by ACP ministers on EPAs, 2010. 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1431%3Asb52&catid=144%3As
outh-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en 
Elijah Nyaga Munyi PhD 2013 
155 
In the final months of 2007, upon the looming end of the WTO waiver period 35 ACP states 
initialed an EPA agreement. Initialing an EPA meant that they had accepted as accurate 
whatever texts and agreements that had been reached up to that point.  Realizing the hasty 
nature of the agreements reached however, almost all the initialing states declined to sign or 
ratify the agreement. Signing or ratifying the EPAs at this point would have made them legally 
binding. And thus in spite of the EC triumph in somewhat attaining an ACP agreement 
conditioned on the fear brought by the 2007 deadline, this triumph was obscured by the 
refusal of many of the EPA initiallers to ratify the agreements. Faced with this mutiny and 
protraction, at the end of 2007, the EC came up with a unilateral measure [Market Access 
Regulation 1528/07] that would compel the ACP states to either ratify [thus operationalize] the 
interim EPAs or be automatically reverted to the EU’s GSP system.  Regulation 1528 was 
designed both as a stop-gap measure that would allow ACP states that had initialed an EPA 
but not ratified it to continue exporting goods to the EU under the Cotonou preference. 
 
The regulation set a new negotiation deadline of January 2014. According to the regulation, 
those non-LDC states which would not have ratified their EPAs by then would be relegated 
into the GSP. After an intense lobbying of the EU parliament, the ACP states managed to 
persuade the EU parliament to recommend an extension of this date to 2016, thus possibly 
gaining more time to negotiate and renegotiate some of the issues which had already been 
agreed under interim EPAs. In a resolution on EPAs issued in 2010 by ACP ministers, the 
ministers urged the EU to maintain market access until the full EPAs had been agreed on and 
signed. 
 
Whatever the outcome of the proposal to push market access under the CA (Cotonou 
Agreement) to 2016, already the ACP states have been big beneficiaries of the more than 10 
year negotiation process. This is because all the EPA negotiating states (apart from South 
Africa and Cariforum) have continued to benefit from the more advantageous non-reciprocal 
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Cotonou agreements in spite of the expiry of the trading agreement in 2007. The ACP states 
therefore displayed some negotiation dexterity in agreeing to the interim EPAs yet delaying or 
refusing to ratify them. Conversely, it could be argued that the EU has displayed some 
puzzling patience and reluctance to simply downgrade the non-ratifying ACP states to GSP. 
For the purposes of this thesis, both puzzles are pertinent. What does it say about the 
negotiation when ACP states ‘agree’ (initial) to an EPA yet decline to sign and ratify the same? 
Second, why does the EU cautiously hold back from ending the negotiation by relegating non-
ratifyers to a GSP status? 
(8) Comprehensive EPAs 
Comperehensivity meant that the EU wanted the EPAs, as much as possible to go beyond the 
basic requirement of basic of WTO compliancy, to entail other facets of trade openness such as 
liberalization in services, agreements in intellectual property rights, agreements on the 
appropriateness of use of export taxes or the opening up of national treatment 
(nondiscrimination) in investments. As the EU negotiating mandate observed,  
‘EPAs should not only extend to trade in goods but also trade in services. Indeed, the 
importance of trade in services in world trade is increasing and there are examples of sectors 
where ACP states have comparative advantage. Services are therefore a potential source of 
growth for the ACP…liberalization of services will act as a spur to domestic reform, 
encouraging more efficient, varied and competitive markets and so contribute to increasing 
ACP competitiveness’ (Commission of European Communities, 2002:4).  
The EU thus sought to include service liberalization in EPAs. While sounding cautiously open 
to negotiation on trade in services at the beginning of the negotiations in 2002, the ACP states 
later issued a statement (in 2010) where they expressed concern that service liberalization, like 
other contentious Singapore issues such as competition policy and government procurement, 
‘could restrict the ACP governments’ scope and policy space to regulate investors in the public 
interest or to give domestic small and medium enterprises a boost’ (South Centre, Resolution 
on EPAs by ACP Ministers, 2010). Thus in most cases, liberalization in services has been 
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lumped up together with Singapore issues and ACP states were opposed53 to negotiation of 
‘WTO plus’ issues. 
 
Table 13 below summarizes the outcomes on the zone of agreement and from this we can 
deduce which party’s’ position the final agreements reflect –and hence the nature of wins and 
concessions. Section 4.2.2. gives an in depth inference on of the uniformity in distributional 
characteristics of EPAs. 
 
Table 13: Summary on the EPAs Negotiation Zone of Agreement and Outcomes 
 
Issue Who wins Comment (why) 
1. SAT EU   
For all regions, the EU gets its pre-negotiation 
objective of at least 80% liberalization 
2. Liberalization 
duration 
EU  
The EU gets its pre-negotiation target of 80% 
liberalization in 15 years.  
3. Liberalization 
compensation 
EU  
ACP states do not get any legally binding 
liberalization compensation ‘over and above EDF’ as 
aspired at the beginning of negotiation.  
4. Export taxes The EU  
                                                 
 
 
53 For African ACP state opposition to Comprehensivity see, ‘Trade: ACP Ministers clarify their EPA principles 
and options’ http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo110722.htm 
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# The EU gets the ACP states to concede 
negotiation on an area that is ‘WTO plus’ and thus 
need not have been in the EPAs. 
# The EU gets to inject itself into the policy 
influence on use of export taxes by ACP states 
5. MFN EU  
# The EU gets the ACP states to concede 
negotiation on an area that is ‘WTO plus’ and thus 
need not have been in the EPAs. 
 
#The EU succeeds in getting automatic MFN 
status against the ACP states wishes.  
6. Comprehensivity 
(scope) 
ACP  
Apart for the Cariforum, other ACP regions resist 
push to include so called Singapore issues in EPAs 
and services in EPAs.  
7. Non-execution 
clause 
ACP  
ACP states succeed in fending off EU demands to 
insert political dimension into EPAs 
 
8. Negotiation time 
frame & legality  
 
 [EFFICIENCY] 
ACP  
ACP states agree to the EPAs but succeed in 
delaying operationalization of  EPAs thus 
prolonging the more advantageous Cotonou 
Agreement preferences beyond 2007 
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4.2.2 Summary on Distribution Characteristics: The Two Puzzles of Explaining Efficiency 
 
As has been repeatedly emphasized so far, the main question of this dissertation is that of 
explaining variances in efficiency rather than in distribution characteristics. The purpose of 
section 4.2.1 above (which expends some considerable space to analyzing the distribution 
characteristics of EPA outcomes) is done with one objective in mind: To show the relative 
uniformity of the distribution characteristic outcomes for all the ACP regions. Looking at 
contested issues 1-5, in table 13 above the EPA outcomes clearly reflect (mostly) the original 
EU preferences. While the EU was accommodating on each of the regions’ variances with 
regard to each of the contested issues, it remained resolute and successful in extracting its 
minimum threshold target in each contested issue. On the core Free Trade Area GATT 
requirement of liberalizing ‘substantial’ trade within a ‘reasonable’ period of time, the EU gets 
its 80:15 target for all ACP regions.  This means that all ACP states would liberalize at least 
80% of their trade within 15 years. On perhaps what is the most contested of issues- 
development and liberalization compensation- none of the ACP states manage to wring out 
any funds from the EU over and above existing EDF funding as the ACP negotiation mandate 
had set out. In three areas- granting EU an MFN Status, and limiting ACP states use of use of 
bilateral safeguards and export taxes, the EU is once more successful in not only injecting these 
non-essential ‘WTO plus’ issues into the negotiation, but also in limiting the ACP states use of 
these policy options through sunset clauses which allow the use of such policies tools for a 
limited number of years –usually not beyond 12 years. The intra-ACP variances in these three 
areas are immaterial as they represent EU flexibility once it’s essential target of limiting the use 
of these policy tools has been met. These triumphs for the EU represents a clear foray into the 
policy space of ACP and a loss for the ACP states since they were opposed to inclusion of 
these issues into the negotiation. Even though issue (6) on comprehensivity is classified as a win 
for the ACP, it is the one single contested issue under scrutiny where there is a fundamental 
variance between the Cariforum and other ACP states. While the Cariforum states ratify a 
comprehensive EPA, other states agree to only an interim EPA. The classification of 
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comprehensivity as an ACP win is based on the fact that out of all the EPAs that have been 
concluded, ratified or/and reported to the WTO (EU-Cariforum states, EU- Cote d’ivoire, EU-
ESA states, EU- Seychelles and EU Cameroon), all these are ‘goods only’ FTAs except for the 
EU-Cariforum’s agreement which includes services.   This classification of the EPAs as goods 
only is the basis of arguing that the EU concedes to interim EPAs agreement rather than a 
comprehensive agreement as its negotiating mandate had set out.  Of course the EU’s 
concession is only partial as it does not include the Cariforum. 
 
What explains Cariforum’s disposition to agree to a goods and services liberalization while the 
rest of ACP avoids service liberalization is a question that has been examined thoughtfully and 
thoroughly by among others (Bishop, Heron and Payne: 2013). In fact the one important caveat 
on the claim made here of a lack of variance in distribution characteristics among ACP states 
regards the extent to which the Cariforum group seems to give up more in policy space (than 
its African and Pacific counterparts) in almost every aspect of the contested areas.  One is of 
course on having included services into their EPA agreements. Regarding the possibility to use 
export taxes, the Cariforum commits itself to abolishing use of ET in the shortest period – 3 
years- while other ACP states manage to extract longer durations. Cariforum EPA is the only 
one among the ACP groups to have provisions relating to National Treatment in investment 
contrary to the position taken by African Ministers of Trade to defend against what they 
regard as EU encroachment of their policy space. Together with the EAC group, the Cariforum 
group also accepts the shortest duration – only 10 years - for availability of infant industry 
support provisions while other regions get longer durations. The point here is to state that 
even though the dissertation avers that there is general uniformity with regard to the 
distribution characteristics of ACP states’ EPA outcomes, this does not discount some small 
differences in outcomes especially as relates to the Cariforum.  The pertinent question 
regarding these small differences (which indicate Cariforum’s greater forfeiting of its policy 
space) is whether these greater Cariforum ‘concessions’ are a function of Cariforum’s greater 
material dependencies. Or do these greater ‘concessions’ on Cariforum’s part in fact signal a 
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greater normative belief convergence between the Cariforum and EU than the EU has with 
other ACP groups? 
 
Having elaborated on the general uniformity of outcomes, we are thus left with the question of 
variances in negotiating timeframes (issue no. 8) in table 13 as the key variance of outcomes. 
Intra- ACP variances in time taken to accept (ratify) an EPA is thus the main dependent 
variable of the research. Why have some ACP states moved ahead of others in accepting and 
ratifying the EPAs?  How compelling is the argument on material dependency of these 
regions/states in explaining the variance in proclivity to ratify an EPA? Having highlighted 
the relative uniformity of distribution outcomes of EPA in section 4.2, section 4.3 delves into 
examining the cogency of the deductive supposition on the role of trade dependence and tariff 
vulnerability as independent variables in causation of EPA efficiency outcomes. How 
persuasively can the propensity to accept (ratify) an EPA be explained by intra-ACP variances 
in trade dependence and tariff vulnerability from the EU? 
4.3 Trade Dependence and Tariff Vulnerability - in Explaining Intra-ACP Efficiency 
Variances 
As figure 2 and table 14 below show, the initialing ACP states can now be grouped into three 
distinct groups. In 2007, there were 35 states that initialed the EPA agreements. By initialing 
EPAs, these states not only accepted as authentic the EPA texts of their negotiations with the 
EU, but also affirmed their desire to upgrade their trading terms from Cotonou preferences to 
legally binding WTO bound EPA preferences. All 35 states initialed their EPA within three 
months of each other and in the final six months of 2007. As has been indicated above, since 
this frenzied acceptance of EPAs in 2007 was precipitated by the imminent expiry of the WTO 
waiver on EU preferences to non LDCs, it does partially affirm the theoretical suppositions on 
the primacy of material dependencies of weaker states in driving their quick capitulation to an 
agreement. As has been indicated by the ACP (initialing) states withholding of EPA 
ratification however, the initialing agreement was seemingly a bad case of compliance.  
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However, as figure 2 below shows, beyond 2007, a three-speed phenomenon has cropped up 
in ACP. There were those states which ratified/applied their EPAs a few years later 
(Cariforum, Oct 2008; Cameroon, Sep 2009; Ivory Coast, Dec 2008 and ESA, Feb 2012). Others 
have merely signed the agreements (Fiji and the SADC four – Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Mozambique). All the other states remain stuck at their 2007 position. 
 
Figure 2: Three Speed ACP in EPA Efficiency (variance in Speed to ratification) 
 
 
 
What explains the intra-ACP variances in time frame of EPA negotiations- What explains EU 
success in reaching an agreement with some ACP state and not others? 
 
Table 14: Variable Speed in Intra- ACP EPA Agreement after 2007 
 
INITIALED  
ONLY 
SIGNED  
ONLY 
RATIFIED/ 
APPLIED 
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Region No of 
members 
Non-
LDCs 
in 
group54 
                     2007                                                        
2013 
No EPAs Initialed 
(2007)  
Signed 
 
Ratified/ 
WTO 
legal 
SADC 7 4 1 1 4 (2009) - 
ESA 11 3 5 2  4 (2009) - 
EAC 5 1 - 5 - - 
Cent Afric 8 3 7  1 (2009) - 
West 
Afric 
16 4 14 1 1 (2008) - 
Cariforum 14 13 -  - 14 (2009) 
Pacific  15 9 13 1 1 1 (2011) 
Total 76 36 40 10 11 15 
Source: EU Trade (2012) Overview of EPAs. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf 
 
Figure 2 and table 14 show the variable speed whose explanation the dissertation seeks to 
examine. Both show the EPA initialing ACP states and the legal status of each state’s EPA.  
Table 14 also shows the seven ACP regional negotiating groups (column 1), the number of 
states in each of these groups and how many of the states in each group were non LDCs. Why 
have some states been more disposed to accepting EPAs than others? Is there a regularity that 
can cogently explain how to understand what has propelled some states/regions ahead of 
others in ratifying EPAs? As follows below, this examination begins with an empirical 
                                                 
 
 
54 Hence GSP states which are not eligible for export to EU under the EBA 
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examination of the degree of correlation between the variable speed and degree of export 
dependence (and tariff vulnerability) of EPA initialing states. 
 
Table 15 below classifies the 36 states (most of them Non-LDCs)55 which have at least initialed 
an EPA into the three categories of EPA initialed, EPA signed or EPA ratified. Is there 
correlation between export dependency and speed of EPA ratification? 
 
Table 15: ACP States’ (and regions) Export Dependence on the EU 
 
State EU share of State’s 
total Exports              
(2007)56  
Regional 
Median share 
of exports to 
EU 
No of 
Negotiation 
Years 
  EPA state 
2010 2007  
Mauritius 64%             69.8  
 
58.6 
  
Signed (2009)  
NOT legal 
Seychelles Ratified  
Seychelles 56.3%              61.7  
10 Zimbabwe 20.5%              17.9
Madagascar 52.3%              55.5
Zambia 3.4            5.0   initialed 
Comoros    Initialed  
     
                                                 
 
 
55 Seven LDCs that have at least initialed an EPA include seven states in Africa ( Burundi, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania , Uganda and Comoros) and one state (Haiti) in the Cariforum. 
56 2007 is the year when all EPA states initialed an agreement  
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Antigua and 
Barbuda  
--   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comprehensive and 
legal  
    (2009) 
Bahamas 13.7               38
Barbados  7.0              13 
Belize 28.0              30.8 
Dominica 7.1               12.4 
Dominican 
Republic 
10.0            17.1 
Grenada 7.8               0.8 19.6 
Guyana 18.3              31.5 
Haiti 4.8               5.9 
Jamaica 15.1                         26.7
Suriname 18.3              22.1 
St. Lucia 18.0              44.3 
St.Vincent & 
Grenadines 
57.6              74.7 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
9.3               7.1 
Trinidad an 
Tobago 
14.1              8.9 
     
Fiji  4.0 12.5  
10.1 
  9 Ratified (2011)   
Legal for PNG 
Fiji signed 
Papua New 
Guinea 
7.3 7.7 
      
Cameroon  66.1 66.1 7 signed 
Ivory Coast  35.2            41.27  
42.63 
  6 
12 
Signed (2009) 
Ghana Initialed   Ghana 38               44.0 
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Kenya 25.8           27.3  
 
27.3 
 
  12 
 
 
Initialed (2007),  
Not signed, NOT 
legal 
Uganda 26.4          49 
Tanzania 17.6           27.2 
Rwanda 10.8           18.7 
Burundi 45.8          45.8 
     
 
Signed but NOT 
(legal)  
Not signed  
Mozambique 26.4   12 
Botswana                
 
 
             
36.9 
 
 
36.9 
  12 
Lesotho 
Swaziland 
Namibia 
S.A    No EPA 
Source: DG trade, bilateral relations, statistics, 2012. / SACU exports TPR 2009 for the SACU region. Cameroon: 
http://nl.nabc.nl/Portals/0/docs/Country%20information%20pdf/CAMEROON%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf 
 
We then establish the trade dependence of each of these states in order to examine if a 
persuasive pattern of causation (speed to ratification) can be attributed to its trade dependence 
on the EU. In the case of this study trade dependence is measured by the degree of export 
dependence of each of these states to the EU market. In addition to the relative duration of 
negotiation taken for each region, the table also shows, each regions (or state’s) relative trade 
dependence on the EU and the state of its EPA (whether legal or not). Each state’s share of 
exports to the EU as a percentage of its total exports (column 2 and 3) is used as a measure of 
export dependence. This measure has previously been used by among others Hirshmann 
(1945), Crescenzi  (2003), Keohane and Nye (1977), Barbieri (1995, 1996, and 1998) and Gartzke 
(2003).  This is to show the degree of asymmetrical dependence and vulnerability. 
 
As table 15 shows all African regions are on the whole more trade dependent than the 
Cariforum states and Papua New Guinea or Fiji which have ratified or notified their EPAs to 
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the WTO. The regional median share of Cariforum and Papua New Guinea exports to the EU 
based on 2007 figures is about 19.6% and 10.1% respectively which is much lower than that of 
all African regions. In Africa, the East African Community has the lowest trade dependency 
among African states with a regional median of 27.3% while the four ESA states (Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Madagascar and Zimbabwe) show the highest trade dependency of 58.5%.  In spite 
of their greater trade dependence, more African states are therefore rather astute in ‘resisting’ 
or not embracing the EPAs.   
 
Table 16: Correlations between Efficiency and Trade Dependency 
 
Efficiency 
 
                       Categories/Degrees of trade dependency 
 Low (under 20%) Middle (21-40%) High (over 40%) 
  
Papua New Guinea, 
Cariforum (15) 
  
ESA (Seychelles, 
Mauritius, Madagascar & 
Zimbabwe) Cameroon 
and Ivory coast 
Ratified  
                                   
                                                                     The 22  vs. 13 cleavage 
Signed Fiji  (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland & Mozambique 
    
 
Initialed 
Zambia, Rwanda Tanzania, Namibia 
and Kenya 
Uganda, Burundi 
 
The picture that emerges from this table is one of a slightly muddled scenario in as far as trade 
dependency is concerned. This muddiness is represented by table 16. As the table shows, there 
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is no regular linearity in patterns of correlations in trade dependence and efficiency. In each 
category of efficiency (initialed, signed or ratified/applied) ratification being the best, we have 
representatives from each category of trade dependency – from high to low. 
In this table we divide the degree of trade dependency into three –below 20%, between 21-40% 
and above 40%. We then match states in each of these categories of the independent variable 
(trade dependency) to their state of EPA completion. From a Hirschmanisque, material 
dependency interpretation, we would have expected a pattern of speed of EPA 
agreement/ratification to move along the lines of material dependency in trade. Clearly, this is 
not the case. The low dependency states of Cariforum and Papua New Guinea are lumped 
together with the heavily dependent ESA states plus Cameroon and Ivory Coast. While 
dependent states in East (EAC) and South (SADC) Africa are more resistant to EPA 
ratification. Of course the heavily dependent African states –Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mauritius 
and Seychelles all agree to and notify their EPAs. As evident the argument of the exigency 
brought forth by fear of loss of market access for African non-LDCs is not very compelling 
with regard to propensity of EPA ratification. In fact the balance of African non-LDC states 
which have so far ratified or notified57 their EPAs against those that have not stands exactly at 
50:50 thus somewhat impugning on the cogency of trade dependency to compel agreement.  
While five African non-LDCs [Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Ivory coast and Cameroon] 
have notified their EPAs, five African non-LDCs which similarly initialed an EPA [Namibia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Botswana and Swaziland], have so far resisted ratification.  If we take out 
Cameroon and Ivory Coast which have not in fact ratified their agreements, the balance falls 
soundly towards more non-LDCs that have not ratified.  This balance of ratification or non-
ratification among the African non- LDCs would suggest that over and above the pressure of 
                                                 
 
 
57 Here I include even those states whose EPAs are only  in force provisionally – Cameroon and Ivory Coast.  
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potential market loss, other factors provided the additional kick that propels some states to 
ratify or provisionally apply their agreement faster than others. 
 
As this empirical cases show, contrary to theoretical supposition, it is the less trade dependent 
region/states that have actually conceded speedier (and definitive) agreement with the EU.  
As tables 15 and 16 show, the 15 Cariforum states plus Papua New Guinea and the ESA states 
have pulled ahead of the rest of the ACP in time in not only signing but also ratifying their 
EPA agreements and making them operational. In total, 22 states can be argued to have 
completed their EPAs while 13 are stuck. One could say 22 or 20 states depending on where 
you group Cameroon and Ivory Coast – whose EPAs have not been ratified hence making 
them legally unbinding, but whose EPAs are in provisional application. Strictly speaking in a 
legal sense the Cameroon and Ivory Coast EPAs are incomplete until they are ratified. These 
22 (or 20) states hence represent a case of EU success in terms of its objectives over other 
regions. Moreover, besides merely the speedy completion of their negotiation, the seeming 
contradiction of these outcomes is further compounded by the fact that based on the results 
outlined in section 4.2.1 the Cariforum putatively conceded more policy independence in such 
areas as use of export taxes and shorter durations for infant industry safeguard, than some of 
the African states who are still negotiating and thus can still enjoy this policy space for longer 
durations. 
 
What then explains this continuum between No EPAs and operational EPAs? What made the 
15 Cariforum states, Papua New Guinea, Cameroon, Ivory Coast plus the 4 ESA states ratify 
their EPA agreements faster while rest remained defensive? As a Hirschmanesque 
interpretation as well as a Nye and Keohane’s liberal theory’s complex interdependence thesis 
would have it, the efficiency (how quickly a party’s desired outcomes are achieved- in this case 
by the EU’s) would depend on the relative vulnerability of the other party (in this case the 
ACP states). In cases of trade agreements, this vulnerability has been inferred to be the salience 
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of export market dependency. Such a thesis would then imply that the 20 ratifying states have 
greeter trade vulnerability than the 13 (or 15) non-ratifying states. As evidenced by the 
variance in ACP states’ and regions’ export dependence on the EU shows (table 16 and 17) this 
trade dependence thesis doesn’t hold. 
 
 
In the case of EPAs the degree of a state’s material vulnerability could also be deduced from 
how much a state’s exports would suffer from a tariff re-imposition if, -by failing to ratify an 
EPA-  an ACP state’ export tariffs into the EU were relegated into the less preferential GSP 
scheme. Tariff erosions on Cotonou preferences would increase the costs of exports to the EU. 
This vulnerability is established based on the relative increase in tariffs once the nonreciprocal 
tariff preferences granted under the Cotonou Agreement were eliminated.  In theoretical terms 
greater tariff erosion vulnerability would of course make a state more disposed to accepting to 
ratify its agreement. A state’s vulnerability can be deduced from the degree of tariff costs of 
having the standard GSP re-imposed, in case the state failed to reach a reciprocal free trade 
agreement. 
 
Table 17: Degree of Tariff Vulnerability by Initialed ACP states 
 
STATE  Vulnerability 
based on tariff 
jump on export 
 Regional  
 
Regional 
Averages 
Ghana 67%  West Africa Ghana   
60.5 Kenya 62%  Ivory Coast 
Cote d ivoire 54%   
 
ESA 
Mauritius  
 
37.5 
Mauritius 47%  Madagascar 
Suriname  42%  Zimbabwe 
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Swaziland  40%  Seychelles 
Cameroon 38%  Central Africa Cameroon 38 
Zimbabwe 38%   
 
EAC 
Kenya  
 
 
28 
Madagascar 37%  Uganda 
Jamaica 35%  Tanzania 
Uganda 31%  Rwanda 
Namibia  26%  Burundi 
Tanzania 25%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CARIFORUM 
Jamaica  
 
 
9 
Seychelles 20%  Suriname 
Trinidad & T 20%  Trinidad & T 
Fiji  12%  Barbados 
Mozambique 11%  Belize 
Barbados 10%  Antigua & 
Rwanda 10%  Guyana 
Belize 9%  Dominica 
Antigua & 9%  Haiti 
Guyana 9%  Bahamas 
Dominica 9%  Greneda 
Haiti 7%  St. Kitts  
Bahamas 6%  St Lucia 
Lesotho  5%  St. Vincent 
PNG 5%   
Pacific 
Fiji 
Botswana 4%  PNG 5 
Greneda 4%   
SADC 
(BLSM) 
Botswana  
 
8.5 
St. Kitts  4%  Lesotho 
St Lucia 4%  Swaziland 
St. Vincent 4%  Mozambique 
Source: ODI (2007): 8 
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This could be thought of as BATNA. Or the opportunity cost of NOT agreeing to ratify its 
agreement. The use of tariff vulnerability is even more nuanced than trade dependency since it 
indicates precise tariff changes based on the specific products which would fall under 
increased tariff if a GSP system were to be re-established by the EU. 
 
Table 17 above shows all the initialing states and the level of their tariff vulnerability based on 
the expected tariff jump on exports if their export tariff were downgraded to the less generous 
the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The data is obtained from a report prepared 
and published by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 2007 called “The Costs to the 
ACP of Exporting to the EU under the GSP”. 
 
The higher the percentage of tariff jump, the more a state could be said to be vulnerable, since 
the expectation is that states would like to maintain export competitiveness in the EU market. 
As the table shows, some states that have ratified the EPA agreement would have suffered 
heavily from tariff erosion. Such states include the ESA states – Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Zimbabwe and Madagascar.  Compared to other Caribbean states, Suriname also would have 
suffered steep increases in tariffs under the GSP. Similarly both Cameroon and Ivory Coast 
would also have been affected by steep tariff increases. As has been remarked a few times 
now, these two latter states have in fact not ratified their EPAs and hence their legal status 
hangs in the balance. 
 
Nonetheless, the use of tariff vulnerability does provide a more focused picture and possibility 
that material dependencies have in fact been considerably essential in compelling EPA 
ratification. Yet we are still faced with significant cases of outliers. First, the two states with the 
highest tariff vulnerability –Ghana and Kenya- are two African states which have bucked from 
ratifying. Are these errant outliers or do they point to other factors at play? Second, out of the 
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ratifying 15 Cariforum states, 12 of these have a low tariff vulnerability of 10% or below. 
Papua New Guinea too, the only Pacific state to ratify its EPA so far has a comparatively lower 
tariff vulnerability of 5%. The median vulnerability for the Cariforum as a whole in fact is 9% 
and thus relatively lower than that of most African states that were much slower in ratifying 
their EPAs. Yet it is the Carifoum states and the PNG which have a lower tariff vulnerability 
that have definitively completed their EPAs. Graph 1 below shows a simple scatter plot 
presentation of the proximal correlation between tariff vulnerability and the efficiency in EPA 
completion. As the graph shows the correlation is positive (as expected) but very weak. 
 
 
Graph 1: Weak Correlation between Tariff Vulnerability and Efficiency 
 
 
 
Tariff vulnerability does perhaps help in drawing the differences among African states and 
why some of them - based on tariff vulnerability - may have opted to operationalize their 
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EPAs earlier than others. Certainly it is plausible that three ESA states [Mauritius, Zimbabwe 
and Madagascar] may have been motivated by the fear of tariff re-imposition. But even if we 
were to argue that the ratifying African states (ESA states plus Cameroon and Ivory Coast) 
were driven by their tariff imposition fears, we would be at a loss to use the same variable 
(fear of tariff increases) to explain why the relatively lower risk Cariforum states and Papua 
New Guinea precede their African counterparts into EPA acceptance in spite of their lower 
tariff vulnerability. Moreover, how do we account for Kenya and Ghana’s resistance to ratify 
in spite of their very considerable tariff vulnerabilities?    Ultimately as the scatter plot graph 1 
shows, the potential correlation between tariff vulnerability and efficiency is rather weak as 
the tread line of the correlation has a very low gradient. 
 
From these two variables for material vulnerability -trade dependency and tariff vulnerability 
- a pattern emerges of the Cariforum states and Papua New Guinea preceding their African 
counterparts in EPA legal ratification in spite of their relatively lower trade dependence and 
tariff vulnerability.  Following on are the ESA states which on the other hand show very high 
levels of dependency in trade and tariff vulnerability. Overall the Cariforum states and Papua 
New Guinea show greater enthusiasm for EPA completion than their African counterparts. 
This variance is even more poignant if we classify Cameroon and Ivory Coast as non-ratifyers.  
Legally speaking the only African states that that have completed their EPAs are the four ESA 
states whose EPA is in force definitively. 
 
Section 4.3 has been used to examine the cogency of the deductive proposition that variance in 
propensity of a state to agree to an EPA would be highly contingent on its material (trade or 
tariff) dependence.  This supposition is not cogently affirmed in the case of EU-ACP EPA 
negotiation. Generally, it is the less vulnerable Cariforum states that have been more disposed 
to completing their EPA faster than the more materially dependent states. Moreover, the 
Cariforum states have even ratified a comprehensive EPA that includes services unlike that of 
Elijah Nyaga Munyi PhD 2013 
175 
all other states (Pacific and African) which involve only goods. Ultimately, it the less 
materially vulnerable ACP states that are more agreeable to getting into EPAs. Yet, if material 
disparities and vulnerabilities among ACP states do not explain variable speed in ratification, 
then how do we account for variable speed? 
 
Based on this finding one could perhaps imagine a few alternative potential explanatory 
suppositions of why the Cariforum, PNG and ESA states strike ahead of other ACP states in 
completing their EPA negotiations. Here I propose two. First, one could present the hypothesis 
that perhaps the EU has been more exacting in pushing for ratification in those states that have 
ratified. This would be an argument based negotiation strategy/dexterity as the independent 
variable in explaining variance in speed of ratification. The logical extension of such an 
argument would be that the more trade dependent and tariff vulnerable states have been 
better at resisting EU offensive.  Some scholars have imperceptibly raised the possibility of 
negotiating capacity as an explanatory variable in EPA outcomes. Although it would seem 
paradoxical in explaining the efficiency outcomes of EPAs, Tony Heron has for instanced 
made mention of  CARIFORUMS’ vaunted negotiating machinery as having the ‘bureaucratic 
capacity and supranational authority deemed necessary to negotiate region-wide trade 
agreements, but which is generally absent in the ACP’ (Heron, 2010:2). Similarly, as seen in the 
ACP negotiating mandate the ACP states had themselves assumed that the solidity of their 
coalitions would enhance the chances of better outcomes against the EU. The argument on 
negotiating dexterity as a variable to explain outcomes is thus theoretically valid and one that 
could be subjected to empirical enquiry.  However, if one takes the position that a delayed 
ratification was in favor of the ACP - (due to the continued application of non-reciprocal 
Cotonou preferences in their exports to the EU and without fiscal losses of EU import tariff 
liberalization) – and thus if one takes the Sharp, et al, (2000) definition of power as the ability 
not only to dominate but also to resist resistance (Few 2010: 30), then it is the mostly African 
countries that are slow to accept (ratify) an EPA whose negotiation dexterity (in resisting the 
EU) would be considered superior – not the Cariforum’s. 
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A second hypothesis could be that the states that have ratified their EPAs had a greater 
normative convergence of the need/utility of EPAs with the EU than those that have not. This 
is the normative persuasion as an independent variable in catalyzing faster ratification. Being 
confronted with these possibilities, as section 3.2.2.3 has detailed elite conceptual interviews 
were conducted with experts close to the negotiations to give insights in new, more cogent 
variables for explaining variance in efficiency outcomes. The results of the conceptual 
interviews are discussed in section 4.4 below. 
 
 
4.4 Outcomes of Elite Interviews: Why did you sign on to EPAs? (A few verbatim notes) 
As outlined in the methodology section (3.2.2.3) the elite interviews on ACP negotiators are 
primarily geared towards evaluating negotiators motivations for accepting (whether initialing, 
signaling or ratifying) an EPA.  This section details some few truncated verbatim responses of 
ACP negotiators on the question: why did you sign on/agree to an EPA? A few of the 
conceptual interviews were not recorded due to interviewee’s request to avoid being seen as 
speaking on behalf of the region or state (as in the case of the EAC). These section does not 
aspire to record the entire interviews and is very purposefully selective to highlight those 
sections where the interviews were specific on the general disposition of states on motivations 
for accepting an (why they accepted an EPA or not), and their stance on asymmetry (why or if 
the EU should compensate them and other asymmetrical aspects of the negotiation).  The 
verbatim outline of a sample of the elite interviews is given essentially as a methodological 
guide in how I arrived at my ultimate explanatory variables – norm convergence. It is what the 
negotiators said in these interviews that guided my selection of key variables for examination 
in the following section. 
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Country: Mauritius (ESA region) 
Official: Sunil Boodhoo – Deputy Director for International Trade Division, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Mauritius 
Me: What were your fundamental objectives of EPA? 
Mr. Boodhoo: We wanted to make trade (with EU) more predictable, by having it on legally 
secure ground... and of course we wanted an arrangement that is compatible with the WTO 
rules.58 
 
Me: So you did very much agree with the EU’s in terms of the objectives of EPAs? 
Boodhoo: Yes, yes, sure, of course! We are on the same wavelength. EPAs will also help lock 
in economic and trade reforms that Mauritius is undertaking and as such we would like EU 
assistance in aid to trade to help in this process. 
 
Country: Seychells (ESA region) 
Official: Myra Laporte – Senior Economist, Development and Regional Integration, MFA, 
Republic of Seychelles 
Me: Why did you sign the EPAs? 
                                                 
 
 
58The highlighted sections of the response are done to point to the basis on which deductions on the motivation 
for signing, initialing or ratifying is done.  
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Ms. Laporte: We signed to maintain our competitiveness …by signing we managed not to 
lose our biggest trading partner which is the EU 
Me: But do you feel that you would enhance your economic competitiveness by signing? 
Laporte: Well, well, it’s not enhanced in comparison to what it used to be before (under 
Cotonou), but it just maintains our competitiveness, otherwise one would have lost out 
because the tariff (new GSP tariff) would have been introduced. So we have managed to 
maintain our competitiveness. 
Official: Guillaume (Seychelles too): … signature of an EPA would not have been that 
detrimental, but we have signed to maintain our preferential access to the EU market. On the 
other hand, it’s not the EPA that might be detrimental to Seychelles but EU regulations that are 
not directly related to EPAs but can affect our competitiveness. 
 
Country: Fiji (Pacific Region) 
Official: Shaheen Ali – Permanent Secretary for Trade and Industry and lead negotiator for Fiji 
in EPA 
Me: …so what you actually signed for is the interim EPA, right?  
Mr. Ali: That’s right. We had to sign an interim agreement to ensure that our preferential 
exports continued beyond 2007, because they were going to expire, and so whatever was on 
the table, up to that date, end of 2007, and there were a lot of contentions and outstanding 
issues, so we had no choice basically but to sign to ensure that one of our vital industries does 
not collapse. Fiji had sugar and PNG had fish.  
And After 2007, we have been having negotiations for a comprehensive agreement without 
much tangible outcomes I must say. 
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Country: (ECOWAS Rep.) 
Official: Yaya Sow. – Head, ECOWAS Representation in Brussels 
Me: How do we understand the wins and concessions between the EU and ECOWAS? 
Mr. Sow: First, Ghana has just initialed, while Cote d’Ivoire has signed the interim EPA. They 
signed because they didn’t have a choice. It was just for them to avoid disruption of trade 
with the EU. Because they are not LDCs, if at that time they had not signed, the EU would 
have imposed tariffs on their goods. 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have accepted and signed everything in the EPAs, including the 
MFN and the SAT issues. ECOWAS is negotiating a regional agreement with the EU as a 
region and in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoires interim EPA, they say that as soon as ECOWAS has a 
regional agreement with the EU, they will stop the interim one and they will come to 
ECOWAS. On regional contentious issues, on SAT we are saying 70% volume of liberalization, 
they are saying 80%. On MFN they say that if we should give advantages to China or India, we 
should extend it to them, we say no, If China and India give us advantages we can reciprocate, 
but we cannot give it to you, unless you did the same to us. 
 
Country/Region: CARIFORUM 
Official: Junior Lodge - CARICOM Office of Trade Negotiations 
Me: What were the Cariforum’s initial objectives in getting into an FTA/EPA at the 
beginning...what did you have in mind around 2002/2003? 
Mr. Lodge: One, binding the preferential agreement that we had and therefore making it 
immune to WTO litigation, because you remember the Caribbean has had a rich experience in 
WTO dispute settlement especially with respect to Bananas and sugar.  And thus binding our 
preferences and was important….and we used the WTO waiver deadline only as a motivation, 
as a pretext to conclude our negotiations. 
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Second, the nature of our economic relations with the EU was one where the EU provided 
preferential market access and market access was here defined, solely in terms of goods and a 
tariff preference. Increasingly, our market share in the EU was eroding and that was because 
market access in and of itself is not enough. We needed to spur the regulatory and productive 
capacity for non-tariff measures, SPS, TBT….And we felt that in order to spur construction of 
regulatory framework in those areas we needed to have commitments in those areas, 
because what that does is that it forces you to address your regulatory framework. And that 
is why we again felt that we needed to have a comprehensive agreement not limited to 
goods but looking at a whole range of disciplines because every modern trade agreement 
that’s what it had. 
 
Me: Was it not possible for the Cariforum to reform the regulatory framework in NTB 
domestically without EPAs? 
Mr. Lodge: An FTA does two things. It binds the reforms and two it advertises those trade 
reforms especially to your major trading partners and especially in countries such as ours 
which are capital importing countries. To the EU, it’s a good way of flagging and saying, hey, 
here I am, I am doing something serious. 
Verdict on motivation for the Cariforum: Normative motivation on appropriateness of EPAs, in 
spurring domestic regulatory reform, in advertising those reforms to investors and in locking the EU 
preferences in a legally binding litigation proof manner (diminishing political trade dependency). 
 
Region: EU 
Officials: Remco Vahl and Jana Popelkova 
Me: You did well with the MFN, how did you persuade almost all regions to accept it? 
Ms. Jana: All regions didn’t like the MFN clause from the onset. 
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Me: How come that the ACP regions eventually accepted it? 
Mr.Vahl: MFN is still an issue for most states, so it’s come back to haunt us. I think the MFN 
clause is not as diabolical as people make it to be, because what it says is that don’t 
discriminate against the EU with regard to its main competitors. 
 
Me: Do you feel that there were states/regions that better understood or agreed with the 
broad EU EPA objectives as an economic development initiative? 
Vahl: Yes. Yes I feel that. But it’s not a continental thing or even regional thing. It’s not even a 
national thing. In the Caribbean we were faced with a set of negotiators who were particularly 
keen on gearing the EPA towards their own trade and developmental objectives. And it’s no 
surprise that theirs was a comprehensive and one of the earliest EPAs. I understand from Jana 
that in PNG, there was a similar mindset. 
Ms. Jana: In Mauritius (too) I could tell that it’s a mentality. People had the spin to do things. 
In some countries it was a Matter of personalities, like Malawi where the president was 
opposed. 
Verdict on EU views on ACP states Motivation on speed of acting on EPAs. Partly it was trade 
dependence, partly it was a matter of personalities and partly it was matter of learning curve (the pacific 
states). Some states learned faster than others. And for some states it was a matter of a mental 
disposition. 
 
Region – EU 
Official - Poul Nielson – a former EU Development Commissioner  
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Question: Did you at any point in the negotiation, feel that the ACP regions or states acted 
with a sense of entitlement to EU compensation? That the EU owed them the favour of extra 
financial compensation? 
PN: No. As stated above, the total envelope of the EDF was decided already in 2000.   The 
premise of the EPA’s being some kind of burden on the ACP countries is also wrong. But the 
perception of this has been one reason why the process has been so slow. 
Question: CARIFORUM chief Negotiator was in 2008 quoted as saying that for the Caribbean 
states, ‘revenue losses will be compensated by capitalisation of the market access opportunities 
available to firms’ (In the driving seat of the Caribbean ‘Machinery’. Meeting with Dr Richard 
Bernal*).  This reflects an understanding that there shouldn’t have been expectations of 
compensation from the EU. Over the course of EPA negotiations, did you experience variances 
with regard to different ACP regions’ expectations for compensation of revenue losses due to 
the EPA FTA? Is there any ACP region in particular whose understanding of the development 
dimension you remember, as more agreeable to the EU’s position? 
 
PN Answer: Again – you are asking me a question that should have been put to my successors 
in the Commission. But it is true, that the less poor and generally better organized Caribbean 
states were more ready to see themselves as moving into the competitive international 
marketplace than many African countries. But this relates to differences in the background and 
economy of these countries – not to the negotiations with the EU. 
 
Question: One of your biggest contributions to the EPAs process is perhaps your role in 
defining the ‘development dimension’ of EPAs. This definition is along three broad themes; 
EPAs as enhancing economic stability and growth, EPAs as promoting regional integration 
and EPAs as allowing differential treatment among ACP states. You sought to depict EPAs as 
automatic development tools because trade liberation leads to development.  How was this 
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view of development by the EU different from the existing Cotonou Agreement view of what 
constituted development? How was it reflective of ‘a new era of a relationship’ in 
development thinking as you put it in one of your speeches? 
(SPEECH/03/451    Date:  06/10/2003) 
PN: To understand the relationship between trade and development in this context one has to 
realize the change that took place with the Cotonou Agreement, signed in June 2000. After 
having lost the banana-case in the WTO we had to make a new regime that would be WTO 
compatible. This was clear to all and was not something that was “smuggled through” the 
intense negotiations. Liberalisation was not seen as a central tool for development. It was part 
of what was necessary to pursue. But many have neglected the fact, that integrating the small 
national economies in the different regions in especially Africa is really the important factor. 
Opening up to the neighbors and shifting from import taxes to VAT was necessary – with or 
without the cooperation with the EU. It is wrong to describe this as if I meant, that 
liberalization is THE way to growth and development. 
 
Based on the conceptual interviews, the latter proposition in section 4.3 was seen as a more 
widely appearing in respondent’s answers and was taken up in the Subjective Value Index 
questionnaire for more elaborate assessment/testing.  How does the ACP state’s normative 
persuasion (or lack of it) on the appropriateness of an EPA affect their propensity to accept 
one. By just observing these few responses given above, the motivations for the CARIFORUM 
group for instance are markedly different from those of other ACP states.  While all other 
states show a form or other of compliance (reluctant agreement due to the exigencies of 
potential market loss) there is not even imperceptible resistance on the part of the Cariforum 
negotiators. This difference forms the foundation of my variable selection. The outcomes of a 
more rigorous testing of regions normative feelings/position on EPA appropriateness and the 
state of asymmetry is taken up in section 4.5. As outlined in section 3.2.2.4 the SVI is used to 
measure the  subjective feelings of negotiators on (a) instrumental outcomes, (b) convergence 
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in negotiator beliefs on EPA utility (and asymmetry), and (c) Negotiator feelings on 
institutional entrapment during the EPA process. Of most importance in evaluating the 
variance in efficiency outcomes is the degree of convergence on negotiator beliefs on the utility 
of EPAs. Section 4.5 thus delves into examining the empirical evidence on ACP states levels 
and variances in belief convergence. 
4.5 EPA Utility and ACP-EU Asymmetry: Belief Convergence in Intra-ACP Efficiency 
Variances 
As Bjorkdahl, (2002: 13) has observed, ‘a central problem with the conceptualization of 
international norms is how it is empirically possible to recognize a norm’. As outlined in 
section 3.2.2.4 the Subjective Value Index questionnaire is used to examine the proposition that 
belief convergence (as norms) between the EU and ACP states plays a more compelling 
parameter in influencing the efficiency in EPA completion. By belief convergence the quest is 
to examine the extent to which ACP states were persuaded by the putative necessity and 
objectives of EPA (enhancing economic growth, export diversification etc) as well as their view 
on the place of asymmetry in EU-ACP relations. Should it be maintained, reduced or 
expanded? As explained in section 3.2.2.4 3 key questions in the CNO category of the 
questionnaire are used to measure/evaluate the ACP states belief convergence with the EU. 
What is important highlight at this point is that these three main aspects of belief convergence 
reflect the EU’s framing of what the utilitarian objectives of EPAs would be. As section 2.2 of 
the 2002 EU mandate spells out, EPAs were conceived ultimately as tools for economic 
development. As the EU saw it, 
‘EPAs are designed for that purpose: by establishing a stable, predictable and transparent 
framework for economic and trade relations between the ACP countries and the EU, EPAs are 
intended to mobilise economic operators at local, national, regional and international levels and 
to promote local economic activity and attract regional and international investments. By 
removing border measures to trade between the parties as well as other factors causing market 
segmentation, they will enlarge the markets of ACP countries, which will allow for economies 
of scale, will improve the level of specialisation, will increase competitiveness of the ACP States 
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and will help attract investment. This, in turn, will lead to an increase in trade flows in the 
region, with the Community and with the rest of the world, thereby promoting the sustainable 
economic and social development of the ACP countries’ (Commission of European 
Communities, 2002).  
 
The belief convergence therefore referred to in the questionnaire’s section CNO tests the extent 
to which different ACP were persuaded about these goals set out as EPA objectives. Did they 
belief (intrinsically) in these objectives? 
 
Question 6 tests the extent to which ACP states were persuaded on the argument that 
reciprocal EPAs were the best option to correct for Cotonou preferences WTO incompatibility. 
To what extent were different ACP states in fact persuaded by Cotonou Agreements (Article 
36-1) pledge to ‘to conclude new WTO compatible trading arrangements, progressively removing 
barriers to trade59 between them and enhancing co-operation in all areas relevant to trade’ 
(Community of European States, 2002). This question examines not only the states 
commitment to having WTO compliant agreements with the EU but also the states view of 
asymmetry with the EU, since removal of trade barriers would ultimately entail enhanced 
reciprocity unlike the prevailing Cotonou asymmetrical preferences. The states’ disposition on 
asymmetry is again examined more directly in question 10.   The greater the feeling amongst 
an ACP state’s negotiators that the EU ought to compensate them for their liberalization losses, 
the greater we can deduce a clientlist attitude fuelled by a higher degree of asymmetrical 
expectation and relational exchange. Those states which do not seek or expect compensation 
                                                 
 
 
59 Italicization{ mine} 
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show a higher propensity for more ‘equal’ relations where the exchange is more purely 
commercial than relational. Such states would be more likely to accept an EPA faster even if 
the EU doesn’t give material incentives to catalyze their acceptance. Questions 7 and 9 test the 
negotiator persuasion on the supposed putative benefits of an EPA as stimulus tools for 
economic growth. Question 8 examines the ACP states view on the urgency to complete the 
EPA negotiations. More explication of the SVI questionnaires is done in section 3.2.2.4. 
 
Table 18 below shows the outcomes from SVI responses on negotiator beliefs on EPA utility. 
The responses come from 28 states out of 35 states which initialed an EPA, representing a 
response rate of 80%. The table below includes Angola whose results are not factored in the 
analysis since Angola did not initial an EPA. 
 
Table 18. ACP States’ Variance in Degree of Belief Convergence on Asymmetry and EPA 
Utility 
 
ACP States                       Belief convergence (CNO) Total Weighted 
indv. 
Total 
Weighted 
regional 
averages 
 Item 1. Item 2. Item 3. Item 4. Item. 5    
         
Cariforum 6 1 - 7 7 21/4 5.25 5.25 
         
PNG 7 4 4 - 1 16/4 4 4 
         
Mauritius 2 4 3 2 3 14/4 3.5  
3.52 Seychelles 4 4 5 6 2 21/5 4.2 
Elijah Nyaga Munyi PhD 2013 
187 
Zimbabwe 5 6 1 5 1 18/5 3.6 
Madagascar 4 4 4 1 1 14/5 2.8  
         
Botswana 6 2 7 1 7 23/5 4.6  
 
3.4 
 
Mozambique 4 6 6 4 4 24/5 4.8 
Swaziland 4 3 5 1 1 14/4 3.5 
Namibia 2 3 1 1 1 8/5 1.6 
Angola 7 4 2 1 4 19/5 3.8  
         
Kenya 7 7  4 1 19/4 4.75  
4.1 Rwanda 3 4 3  4 14/4 3.5 
Zambia 5 2 - 2 1 10/4 2.5 2.5 
Source: Computed from the SVI responses  
Higher regional score = higher degree of belief convergence on EPA utility and satisfaction on asymmetry. 
 
From the table, column 1 has the ACP states proximally grouped into their respective 
negotiating regions. PNG represents the lone Pacific state while the Cariforum group of course 
comprises 15 states. The states in these columns are the states from which responses were 
received. Columns 2-6 represent the score from each state/region on the five belief 
convergence question. Columns 7 shows each state’s total score on the belief convergence (an 
addition of scores from item 1 -5) while column 8 shows the weighted individual state average, 
which is the total score divided by the number of responses. The normal number of responses 
should be 5 (based on the five questions) but since there are NA responses in some cases, the 
average is done to adjust to the exact number of responses. In the Cariforum case for instance, 
item 3 was a NA response and therefore the scores used are from only 4 (rather than 5) 
questions.  It is the same case for Rwanda on item 4. Column 9 then provides the regional 
aggregate which is an average for the states’ individual scores in each region. The use of a 
regional average is particularly important since it not only factors in the regional nature of the 
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negotiations but also evens the comparison between the Cariforum and other regions since we 
have a single aggregated score for the entire Cariforum which comprises 15 states. From the 
table, the weighted regional averages show that it is states which have a higher belief 
convergence to the EU on EPA utility/asymmetry that have been most disposed to ratifying 
their EPAs. The Cariforum leads, followed by Papua New Guinea and then the ESA states. 
These three regions have signed the EPAs and their EPAs are at least in provisional 
application. The EAC remains an outlier because although it has not signed or ratified its EPA, 
its belief convergence with the EU remains high. This can be most likely be explained by the 
high intensity of regionalized negotiations and the development and commercial differences 
between Kenya and the rest of LDC EAC states. 
 
Table 19 and Graph 2 below show the inverse relationship between depth of belief 
convergence and the duration taken to EPA completion. The more a state (or region) was 
persuaded on the putative objectives of EPA, the shorter the duration it takes to ratify its EPA- 
in spite of more of less the same distribution characteristics for all ACP states. 
 
Table 19: Correlation Patterns between ACP Belief Convergence and EPA duration 
 
Region EPA State Period 
notified/signed 
Weighted 
regional CNO 
Score 
Duration taken to 
ratification in 
Years 
Cariforum Ratified  Oct, 2008 5.25 6 
PNG Ratified  Oct, 2011 4.0 9 
ESA states Ratified  Feb, 2012 3.7 10 
SADC States Only signed June, 2009 3.4 12 
EAC Only Initialed Nov, 2007 4.1 12 
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As the scores on belief convergence in column 9 show, there is almost a considerably clear 
linear pattern of correlation between an ACP regions’ belief on EPAs and asymmetry and its 
propensity to expeditiously complete an EPA. (See columns 4 and 5 in table 19). With belief 
convergence score of 5.25, the Cariforum tops the rest of the ACP groups, followed by PNG, 
then the ESA states and then the SADC states.  The order of the scores corresponds almost 
perfectly to the patterns of efficiency in ratifying or merely signing the EPA. The only outliers 
are the EAC states which show a high level of belief convergence in spite of their being very 
low of efficiency (they have only initialed their EPAs). By way of measuring the believe 
convergence in EPA utility and asymmetry, we derive a compelling pattern with regard to 
each region’s state of EPA completion.  In spite of the few data points, a rather neat pattern of 
inverse relationship emerges between the degree of belief convergence and time taken to 
completion emerges as shown in graph 2. At the least, as graph 2 shows, (I contend) this 
pattern is more compelling in explaining propensity to ratify an EPA than was the case with 
material dependence (trade and tariff vulnerability). This is a relationship more robust than 
that shown in graph 1. 
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Graph 2: Positive Correlation between Belief convergence and Efficiency 
 
 
4.6  What Explains ACP states’ Successful Defense against the EU in Negotiating Time-
frames? 
As briefly intimated at the beginning of the dissertation (section 1.2) the second question on 
EPA efficiency is the question of ‘what accounts for ACP’s inordinate resistance to EPA 
conclusion from the EU considering the EU’s putative power dominance in the negotiation?’ 
This regards the unique strength that ACP states have collectively shown in resisting a quick 
conclusion to these agreements. While sections 4.3 and 4.5 deal with intra-ACP variances in 
efficiency, section 4.6 examines explanation of efficiency in the super dyad (ACP vs. EU). In 
spite of the putative material asymmetry between the EU and the ACP states, the EPA 
negotiations are the longest running EU FTAs with neither completion nor suspension. In the 
EPAs the ACP states do not seem to be the supplicant demendeurs that Elgstrom suggests 
ACP states to be. They hold their own quite successfully against the EU. The argument of 
longer negotiating durations as being a ‘success’ for the ACP states is based on two elements; 
One, that longer negotiating time frames were in favor of ACP states (more than the EU) since 
as long as the EPA negotiations were ongoing, the EU would keep on applying the more 
preferential non-reciprocal tariffs to ACP exports into the EU. In addition, since the EU already 
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had almost60 100% liberalization for ACP imports under the EBA, EPAs entailed a 
disproportionate liberalization on the part of ACP states. Second, compared to other recent EU 
attempts at region-to-region FTAs, particularly with ‘south’ regions, the EPAs have been the 
longest running without a conclusive agreement or disagreement (suspension of negotiations). 
 
Other EU attempts at region-to-region FTAs have either been completed (for one case) or 
suspended (five cases) within five years of the start of negotiations. As table 20 below shows it 
took at least 6 years before the first (most efficient) EPA was conclude with the Cariforum 
group. For other ACP regions, negotiations have stretched to nine, ten or twelve years. This 
nature of protraction without completion or suspension of negotiations is chiefly unique only 
to the ACP states. Why has the EU been so concessionary? What explains this protraction 
without the EU pulling out and unilaterally imposing the GSP? 
 
As table 20 shows, in recent years the EU has attempted a few other region-to-region FTAs but 
with a low success rate. Most of these negotiation attempts have ended up being suspended in 
the first 3-5 years of negotiation. The ASEAN FTA was suspended within two years of 
negotiation. In 1999, the EU launched FTA negotiations with Mercusor, but these negotiations 
collapsed after five years, in 2004. Similarly the EU-Andean Community FTA collapsed within 
three years of the start. 
 
                                                 
 
 
60 For a detailed outlay of the trade policy and tariffs that the two parties apply to each other and the 
expected/predicted impacts of tariffs liberalization on the ACP see Fontagne, Mitaritonna and Laborde (2008)  
‘An Impact Study of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in the six ACP Regions’. 
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Table 20: Duration and Status of Recent EU Region-to-Region FTAs 
 
Region-to region     Negotiation Duration       Status 
Start  end In Years 
EU- ASEAN 2007 2009 2 suspended 
EU-GCC 1990-1991 
2002- 2008 
2008 1 
6 
Suspended (1991)    
Suspended again (2008) 
EU-Mercusor 1999 2004 5 suspended 
EU-Andean 2007 2010 3 suspended 
EU- Central 
America 
2007 2010 3 Concluded 
Source: EU commission Trade (2013) Overview of FTA and Other trade negotiations 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf 
http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf_cooperation/index_en.htm (for the GCC negotiations) 
 
The EU-Gulf Cooperation Council FTA has been the longest running and rivals the ACP EPAs 
in duration. Started in 1990, it was quickly suspended in 1991, then re-started in 2002 and 
suspended again in 2008. But of course unlike the Gulf Cooperation Council FTA attempt 
which has been on and off, the EPAs have not been suspended for a single day in their 
ongoing 12 year run. The one successful case of a completed region to region EU FTA is with 
six61 Central American states which took only three years. And as table 21 shows, this pattern 
                                                 
 
 
61 The six Central American states are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147660.pdf 
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of either quick conclusion or suspension within six years of start of a negotiation process is 
similarly shown with the FTAs (called Association Agreements) that the EU initiated with four 
African Mediterranean states as part of the EU’s Barcelona process in the mid-nineties. 
 
Table 21: Duration of EU- Euro Mediterranean FTA Negotiations 
 
Region Negotiation time frame % Share of Exports to 
EU  
FTA state 
 Years            No. of 
years 
  
 
 
All WTO Legal  
Egypt 1995-2001 6 37.4 
Tunisia  1994-1998 4 76.7 
Morocco 1995-1996 2 62.2 
Algeria 1996-2000 4 46.2 
    
South Africa 1995-1999 4 28 
Source: Nabli Mustapha, 2001. Euro Mediterranean Agreements timeframe 
South Africa: Sudworth, E., and K. Van Hove. 1998. European Union-South Africa Trade Negotiations: Insights 
into an ACP-EU Negotiating Process. (Working Paper No. 57). Maastricht: ECDPM - See more at: 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/22fca781fecdc24bc1256c87004bfd78?Open
Document#sthash.nsKmn4J8.dpuf  
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In the case of the Euro-Med FTA agreements with the four North African states, the longest 
FTA negotiation (with Egypt) took six years. With the EPAs, it’s the fastest region (Cariforum) 
that takes six years. Table 21 shows each of these North African states and South Africa, and 
the years it took each of them to finalize an FTA with the EU. These North African states are 
not part of the ACP. As it shows all the four North African states took between 2 and 6 years to 
complete the FTA. This is in contrast to the ACP states, many of which even after initialing an 
agreement in 2007 have not completed an agreement after eleven years. As may be apparent, a 
position taken in this dissertation is that a longer negotiation period favors the ACP states 
because it delays the implementation of the less favorable EPA agreements than Cotonou 
Agreement. At the minimum, operationalization of an EPA would mean forgone tariff income 
from importation of EU products. A quick conclusion of an FTA/EPA is therefore necessarily 
in the EU’s interest and not necessarily so for the ACP states. And as these two tables are 
designed to show, unlike other regions or groups of states which are not bound to the EU by 
some special historical institution, the ACP has held its own very successfully in resisting a 
speedy conclusion of these EPAs. 
 
As Ulrike Lorenz (2012) has observed, the variance in and successful extension of negotiating 
time frames for different ACP regions indicates that it is each of these regions, rather than the 
EU that were in charge of determining their negotiating time frame beyond the original five 
years (2002-2007) envisioned at the beginning of the process.  As Lorenz observes, ‘for the first 
time, European negotiators had to substantially leave their pre-agreed negotiation path and 
positions due to the immense pressure from ACP countries, regional organizations, and non-
state actors – and still have not been able to finalize negotiations that had initially been 
expected to only take five years until the end of 2007’ (Lorenz, 2012: 1). This unusual ability of 
the ACP states in not only dictating the negotiating time frames but also pushing for re-
negotiation presents a foundational puzzle of this work. As results on SVI tests on EU’s 
subjective attitudes in negotiation with the ACP states show, the EU’s (and ACP states) 
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attitudes about their institutional relations have chiefly affected the pace and propensity of the 
two parties to be concessionary and thus indisposed to breaking hard negotiations. 
 
The EU negotiating machinery being very centralized and institutionalized, the SVI responses 
were submitted to the EU (Directorate of Trade in charge of EPA negotiations) and were 
collectively answered by the section’s head of unit by agreement on their side. Being in charge 
of the seven desk officers, the head of unit was the lead negotiator and in charge of steering the 
EU’s preferences and positions.  In any case, the EU as a whole had a single negotiating 
mandate. As indicated in the method section, questions under NOI are designed to evaluate 
negotiator feelings about the role of institutions and EU-ACP historical relations in 
constraining the behavior, preferences and consequently outcomes of the EPA negotiations. 
How intensely do the norms of EU-ACP historical institutions and relations affect the conduct 
and outcomes of the EPA negotiations? Based on the hypothesis that the EU is more 
constrained by the nebulous notion of EU-ACP  ’special’ relations, the NOI question seek to 
test the impact of the three defining norms of special relations and the extent to which they 
constrain the EU to be more concessionary than would be usual with other regions not bound 
by ‘special relations’.  
 
The concept of exactly what EU-ACP  ‘special relations’ entail  is misty, but it is a concept that 
is patently alluded to by almost every scholar –Ravenhill, Elgstrom, Mahler, Hurt, Zartman, 
Stevens, Bilal, Parfitt, Heron, Meyn, and others-  of EU-ACP relations. In an attempt at 
crystallization of the concept in this thesis, ‘special relations’ comprises three elements; a 
feeling of EU special responsibility for ACP states, a tendency for both parties to emphasize 
consensus in negotiation (no history of breakdown in negotiations in more than 50 years of 
special relations) and both parties commitment to regional integration. These are all factors that 
are in fact listed as principles of EPA negotiations in EU’s framing of its objectives in EPA in its 
negotiating mandate. Without interpretation of the concept to the negotiators,  but with a 
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precise ‘code’ on interpretations to the answers provided, SVI questionnaires intent on 
measuring commitment to these principles were presented to them with questions intended to 
assess their feelings on these principles’ influence on their preferences and actions during the 
negotiation. 
 
Table 22: EU Subjective Value on Institutional Constraints in Negotiations with ACP States 
Institutional Norm SVI Questions EU Score 
 
 
 
 
EU ‘Special’ 
responsibility for 
ACP 
How influential was the idea of maintaining EU-ACP 
‘special relations’ important in informing your 
negotiating objectives, preferences and attitudes? 
 
As an EU negotiator did you feel that the EU’s 
negotiating positions/offers on the FTA aspects of 
the EPAs (eg. in trade liberalization duration, 
volume of liberalization, negotiating timeframe, 
RoO, etc) were more generous than for other recent 
EU’s FTAs with developing countries? 
 
If so on question 3, (4 - 7) was such generosity 
informed by the ACP-EU special relations and the 
EU’s sense of special responsibility for ACP states’ 
development and good economic performance as 
these states (ACP) integrate into the global trading 
system? 
 
5 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Eventual consensus 
in negotiation  
How much was the extension of negotiation deadline 
from (2007 to 2014) informed by an EU motive to 
have mutually acceptable EPA agreements through 
consensus, even if it took more time beyond the 
initial WTO imposed deadline to do so, rather than 
have agreements (GSP or EPAs) largely dictated by 
time constraints? 
 
In your experience, to what extent was EU 
 
 
7 
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willingness to extend the negotiating period beyond 
the WTO mandated 2007 deadline, informed by EU 
negotiators sensitivity not to undermine (or avoid 
accusations of antagonizing) the stability of EU- 
ACP relations/partnership? 
7 
Regional Integration In your experience, to what extent was speed of 
negotiations held back by EU negotiators sensitivity 
to breaking-up, or perceptions of breaking-up of 
regional ACP regions coherence, or outright lack of 
coherence among ACP regions? 
 
 
6 
Total average 
institutional 
constraint  
Total Score/6 questions 6.5 = strong 
 
Table 22 above shows the results from the SVI responses of EU negotiators feelings on the 
extent of institutional/or regime constrains on them. The highest possible score being 7, an 
average score 6.5 represents a very strong degree of norm (or institutional or regime) 
entrapment for the EU.  From the results, the EU negotiators feel highly constrained by the 
nebulous regimes that characterize EU-ACP relations and constitute what is called ‘special 
relations’. As questions on the norm of EU ‘special responsibility’ for the ACP states show for 
instance, the EU feels obliged to be ‘more generous’ with the ACP states than with other 
developing states.  Interestingly the EU feels greater pressure on the need to maintain ‘special 
relations’ than most ACP states report to feel. 
 
Similarly the EU feels obliged to keep the negotiations going in order to have agreements 
driven by consensus rather than by time constraints. Considering that the EU has now set a 
unilateral deadline, we can infer that the EU at some point decided that this consensus 
approach would perhaps keep EPAs going indefinitely. As the EU indicates, it is moderately 
sensitive to being seen as antagonizing EU-ACP relations and thus willing to keep the 
negotiations going.  It is insightful to note that the issue of ACP-EU relationship, and its 
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potential disintegration, was also strategically used by ACP states to coax the EU to avoid 
setting a 2014 negotiating deadline. As Hon. Musikari Kombo, the co-president of the EU-ACP 
Parliamentary Assembly at the time put in his speech in response to the EU’s Resolution 1528, 
‘The ACP side is strongly appealing to its partners to show flexibility and reconsider its 
position regarding the proposed amendment to the Market Access Regulation 1528/07. Our 
relationship has gone on for so long and is so deep that it should not be put to threat62 by issues that 
can otherwise be amicably resolved to the mutual benefit of us all’ (Kombo, 23rd Session of the 
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly). EU sensitivity (even vulnerability) to a breakdown, or 
perceptions of a breakdown in relations with its ACP partner states was thus real.  And finally 
the EU is very keen on not being seen as scattering efforts of regional integration among ACP 
states. Because of EU’s sensitivity to anything that might be seen as ruining this ‘special’ 
relations, the EU becomes overly concessionary with the ACP states as the SVI results in table 
22 show. This is in line with Lempereur (2009: 560) observation that in cases where the EU has 
a privileged economic relationship with another state (such as the ACP states) the upholding 
of the relationship takes precedence over the actual outcomes of the negotiations. This 
relationship in turn spurns a regime through which the states interact. 
 
In line with Krasner definition of regimes as 
‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are 
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
                                                 
 
 
62 Italicization is mine to highlight the use of relationship as a bargaining chip.  
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making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice ( 
Krasner, 1982: 186)  
 
the argument here is that the EU is deeply constrained by the regimes of ‘special relations’ 
which govern and constrain its negotiating maneuvers with the ACP states. Whether defined 
as principles or norms, the regimes engendered by ‘special relations‘ can explain EU 
inordinate concessionary disposition towards the ACP (on matters of time) and thus the 
protraction experienced in EPA negotiations.   Even though it seems to characterize EU-ACP 
negotiations going back to Lome 1, this idea of a ‘not so weak south’ as Lorenz, (2012: 7) calls it 
is one that has not been so widely acknowledged or systematically fitted within broader 
institutionalism theories. Ravenhill, (1979: 160) does of course allude to it, and does try to 
explain it as it regards renegotiation of Lome agreements in the early 1980s. Like Ravenhill, I 
argue and explicate at length in the following chapter (analysis) that ACP strength can be 
explained by collective clientelism. But beyond Ravenhill’s identification of the clientelism, I 
venture into explaining why/how it works by placing clientelism within a formal 
institutionalist conceptual frame. As I argue, ACP collective clientelism is made potent by the 
institutional regimes produced by ACP-EU special relations. As it appertains specifically to 
EPAs, only Lorenz (2012) has tried a systematic pursuit of how to explain ACP strength. I 
therefore use these final paragraphs of this chapter to address her arguments on ACP 
resistance power. 
 
In her case she avers that regional positions followed from the preferences of regional 
hegemons (Kenya and South Africa). In explaining South Africa’s convoluted position on 
EPAs it sounds like Lorenz is actually describing South Africa’s normative position 
(ideological disposition) on trade, in which case we would agree. However considering that 
Africa’s putative regional hegemons (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya) have not signed or ratified 
their EPAs while some states in those regions have, (Ivory Coast, Seychells, Mozambique, 
Lesotho and others), I find Lorenz’z contention on the role of hegemons as lacking force. In the 
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case of the EAC, it’s actually the East African LDCs [Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi] 
through the EAC secretariat that have heaped pressure on Kenya not to go it alone and sign an 
EPA in spite of Kenya’s high propensity to do so (see SVI response for Kenya).  So in the case 
of Kenya, while it is East Africa’s economic powerhouse, its actions have been constrained by 
loyalty and commitment to the regional agreements (the East African Community Customs 
Protocol) to always conduct regional negotiations. (See CUTs International 2011 ‘Report for the 
Workshop: EAC/EC-Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAS): Kenya’s Perspectives’). Thus 
Kenya63 is a hegemony that is in fact constrained by the regional agreement rather than one 
that leads or charts the course of the EAC region. 
 
How is it that that putatively trade dependent and weak ACP states seem uniquely successful 
in resisting faster conclusion to EPAs?  As the SVI questionnaires sought to examine and as the 
results show, EU’s inordinate concessionary attitude towards the ACP is fueled by the unique 
‘partnership’ regimes that guide EU-ACP relations. It is these regimes that the ACP in turn 
exploits in its offensive against the EU in a fashion that other states outside of such privileged 
relations (ASEAN for example) are not able to exploit. These sorts of regimes constitute the 
institutional norms which in turn can engender either cooperativeness or entrapment in a 
negotiation round. Thus as I argue in the final chapter of the dissertation, from a theoretical 
point, normative institutionalism aptly explains EU’s amenability to ACP states due to the 
institutional culture inculcated by historical EU-ACP relations. This will be taken up and 
explicated further in the following chapter. 
 
                                                 
 
 
63 Similarly see the Kenyan Ministry of Trade press release affirming Kenya’s regional loyalties: 
http://www.trade.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=158&Itemid=98 
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Chapter 4 has been aimed at providing empirical data that illuminates on the questions 
addressed in this dissertation. First, through document analysis, a comparative analysis of the 
distribution outcomes of EPA shows that overall, the EU prevails in most of the contentious 
issues of ‘division’ in the EPA negotiations. The final outcomes in distribution characteristics 
of EPAs on most contested issues reflect the EU’s position. Even though there are some 
differences in ACP regions outcomes, these differences are only auxiliary to the primary EU 
preference. For instance under ‘substantially all trade’ the ACP states frame of liberalization 
ranges between 80% and 98%. So while Seychelles for instance agrees to liberalize 98% of its 
trade, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe only agree to liberalize 80%. The bottom line on 
SAT is that all ACP states accept EU terms of a minimum 80% liberalization. Similarly the EU 
is able to push and insert itself assertively in ACP states use of export taxes, a position 
opposed by all ACP states at the beginning. 
 
The ACP states however do deliver some success in extending duration of the negotiation, 
limiting the scope of negotiations (comprehensive or goods only) and completely eliminating 
non-execution clauses from the negotiation. My dissertation focuses on the duration taken by 
various ACP states and what propels some states to accept an EPA faster while others hold 
out. This propensity to complete or withhold EPA ratification is what I refer to as to as 
efficiency. 
 
Secondly, through conceptual elite interviews, divergences in states’ normative stance on the 
quality of asymmetry in EU-ACP relations and persuasion on EPA utility are identified as lead 
(independent) variables that explain the efficiency variances in EPA completion among ACP 
states better than asymmetrical material dependencies. Thirdly through more expansive 
standardized Subjective Value Index questionnaires, the primacy of these attributes 
(normative stance) in explaining EPA variances and overall efficiency is examined and found 
to have more cogency than structural (material interdependence) interpretations.  In finalizing 
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the dissertation, the analysis, chapter five, will look at what these findings, if plausible, entail 
for theory development in asymmetrical negotiations. 
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5 SO WHAT? THEORISING ASYMMETRICAL NEGOTIATIONS FROM 
THE EPA PROCESS AND OUTCOMES 
What then does the EPA process and efficiency outcomes tell us about the state of theory in 
asymmetrical negotiations? Or how does the EPA process illuminate on potentially novel 
conceptual frameworks of understanding the outcomes of asymmetrical negotiations? This 
penultimate analytical chapter seeks to apply the empirical findings of the preceding chapter 
to theoretical developments in asymmetrical negotiations. If the findings of the empirical 
section are credible (as I hope they are) then constitute a veritable grounds in contributing to 
two hitherto theoretically under-acknowledged or empirically untested variables in 
predicating outcomes of asymmetrical negotiations. The two aspects are also finely 
intertwined with each other. 
 
First, the outcomes of asymmetrical trade negotiations may be as much norm-governed as 
maybe structure-governed. Norm governance refers to the mandates and principles 
engendered by institutionalized political relationships.  Is a state’s normative suasion in fact 
not the more primordial, elemental determinant of a state’s preferences, before structure?  At 
least in a liberal theory frame this would be the case since norms inform preference, and 
structure only constrains action. In Moravcsikian liberal theory terms, preferences are ‘causally 
independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate political 
interactions, including external threats, incentives, manipulation of information, or other 
tactics (Moravscik, 1997: 519). As such why then should outcomes of asymmetrical 
negotiations (negotiations involving exchange of non-comparable resources) be almost 
exclusively seen as a product of structural dependencies, structural power and vulnerabilities? 
Is it not as imperative to first, examine the normative basis of states preference formation? 
 
Elijah Nyaga Munyi PhD 2013 
204 
Based on empirical findings of the Subjective Value Index surveys from ACP states where 
normative suasion (outside of material considerations) seems to play a critical role in 
explaining intra-ACP efficiency variance, section 5.1 thus builds a conceptual framework that 
infuses normative persuasion as a basis of preference formation and subsequently its import in 
explaining efficiency outcomes of a negotiation and the conditions under which norms or 
structural resources are key in precipitating outcomes. 
 
Secondly, what is the theoretical essence of collective clientelism? ‘Collective Clientelism’, as 
coined and defined by John Ravenhill (1985) remains a drifty three-decade concept whose 
theoretical essence has not been fully situated within a wider theoretical setting in 
International Relations.  In his seminal book Collective Clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and 
North-south Relations, whose empirical data was based on the Lome 1 negotiations,   Ravenhill 
accurately observed that the ACP states were able to extract more preferential treatment than 
other developing states from the EU (then EEC) by associating more closely with the EU. He 
calls clientelism an associative strategy used by the weak. How does clientelism work? Why 
are smaller states able to derive more from a bigger state if they are more closely intertwined 
in deeper relationships with the materially superior state? As a strategy why does clientelism 
work? Why are stronger states (the EU in this case) perpetually vulnerable to this strategy? 
This is a question that Ravenhill and others scholars who have used the concept to explain 
ACP –EU negotiated outcomes have not pursued, or that has been accepted as self-evident. 
Ravenhill’s accurate observations on clientelism and EU relations with the ACP preceded the 
great profusion of literature on the institutionalization of EU relations and governance in the 
late 1990s and 2000s. Perhaps it’s time to reconcile this strategy to a theoretical grounding in 
this institutionalism literature.  Section 5.2 to gives a theoretical grounding of clientelism 
within institutionalism, and why it works. 
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5.1 Determinants of Efficiency in Asymmetrical Negotiations: The Role of Norm Convergence 
and Expectation on Asymmetry  
Scholarship on how small (er) states engage in international economic negotiations – either 
with success or not- has been a subject of modest scholarly output in recent years such as from 
Emily, Deere-Birkbeck and Woods (2010); Odell,(2010); Narlikar, (2013); (2010); Odell, (2000);  
Panke (2010); Jackson, (2013); and Bilal,  De Lombaerde and Tussie, (2011). Yet the role of 
norms in directing or influencing the course of how smaller states negotiate or succeed has not 
been part of much of this literature especially with regard to an empirical demonstration of 
norm influences in actual negotiations involving smaller states.  In making suppositions on the 
sources of negotiating power, Bilal, De Lombaerde and Tussie’s volume for instance 
[Asymmetric Trade Negotiations] which is deals with actual cases of asymmetrical negotiations 
involving African and Latin American states avers sources of power that are almost 
exclusively structural. ‘We argue that that the bargaining power of states in trade negotiations 
relies on at least four dimensions’ (2011:14). These they enumerate as market size, domestic 
institutions, role of civil society in supporting government and types of coalitions formed. The 
role of norms in either informing preferences or precipitating agreement is somewhat absent in 
such current empirical works of which not incidentally, the ACP-EU EPA negotiations 
constitute a major case. 
 
The objectives of this section is to highlight the empirical findings from chapter 4 and use these 
findings to frame and construct a theoretical framework that encompasses the conditions 
under which norms and structure operate in precipitating negotiated outcomes - with 
particular regard to efficiency - of asymmetrical negotiations. The proposed model, it is argued 
corrects for a narrow Hirshmanisque structural interpretation of asymmetrical economic 
negotiations where outcomes are often assumed to be almost ineluctably a function of 
economic dependencies of the subordinate state. By use of this model and the empirical 
evidence coming out of section 4.3 and 4.4, we elect to highlight the role of norms as 
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independent causal variables while at the same time not discounting the role of material 
asymmetries in fomenting a state’s preferences. 
 
Asymmetrical economic negotiations are just like any other negotiations except that in such 
negotiations there is an expectation of an exchange of some dissimilar commodity rather than 
a division of a similar contested commodity or resource. The EU-ACP EPA negotiations show 
this expectation. In order to understand the outcomes of an asymmetrical negotiation one has 
first to divide the negotiation issues into their two constituent parts; (i) the normal, overt 
‘economic’ aspects under negotiations, and (ii) the more obscure elements of asymmetry under 
negotiation. The argument proffered here is that in asymmetrical negotiations, efficiency will 
depend on the two states’ belief convergence/divergence on the economic utility of agreement 
in the normal parts; and the convergence/divergence on satisfaction in the state of asymmetry 
as reflected by positions in the covert, ‘asymmetry’ aspects of the negotiation. 
 
In the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements case, the negotiation is just like any other in 
as far as the negotiation is strictly a Free Trade Agreement where the commodity of division is 
tariff liberalization. This is the normal part. Under the normal part, tariffs are the common ‘pie’ 
of division. As far as the normal part of the FTA is concerned, the driving motivation to reach 
an agreement is the extent to which parties in a dyad are persuaded of the benefits (utility) of 
getting into an agreement – in this case, how persuasive is the argument that an EPA 
agreement would have positive economic outcomes on both parties as the EU frames it? 
However, unlike a ‘normal’ FTA where the tussling and bargaining is confined to the common 
commodity of division (tariffs in goods and services, NTBs, quotas, transparency in 
procurement, competition policy, etc.) the EU-ACP negotiations involved the asymmetrical 
element which is marked by an expectation of asymmetrical exchange. The driving motivation 
in the asymmetrical aspects is to maintain the balance of asymmetry. When one party feels that 
the other is overreaching in trying to unfairly tilt this balance, then a long protraction follows, 
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where the covert contention under negotiation is what the acceptable balance of asymmetry is. 
This protraction can only be resolved by a time deadline or a concession on at least one of the 
parties on re-balancing of asymmetry. The interaction between these two qualities and the 
extent to which both parties agree or disagree determines the degree of efficiency. In the case 
of EU-ACP, the balance of asymmetry is one of the question of what is the fair balance 
between an exchange of influence (ACP states) and additional financial resources (EU). 
 
 In the case of the EPA negotiations the asymmetrical expectations runs on both sides. On the 
EU side, beyond the FTA aspects relating to division of tariff liberalization, the EU expected to 
be granted a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status by the ACP states without conceding the 
same to the ACP states. Similarly in an overreach that that went beyond the objectives of 
making EU-ACP treaties WTO compliant, the EU rammed in negotiations and agreements 
with sunset clauses on use of export taxes and infant industry bilateral safeguards. These 
elements of the negotiations were non-reciprocal and applied only to ACP states unlike the 
SAT (Substantially All Trade) liberalization which applied to both parties. Moreover the EU 
expanded the scope of negotiations beyond trade in goods only contrary to the wishes of the 
ACP. All these are aspects that show the EU’s asymmetrical reach as they went beyond the 
essentials of WTO complementarity. 
 
On its part, ACP states had asymmetrical expectations of its own. The negotiating mandate of 
the ACP states expressed expectations of not only asymmetrical liberalization, but more 
pressing and ultimately more contentious, expectations of financial compensation from the 
EU. ACP’s asymmetrical expectations on the EU are reflected in its negotiating demands in its 
mandate as shown here. For the ACP asymmetrical expectations were extended even into the 
normal ‘economic’ division of tariffs liberalization part where the ACP called for asymmetrical 
liberalization skewed in its favor. 
 
Elijah Nyaga Munyi PhD 2013 
208 
The provision of special and differential treatment to ACP States must be an essential 
consequence of the differentiation between the ACP and the EU based on equity and 
recognizing their different levels of development 
ACP Negotiating Mandate, 2002, section II, e 
Moreover, given the possible adverse effect of reciprocity on domestic production and fiscal 
stability in ACP States, the latter cannot a priori accept to provide reciprocity in EPAs with the 
EU. In view of the differences in the level of development between the ACP States and the EU, 
the ACP cannot be required to make the same level of commitments under EPAs as the EU, 
particularly as regards market access. 
ACP Negotiating Mandate, section II, c, 21 
 
Most contentiously the ACP sought to be compensated by the EU for its income losses due to 
liberalization. As its negotiating mandate states, the ACP wanted to be indulged. 
As a result of the implementation of EPAs, ACP countries will face a new set of adjustment 
difficulties and challenges such as revenue loss, unemployment, the upgrading of productive 
structures and human resources and the building of the requisite institutional capacity. 
Additional resources will have to be provided to the ACP to assist them in meeting the 
inevitable adjustment costs. 
ACP Negotiating Mandate, section II, K33 
Secure the underwriting by the EU of the costs of adjustment associated with the 
implementation of EPAs through the creation of a financial facility additional to and distinct 
from the EDF 
ACP Negotiating Mandate, section III, A, h 
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Why should one region or state financially compensate another in an FTA if the latter’s 
liberalization is of its own volition?  Why does the ACP behave as though in accepting a 
reciprocal FTA it was doing the EU a favor, in return for which it sought financial rewards? 
And why does the EU so confidently and successfully ram through all the WTO-plus elements 
of the EPA in spite of their being non-essential in WTO compliancy? Well, all these anomalies 
just go to show the acceptable deviations inherent in an asymmetrical negotiation where the 
objectives of both parties are not just about the utility of an economic agreement, but also 
equally important an obscure negotiation of the proper state of asymmetrical relations 
between the two parties. 
 
As most ACP states readily admit, and as evidenced by ACP state’s collective hasty initialing 
of EPAs at the end of 2007, agreements to initial by the 35 states who initialed an EPA in 2007 
are overwhelmingly driven by structural asymmetrical trade dependency. However what 
happens after 2007, in terms of a movement towards and resistance to ratification (which is 
what these thesis has concerned itself with mostly and as shown by the negotiators responses 
in the interviews and questionnaires) suggests that much more than trade dependency plays a 
role in disposition to ratify an EPA. Thus as evidenced by the delays to ratification of EPAs 
after 2007, the most fractious contentions have actually been less about the economic aspects of 
the FTA (substantially all trade) but more about the asymmetrical aspects of the EPA 
(compensation, MFN, Bilateral Safegurds, Export taxes and the scope –comprehensive or 
goods only) and aspects that go beyond the original basic necessities of EPAs – WTO 
complementarity. Ultimately, after initialing it is the ACP states that are normatively closer to 
the EU in terms of their belief in the economic utility of EPAs and similar expectations of 
asymmetry that ratified their EPAs more expeditiously. Belief in potential economic utility of 
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EPAs required a high level of persuasion in a cloudy economic theory that one could spur 
growth by simply making trade with the EU reciprocal. It’s a shaky proposition which was 
firmly and repeatedly championed by the EU64. 
 
Unlike market access which was a more immediate and predictable benefit or loss to ACP 
states, belief in EPAs economic utility was a norm that was rooted in a state’s ideological 
disposition to the unproven putative benefits an EPA. A state may have ‘believed’ in the 
appropriateness of EPAs either because it was really persuaded so, or because it believed this 
be true because the EU said so. 
 
As shown by results in section 4.5 (table 18), the efficiency of an asymmetrical negotiation goes 
beyond simply asymmetrical interdependence as most interpretations seem to aver. Based on 
these findings, I posit that efficiency (defined as a state’s propensity to readily and speedily 
ratify its EPA) is determined by the convergence and divergences between the two parties on 
two principal variables: (a) normative convergence/divergence in persuasion on the mutual 
economic utility of the negotiated agreement, and (b) convergence/divergence on fulfilling 
mutual expectations on asymmetry. Figure 3 below presents the conceptual frame of 
predicting and understanding efficiency outcomes of an asymmetrical negotiation such as EU-
ACP EPA negotiations. 
                                                 
 
 
64 Championed not only in its negotiating mandate as has been documented but in other document by the EU 
commissioners, Mandelson and Michel. See ‘An open letter to anti-poverty campaigners from EU Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandeon and EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel’ 
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Figure 3: Asymmetry/Credibility Model of explaining Efficiency in Asymmetrical 
Negotiations 
 
 
Typologies of Persuasion 
 
Figure 3, outlines the conceptual framework between these two variables [asymmetry and 
credibility] and the expected variances in degrees of efficiency associated with each set of 
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normative persuasion. Just before explaining the model, we introduce a political psychology 
outline of typologies of persuasion as a way of understanding agreement or resistance to an 
EPA ratification. In order to explain this framework its necessary make references on some 
foundational social-psychological theorizing on sources of social influence among groups 
when a behavioral change occurs. 
 
As defined at the beginning of the thesis a negotiation process is one involving, ’a sequence of 
actions in which two or more governments address demands and proposals to each other for 
the ostensible purpose of reaching an agreement and changing the behavior of at least one party’ 
(Odell, 2000:10). Negotiations are therefore inherently about changing the behavior of an 
individual or group (state in this case). When one or both parties in a dyad change their 
behavior from its original preferences to the final agreement, why does it do so? Social 
Psychologist Herbert C. Kelman (1961) identified three motivational sources of group 
behavioral change which I find pertinent in explaining ACP states propensity to accept and 
ratify an EPA. These he labeled, compliance65, identification and internalization. The definition 
of each is as indicated below.  
 
                                                 
 
 
65 Scholarship on compliance in IR has expanded considerably and even more so in European Union studies and 
the word is now more loosely used in IR, without the strict psychological use by Kelman. This is especially so in 
new Social learning theories. Checkel  (2001) in ‘Social Learning and European Identity Change’ for instance 
claims that some constructivists regard compliance as a function of social learning resulting in a ‘non 
instrumental  discovery of new preferences’. Now, clearly in Kelman’s sense of the word, if persuasion is not for 
instrumental purposes, then it is not compliance. It could be identification or internalization. Used here therefore 
is the more concise Kelman’s version. 
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Compliance can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence from another 
person or from a group because he hopes to achieve a favorable reaction from the other. 
He may be interested in attaining certain specific rewards or in avoiding certain specific 
punishments that the influencing agent controls. 
 
Identification can be said to occur when an individual adopts behavior derived from 
another person or a group because this behavior is associated with a satisfying self-
defining relationship to this person or group. By a self-defining relationship I mean a 
role relationship that forms a part of the person's self-image. Accepting influence 
through identification, then, is a way of establishing or maintaining the desired 
relationship to the other, and the self-definition that is anchored in this relationship. 
 
Internalization can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because the 
induced behavior is congruent with his value system. It is the content of the induced 
behavior that is intrinsically rewarding here. The individual adopts it because he finds 
it useful for the solution of a problem, or because it is congenial to his own orientation, 
or because it is demanded by his own values-in short, because he perceives it as 
inherently conducive to the maximization of his values. 
 Kelman, 1961: 62-64 
 
Efficiency of asymmetrical negotiations (speed in reaching agreement and ratification) can 
then be explained in terms of its relation to variances in negotiating states’ subjective 
motivational source of their agreement based on these typologies of persuasion. Only behavior 
change through internalization or identification can be regarded as strictly normative as its 
motivations are based on a veritable convergence of the negotiators normative preferences. 
Agreement through internalization is based on value congruence while agreement from 
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identification is based on understandings of social or institutional appropriateness.  
Identification agreement has a lot to do with agreement which is not predicated on an intrinsic 
persuasion, but based on what is seen or thought of a behavior consistent with sustainability of 
a relationship. As this conceptual model suggests, the propensity for an ACP state to accept 
the EU’s propositions in an EPA would largely depend on two qualities: (a) normative 
convergence/divergence in persuasion on the mutual economic utility of the negotiated 
agreement, and (b) convergence/divergence on fulfilling mutual expectations on asymmetry. 
 
From figure 3, if there is a high degree of persuasion by the two parties in a dyad on the 
economic suitability and utility of EPAs as well as high satisfaction on state of asymmetry 
consequent to an agreement then time wise the negotiation round will be swift (AC). 
Agreement here is based on the belief internalization of both states on the appropriateness of 
the objectives of the agreement.  Similarly under this category speedy agreement could be 
based on identification based reciprocal acquiescence formented on institutional entrapment to 
the rules of appropriateness in maintaining viable exclusive political relationship. 
 
If persuasion (of the materially weaker state ) on the economic utility of an agreement is low, 
but there is high satisfaction by both states on the state of asymmetry, then the weaker state 
becomes more agreeable or vulnerable to the superordinate’s material  incentives or coercion 
(AD). In this case since the materially stronger state has the preference of a speedy agreement 
(high persuasion on utility of an agreement) and the resources to ram one through (by a 
material inducement of the subordinate state), then it’s likely that the outcomes will be 
achieved relatively fast. The only difference is that here, agreement is precipitated by 
compliance of the weaker state. It could be argued that AD describes the situation which 
previous EU-ACP agreements (Younde to Cotonou) have gone though. 
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When there is high agreement/persuasion on the utility an agreement but low agreement on 
the state of asymmetry, the negotiation becomes protracted as parties in a dyad bargain on 
how to re-calibrate their asymmetry (BC). In this situation a time deadline becomes the 
defining variable. Asymmetry in economic negotiations involves finding the right ‘conversion 
rate’ in a crude barter system of exchanging influence and financial/material rewards. When 
there is low agreement on the asymmetry, it’s usually either because the putative materially 
stronger (superordinate) state does not wish to part with as much material benefits as the 
materially weaker (subordinate) state B expects, or when the materially weaker state B is not 
willing to concede as much influence to state A, as state A expects. As the table shows, here 
reaching an agreement will be slow and the agreement is likely to be forced by time a deadline 
upon expiry of the stipulated negotiating time frame.  Alternatively, the agreement can be 
speeded by shelving of the more contested ‘asymmetrical’ aspects from the negotiation and 
confining the negotiation to the economic aspects.  EPAs have mostly been a case of BC. 
Finally, when there is low credibility on the economic aspects of the negotiation as well as low 
agreement on the state of asymmetry, then negotiations are very protracted and could go on 
indefinitely if time deadlines are not imposed. 
 
This model, I argue explains the variable speed in EPA ratification by ACP states and is 
particularly useful in explaining the variable speed between the Cariforum states and some of 
their African counterparts. As indicated in almost all elite interviews, while the Africans states 
(except Mauritius) sign (or initial) on to EPAs as a reactionary move to forestall market access 
loss due to expiry of the 2007 WTO waiver, Cariforum states are proactive in anticipating an 
EPA not only to legalize their preferences and thus avoid political trade dependence but also 
as a catalyst for spurring domestic reform and advertising those reforms. EPAs are completely 
in tune with Cariforum domestic intentions, motivations and aspirations. Cariforum’s strong 
pro-EPA ideological disposition is affirmed by Grant (2000) and Heron (2010) who describes 
how the group’s leading negotiator in 2000 fomented an ‘intellectual character of the CRNM in 
a pro-liberalization direction by identifying the need to respond in a pro-active manner to the 
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‘imperative’ of reciprocity as the central raison d’ˆetre of the new collective negotiating 
framework’ (Heron, 2010: 15). Rather than accepting an EPA as a reluctant measure to forestall 
market access loss, the Cariforum embraces the EPAs as an avenue for locking down its 
preferences with the EU, catalyzing domestic reforms and as a billboard to advertise those 
reforms. In the ‘economic’ aspects of EPA the Cariforum  is therefore in complete normative 
tandem with the EU objectives and thus its position would be around AC. Cariforum group is 
also one of only two states which did not expect any financial reward from the EU thus 
showing great agreement with the state of asymmetry. However, because of their lower 
normative persuasion on the utility of EPA, other initialing ACP regions/states would be more 
to the right of model somewhere around BC. Other ACP non-LDC states which have not 
initialed an agreement at all (such as Nigeria, Gabon and South Africa) would fall under BD. 
For them the utility and asymmetrical exchange in EPAs is undesirable. 
 
Similarly, there is a wide berth between Cariforum and other ACP states (except Botswana), on 
their asymmetrical expectations from the EU. While the normative persuasion of a number of 
African ACP states on the ‘economic’66 aspects of EPAs is amenable, the real and more 
intractable variance between the Cariforum states on one hand and their African and Pacific 
counterparts on the other, is to be found in their stance on the state of EU-ACP asymmetry. In 
fact it is the ‘asymmetrical’ aspects of the EPA negotiations (ACP compensation, MFN, export 
taxes and scope of the EPA) that have been most contentious. When one narrows down to the 
central question of the SVI questionnaire which measures the variances in ACP expectations 
                                                 
 
 
66 As explained earlier, in the EPA negotiation ‘economic’ aspects refer to the basic aspects of an FTA – essentially 
tariff liberalizations on imports. By the end of the liberalization duration, the Cariforum group, the East Africa 
Community, Mauritius and Seychelles would all higher levels of liberalized trade volumes well above the EU 
minimum threshold of 80%. 
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on asymmetry, (To what extent were your negotiators of the view that to accomplish the ‘development’ 
dimension, the EU ought to compensate ACP states for fiscal losses due to EPA liberalization?) the 
Cariforum states (and Botswana) are the only region among the ACP that did not view the EU 
as having any obligation to compensate ACP states due to their liberalization losses. (See 
column six, item 5 of table 18). This is an approach that was in tandem with the EU view of its 
not being obliged to pay/offer the ACP states additional resources over and above the existing 
EDF funds. 
 
Moreover in order to understand the ACP variances in view of asymmetry, one needs to 
appreciate why the Cariforum regarded the state of asymmetry in extant EPAs as acceptable, 
unlike the rest of the ACP. Like other ACP states, the Cariforum too was keen on some level of 
asymmetrical exchange between itself and the EU. However, for the Cariforum, this 
asymmetrical exchange was agreeably (achievable and) was achieved through asymmetrical 
liberalization in the ‘economic’ (SAT) aspects. As the EU side had indicated in its negotiating 
mandate, such flexible, asymmetrical liberalization was to be availed. As the mandate 
envisioned ‘appropriate flexibility should also be applied in relation to product coverage and 
the calendar/rhythm of liberalisation commitments by the EPA partners. "Backloading" of 
implementation commitments and any product exclusions from liberalization should reflect 
the specific constraints and sensitivities of the partner countries concerned’ (ECA, 2002. 6). The 
EU as was thus normatively committed to some level of asymmetrical liberalization in favor of 
the ACP states but only in the ‘economic’ SAT aspects. As the Cariforum negotiating 
machinery clarified in a communique which sought to dispel the ‘fiction’ that ‘EPAs had not 
honoured the commitment to the principle of asymmetry’ (the Cariforum Negotiating 
Machinery, 2008), Cariforum asserts that asymmetry had been achieved because contrary to 
this ‘fiction’ that EPAs were not sufficiently asymmetrical; 
 
EPA obligations are highly asymmetrical with EU obligation being more extensive and 
adjustment periods being shorter than those for the Caribbean; an approach consistent with the 
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differing economic and adjustment capacities of the two partners. Numerous examples of 
important differences in obligations by both sides can be provided, but reference to a few salient 
ones should suffice. 
 
Asymmetry is most evident in the area of market access in goods where the EU is liberalising all 
eligible imports from Caiforum from 1 January 2008 (apart from rice and sugar after a brief 
transition), whereas Cariforum is liberalising most of its imports from the EC over a 15-year 
transition with a number of sensitive imports liberalised over periods up to 25 years. Cariforum 
does not have to begin to liberalise imports before 1 January 2011 and will permanently exclude 
some highly sensitive products from liberalisation. 
(Cariforum Negotiating Machinery, 2008)  
 
In Services, the EU has made liberalisation commitments in 94% of the sectors whereas the 
corresponding figures for Cariforum LDCs and MDCs are 65 and 75% respectively. Cariforum 
countries have thus been able to exclude a larger number of service sectors, including sensitive 
ones, than the EU. The EU has also committed to providing development support to buttress 
regional integration, facilitate the implementation of EPA commitments 
 Cariforum, EPA: FACT VS. FICTION Issue 1. (2008) 
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The Cariforum here goes on to enumerate precisely why and how its agreement had suitably 
achieved asymmetrical outcomes. The Cariforum states were therefore not only in normative67 
agreement with just the ‘economic’ objectives of an EPA but also in agreement with a less 
ambitious, re-calibrated state of asymmetry with the EU where unlike other major rounds of 
EU-ACP negotiations, there would be no financial inducements expected in exchange for 
influence. In contrast, the difficulty for most African and Pacific states – even the states whose 
normative persuasion on the economic aspects of the EPA is high such as Mauritius, Seychelles 
or Fiji - has been to accept concession to EU the influence it seeks in the asymmetrical aspects 
(MFN, Export taxes, liberalization in services etc.), without compensatory, reciprocal financial 
token as the EU has done in every major round of renegotiation of the two parities’ 
agreements. For the Cariforum, its ambitions on asymmetry were more modest than other 
ACP states.  The EU and the Cariforum are thus in tandem in restricting asymmetrical 
exchange to only the economic aspects, unlike expectations of the African and Pacific states. 
 
This model on credibility and asymmetry makes two important contributions in IR theory on 
asymmetrical negotiations and their outcomes. One, by borrowing from psychology and 
introducing the typologies of persuasion, we can highlight the order of different types of 
“negotiated agreements” and particularly so in the case of EPAs.  Negotiated agreement in 
international economic negotiations can be “compliance” agreements, “identification” 
agreements or “internalized” agreements. In the case of ACP states, the duration of time that 
has passed after the 2007 initialing and the subsequent protraction and renegotiation, and as 
                                                 
 
 
67 As referenced in the interview with Junior Lodge -Cariforum negotiator in elite interviews – EPA as a 
pretext/catalysts to protect ACP preferences from WTO litigation, to spur regulatory framework in non-tariff 
based barriers and was interested in using the EPA to spur domestic commitment to economic reform. 
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confirmed by elite interviews, most ACP states initialing an EPA (in 2007) did so as a matter of 
compliance. Initialing an agreement was not borne out of a veritable normative persuasion on 
the appropriateness of EPAs but on the fear of loss market access. Up to this point 
asymmetrical dependence suppositions would be right in attributing outcomes to 
asymmetrical dependencies. However, the emergence of variable speed after 2007, 
spearheaded by states (Cariforum and PNG) that were least trade dependent or tariff 
vulnerable, suggests the import of normative value congruence in precipitating agreement 
with the EU as a far more cogent explanatory variable than asymmetrical dependence. 
Ultimately, by drawing from psychology we are able to place EPA agreements within a 
theoretical prism of graduated types of persuasion. When a negotiated agreement is so 
critically precipitated by a time deadline (as it was in 2007 for all initialing states) then that 
agreement is likely to be only a reluctant compliance. But since some states (Cariforum) 
showed preferences that were very much in line with the EU’s preferences, and their 
asymmetrical expectations too were in line with the EU’s then we can deduce that normative 
convergence as a variable would be more cogently causative than suppositions on 
asymmetrical material vulnerabilities or inducements. When agreement is reached well before 
any deadlines are set, and without any special or additional material resource endowments by 
the superordinate state or region (as in the case of Cariforum group’s ratification in 2008) then 
such an agreement is more likely to be through identification or internalization. 
 
Secondly, the model accommodates both structural based variables as well as normative 
institutional variables in attributing causation of negotiated outcomes. The model does not 
discount the importance of structure (material asymmetries) in conditioning outcomes of 
economic negotiations. However, it argues that norms precede structure in informing states’ 
preferences. States actions should not be assumed to be driven solely, or even primarily by 
considerations of material deficiencies or material capabilities. And thus this model clarifies 
the conditions under which material capabilities or vulnerabilities become critical. That is in 
cases, where there is little chance for reaching a normative, internalized or identity based 
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agreement on an issue. Only then are a state’s action influenced by material capabilities or 
vulnerabilities. Since compliance agreement will only occur in the absence of value 
internalization, it seems logical then to infer that in order of influence, normative persuasion 
precedes structural variances as a more elemental foundation of preference formation. In 
understanding or examining the most elemental basis of a preference we must first consider if 
or not a normative agreement to the putative objectives of negotiations exists. Normative 
agreement or disagreement is the most primordial basis for preference formation. In the case 
of EPAs, taking into account of ACP states’ variances in normative persuasion seems to 
cogently explain their disposition to ratifying an EPA or not.  This corrects the 
Hirschmanesque inspired structural supposition (taken up Heron, Hurt, Dolan, Ravenhill, 
Farrel and Lempereur) that an agreement between a subordinate and superordinate state are 
necessary predicated on asymmetrical dependencies. 
5.2 The Logic of ‘Clientelism’: Asymmetrical Normative Institutionalism 
Since John Ravenhill’s 1985 use of a heuristic device he called ‘collective clientelism’ to explain 
EU-ACP negotiations outcomes, the concept has become widely accepted as way of explaining 
how subordinate ACP states with few negotiating resources successfully ‘punch above their 
weights’ in negotiations with the EU (Clegg, 2005; Olsen, 1997; Elgström 2005; Kappel, 1996; 
Ravenhill, 2002; Stevens, 1986 and Langan, 2008). Undoubtedly, it is a forceful and highly 
persuasive concept in explaining EU-ACP relations. Yet, why is this strategy effective for ACP 
states against the EU? What is the essence of clientlism? Why are subordinate states able to 
extract more from a superordinate state if they are more closely (institutionally) intertwined 
with that economically superior party in an associative relationship? 
 
Collective Clientlism is brought up here because it is deemed very pertinent in explaining 
what Lorenz (2012) has called a ‘not so weak south’. As shown in section 4.6. the ACP states 
are unique in how successfully  they resist  the EU negotiating deadlines , in spite of their 
putative material weakness. And in so doing, initialing ACP states have managed to extract 
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varying negotiating time frames from the EU ranging from 6 years to beyond 12 years contrary 
to the EU’s wishes. Why are they able to do this? Lorenz basis her explanation of ACP strength 
on what she describes as ‘regional dynamics’ rather than EU strength.  She describes ‘regional 
dynamics’ as encapsulating ‘…the negotiation structure (of ACP states), processes of coalition 
building in the individual negotiation groupings, and by the role of the regional hegemon in 
every group in the individual EPA negotiation groupings (Lorenz, 2012:24). However, as 
argued in section 4.6 the role of regional hegemons seems unable to provide a comprehensive 
pattern of explaining ACP wide efficiency variances. After all, a few SACU states in SADC 
have in fact defied South Africa to sign the agreement while within the EAC group, Kenya has 
not68 signed the EPA in spite of its normative disposition to do so and has been kept from 
signing only by its regional obligations to other economically smaller EAC states. This 
disputation of Lorenz’s argument has been done in section 4.6. 
 
Contra Lorenz, as I argue here, the strength of the ACP states (or the weakness of the EU) in 
associative negotiations can be explained not by the inherent qualities of any of the parties but 
by the entrapment engendered by the normative regimes of their interaction and institutions.  
By relying on new theoretical developments in institutionalism, we can infer the institutional 
implications of associative relationships in proffering greater negotiation power to subordinate 
states in asymmetrical negotiations. It is the institutional set ups engendered by associative 
political relationships that give potency to clientelism. 
 
                                                 
 
 
68 On Kenya’s difficult balancing position and primary loyalty to regionalism in spite of normative agreement 
with the EU see http://www.trade.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=158&Itemid=98  
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This argument is based on John Ravenhill’s seminal heuristic of collective clientelism. 
However, beyond Ravenhill’s observation, this section seeks to broach on what the theoretical 
essence of clientelism as is used in the context of ACP-EU negotiations and why it works.  
Overall a clientelism relationship is one which ‘involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial 
relationships of power and exchange, a non-universalistic quid pro quo between individuals 
or groups of unequal standing. It implies mediated and selective access to resources and 
markets from which others are normally excluded. This access is conditioned on 
subordination, compliance or dependence on the goodwill of others (Loniger, 2004:353).  As 
Ravenhill defined it in relation to EU-ACP relations and negotiations, ‘Collective Clientelism’ 
refers to a  
 
relationship in which a group of weak states combine in an effort to exploit the special ties 
that link them to a more powerful state or group of states. Through this means they hope 
to construct an exclusive regime under which they exert a claim on the stronger party in 
order gain or preserve particularistic advantages not available to non-associated states’ 
(Ravenhill, 1985: 22). 
 
Ravenhill’s observations were based on the Lome 1 negotiations of 1975 where ACP states 
broke ranks with the rest of the what were then referred to as least developed ‘third world’ 
states to broker a more exclusive and beneficial relationship  with the EU. The Lome 
Agreements between the ACP and the EU were hailed as historic and came in the backdrop of 
developing states clamor for a New International Economic Order which among other things 
sought to index the prices of ‘southern’ exports to match those of its manufactured imports.  
Yet since then, even in negotiations where the ACP has had exclusive (as only ACP) 
negotiations with the EU, this associative strategy based on exclusive relations has usefully 
served the ACP states. 
 
A core variable under consideration in this thesis is of course that of time taken by EU and 
ACP states to reach an agreement. Time (in years) has been used as a measure of negotiation 
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efficiency. And as documented in section 4.6, the EU has tended to be more accommodating in 
conceding longer negotiating timeframes with the ACP states than with other trade 
negotiations with non-ACP states. In fact none of the EU/EC’s existing 41 Regional Trade 
Agreements69 has taken as long a duration to negotiate (without suspensions or utter total 
collapse) as the current negotiations for an EPA. In situations of non-associated states the EU 
has either suspend or completely broken off negotiations if an agreement is not forthcoming 
by the fifth year. And thus true to Ravenhill’s observation on the usefulness of collective 
clientelism, ACP states seem able to exert a stronger claim on the EU than would otherwise be 
if they were not bound in an associative relationship. Ravenhill’s observation on use of 
collective clientelism as a successful associative strategy by ACP states against the EU is 
therefore undeniably perceptible. However, why does clintelism work? A more direct way of 
asking the same question is why are superordinate states more pliable to the demands of 
associative subordinate ACP states?  Why is the EU less accommodating (at least in regards to 
time and patience to stay in a negotiation even where trade expansion prospects could be 
higher) with other less developed non-associative states such as ASEAN or Mercusor states? 
 
Explaining why ACP states seem able to extract more from the EU has been a subject of 
modest interest to scholars of EU-ACP relations. Two scholars who have attempted this 
explanation best based on collective clientelism and normative dispositions are Ravenhill 
(1985) and Egström (2005).  Egström has persuasively hypothesized that the EU feels bound by 
a partner identity which is hinged on three elements- the Lome Culture – a legally binding 
contractual relationship with the ACP, EU’s richese oblige – a sense of special responsibility for 
                                                 
 
 
69 See WTO ‘s website for a listing of EU’s RTAs in force http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx 
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its former colonies and EU’s normative belief in international interdependence. All these 
factors inform the EU’s actions and are illuminating and indeed inform the variables examined 
in section 4.6 of the dissertation.  However with his skewed understanding of ACP’s collective 
clientlism as ACP currying favor with the EU, in tandem with Lister (1998:22), Egström has a 
tendency to interpret EU concessions as a matter of ‘altruism and moral commitment’ 
(Egström, 2005:189) and thus veers off an institutionalist understanding and seems to imply 
that the EU is merely generous to the ACP states. But again if the EU were merely generous to 
the ACP, why can it not be equally generous to other states such as ASEAN or Mercusor or the 
Gulf Cooperation Council with whom asymmetrical trade negotiations have been attempted 
and failed? What makes the ACP such an object of EU generosity? Since ACP states are not the 
only developing LDCs in the world with which the EU has attempted unsuccessful, short-
lived FTAs, in  Egström’s logic, one would expect the EU’s ‘altruism and moral commitment’ 
to extend even to these needy non-associated states. But this is not the case. 
 
Away from Egström’s arguments imputing EU’s altruism, Ravenhill provided a far more 
compelling and institutionally founded explanation of why collective clientelism works for the 
ACP states. As he observes, for the ACP states, ‘…the essence of clientelism was to reach an 
agreement that would guarantee their position by placing constrains on autonomy of European 
policymaking70 on issues of vital interest to them’ (Ravenhill, 1985: 4). Although never pursued 
into a deeper theoretical set-up, Ravenhill certainly provided a perceptible supposition of how 
or why clientelism works, that is - by institutional entrapment of policymaking. The following 
section of this chapter explicates on normative institutionalism (and its off shoot, asymmetrical 
                                                 
 
 
70 My own highlight to emphasis the institutional entrapment alluded to by Ravenhill. 
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normative institutionalism) in explaining why collective clientelism works only for associated 
states, by din of the institutional norms and expectations engendered by a close relationship 
between two states or groups. The following section thus seeks to situate collective clientelism 
within a more formal theoretical set-up in one of the new institutionalisms – normative 
institutionalism. 
 
Normative Institutionalism in EU-ACP Relations and Negotiations 
 
Right on the heels of Ravenhill’s passing hint on the institutional constrains and entrapment in 
international relations, there arose a vibrant debate and theorizing on the role of institutions in 
international relations. The early 1990s brought with them a great profusion of literature and 
theorizing on the role of institutions as independent variables in shaping states’ preferences 
and negotiated outcomes.  Some of the volumes or papers coming out in the decade on new 
institutionalisms included Cook and  Levi, (1990) The Limits of Rationality, March and  Olsen’s, 
(1989) Rediscovering Institutions, Grieco’s (1988)  ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A 
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, and Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth’s (1992) 
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. In 1993, Douglass C. 
North, considered a leading proponent of new institutionalism won the Nobel prize for 
Economics for his role in advocating the role of institutions in explaining variances in 
economic development among states. It may be persuasively observed that Institutionalism 
based foundations for state actions as constrained by rules, principles, norms and procedures 
had of course been firmly established earlier in the decade by Stephen D. Krasner’s (1982) 
superb edition International Regimes. 
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Even closer home to the subject of EU/ACP relations and negotiations, a great chunk of this 
profusion of literature went on to use institutionalism based variables and interpretations in 
explaining EU governance and external relations. Examples here would include, Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig (2010) EU external Governance; Projecting EU Rules Beyond Membership, 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998) European Integration and Supranantional Governance, Stone 
Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein (2001) The Institutionalization of Europe, Donnelley (2010) The 
Regimes of European Integration, Egstrom and Jonsson (2005), European Union Negotiations; 
Processes, Networks and Institutions, and Slapin’s (2008) ‘Bargaining Power at Europe's 
Intergovernmental Conferences: Testing Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories’.  
Having thus appeared slightly earlier than this profusion of theorizing on institutionalism in 
EU’s domestic and international relations, perhaps it is understandable that Ravenhill’s 
concept of collective clientelism was not fitted within any coherent subset of instituionalist 
interpretation. 
 
The central thesis of institutionalism theories has been role of institutions as independent 
variables that guide, shape and constrain state’s behavior, often away from preferences that 
would hitherto be considered competitive or zero-sum. The central role of institutions as 
explicated by North, DiMaggio, Olsen, Sandholtz, Thomas and others is to inform what is 
considered appropriate organizational principles, norms, rules and codes of conduct within a 
given relationship and thereby to constrain the parties to behave within those bounderies. As 
defined by Olsen, political institutions are ‘collections of interrelated rules and routines that 
define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process 
involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligation 
of that role in that situation is’ (Olsen, 1989: 160). Thus based on a normative institutionalist 
interpretation, collective clientelism works not because of any innate EU altruism, or due ACP 
negotiating dexterity or coalitions à la Lorenz, but due to the constraints engendered by the 
principles and norms of their formalized institutional relationship. 
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Normative institutionalism emphasizes the ‘behavioral impacts of standards of 
appropriateness established by the Community’s normative and policy commitments’ 
(Thomas, 2008: 8). As Thomas goes on the elaborate, normative institutionalism takes that 
members states will behave in accordance with the norms and principles established by a 
political union/alliance in order to ensure the viability of that alliance even when there are 
disagreements on the parties positions. In spite of divergent preferences, the prevailing 
agreement will reflect those preferences that are best seen as being consistent with the 
principles and norms established by the political union. While institutionalism has mostly 
been used (by Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Thomas, 2008; Slapin, 2010; Sandholtz, 1996; Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet, 1998 and others) to examine and explain intra-EU bargains, my contention 
here is that in agreement with Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, (2010: 7) the principles of and 
norms of EU institutions have become extended and embedded within EU-ACP institutions as 
a form of a hierarchical governance based on legally binding, asymmetrical compliance. 
Normative institutionalism can either be due to entrapment or cooperation. Normative 
entrapment refers to a situation where a state or region acquiesces to less preferred positions 
or “plays along” in order to be seen to be abiding by the rules of institutional expectation. As 
Thomas spells out, normative entrapment is preceded by acts of rhetorical framing, then 
entrapment and finally the norm consistent policy is reached. 
 
The argument is that EU-ACP relations are unique and have produced a unique set of 
relational norms and principles that are considered appropriate and which constrain the EU in 
a manner that the EU doesn’t feel constrained in other non-associative relationships. EU-ACP 
asymmetrical relations are unique because they have two systematically institutionalized two 
elements: One, multi-layered EU-ACP legally binding non-WTO based agreements which 
have created a notion of political union or partnership.  Two all EU-ACP agreements since 
Younde have institutionalized asymmetrical exchange as a central pillar of the relationship. 
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Even in cases of a specific negotiation round such as EPA, these historical contractual 
engagements have thus lifted any EU-ACP interactions from a mere bilateral ‘trade’ or 
‘development’ negotiations into a negotiation of the ‘partnership’ as a distinct political entity. 
 
As seen in section 4.6 this partnership is hinged on three elements or norms of the relationship: 
One, the two parties’ commitment to consensual negotiations where withdrawal from a 
negotiating round has never been experienced and would be termed as inappropriate. As 
quoted above, any time the EU tried to ram through a unilateral negotiating deadline the ACP 
would accuse it of ruining the relationship. An agreement that is thus seen as non-consensual 
or a unilateral withdrawal from the negotiations is deemed an in appropriate action within the 
partnership. There is an expectation to stay put until a consensus is achieved. Two, the EU-
ACP relationship have an institutionalized asymmetrical relationship which is legally 
incorporated and enforced through a crafty exchange of material benefits and policy influence. 
Thirdly, relations are guided by the normative partners’ commitment to regional integration.  
Over time, both parties become entrapped by these institutional aspects of their relationship 
even when such institutional norms are not necessary utility maximizing.  As table 22 showed, 
the EU’s institutional constraints as represented by these three attributes were very high at 6.5 
out of a total of 7. 
 
As Thomas spells out, normative entrapment is preceded by acts of rhetorical framing, then 
entrapment and finally the norm consistent policy is reached. In addition, normative 
institutional entrapment occurs best when certain conditions are present. These conditions, as 
Thomas presents are: 
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Determinacy: Entrapment is more likely when the relevant substantive norms are determinate – 
that is, when actors, regardless of their preferences, have little doubt about which norm applies 
to the issue at hand, which policy behavior it condones and which it condemns (Franck 2000). 
 
Precedent: Entrapment is more likely when the EU has already made policy commitments on the 
issue at hand – that is, already invested its resources and reputation on behalf of one principle 
or party involved in the issue at hand. 
 
Relevance: Entrapment is more likely when external conditions are relevant to or consistent with 
the assumptions that underlay the existing EU norm or policy commitment. Where conditions 
are irrelevant or inconsistent, actors are disentrapped (or released) from their normative or 
policy commitments. For example, an EU commitment to offer privileged market access to a 
particular country because it is poor would no longer entrap Member States if that country 
ceased to be poor. 
 
Forum: Entrapment is more likely when policy deliberation occurs within forums where EU 
norms and policy commitments are salient and thus exert strong compliance pull. Generally 
speaking, this means within the EU, though it may also pertain to deliberations within closely 
allied institutional forums such as the Council of Europe. When Member States negotiate in a 
forum shielded (at least partly) from the compliance pull of EU norms, which is most likely 
outside the EU, then entrapment is less likely. EU Member States are disentrapped when 
operating within institutional forums that assign them distinctly non-EU roles, such as mediator 
between third parties or the rotating presidency of an international organization. 
 
Publicity: Entrapment is more likely when the issue under discussion has received significant 
public attention, which increases the likelihood that non-compliance with existing EU norms or 
policy commitments will be noticed and subject to disapproval. 
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(Thomas, 2008: 11-2) 
 
In closing the section, here I show how these various conditions for normative institutional 
entrapment were present in the EPAs. To begin, the rhetorical framing of both parties 
negotiating mandates (and other negotiators’ statements) shows that these factors all existed to 
varying extents with regard of the EU and ACP expectations. 
 
Determinacy - as an awareness of what norms are at play shows that each of the parties 
negotiating mandates was acutely aware of the emphasis placed on development, regional 
integration, and asymmetrical liberalization. In other words both parties were very much 
aware of the norms and principles at play, so much so that aspects as regional integration and 
differentiation (asymmetry) as explicitly labeled by both parties as principles of the 
negotiations. 
 
Table 23: Rhetorical Framing of ACP and EU Negotiating Mandates on Norm Salience: 
 
Norm EU Mandate ACP Mandate 
Development  38 47 
Partnership  15 7 
Asymmetrical/differentiation/flexibility 11 6 
Regional integration 18 17 
Source: SEC (2002) 351 final and ACP/61/056/02 final 
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As table 23 shows, key elements of the EU-ACP institutional norms differentiation, 
partnership, development and regional integration- inundated each party’s mandate. As the 
table shows there was preponderant awareness of the principles and norms of expectations at 
play. 
 
Precedence of ACP-EU partnership norms such as asymmetry, regional integration and 
consensual agreements in negotiations were established by the parties in earlier negotiations 
and agreements going back to Younde 1. Similarly, since the EPA negotiations were undertaken 
within the historical institutions of the Commission (for EU) and the ACP constituent regions 
for the ACP states, the forum was present and adequately versed in the procedural norms and 
principles. Once the ACP states fragmented into new regions, or even into individual national 
governments then the greater forum was diminished and thus less normative agreement on 
institutional expectations. Since previous EU-ACP agreements were primarily conducted by 
the directorate of development in the Commission (DG development), a case could also be 
made that perhaps forum was diminished the handover of negotiations to DG trade who were 
in charge of EPAs.  Perhaps this could explain why the development aspect, as a norm of the 
EU, was less influential under the trade department. Nevertheless forum was still highly 
present since the negotiations were done under the same old institutional frames of the EU-
ACP. The relevance aspect of entrapment was perhaps the most telling outcome of the SVI 
questionnaires. With regard to the ACP-EU relations, the question of relevance was one of if 
the ‘special relationship’ as launched by the Treaty of Rome was of any relevance to the two 
parties in these negotiations. When the question of special relationship is posed as a vacuous, 
undefined ideal, [How influential was the idea of maintaining EU-ACP ‘special relations’ important 
in informing your negotiating objectives, preferences and attitudes?], all states reported at least a 
modest entrapment or loyalty to the principle. It’s illuminating to observe that even though 
the question was deliberately phrased in a vague manner where special partnership does not 
encompass any precise benefits, all countries still reported being somewhat bound by a degree 
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of loyalty to the idea of special relations. The EU is itself bound by this principle more acutely 
than most ACP states.  
  
 
Table 24: Entrapment on Relevance (Are special relations still relevant?) 
 
How influential was the idea of maintaining EU-ACP ‘special relations’ important in informing your 
negotiating objectives, preferences and attitudes 
State  Score State  Score 
EU 5   
  Botswana 7 
Cariforum 2 Mozambique 4 
PNG - Swaziland 4 
Mauritius 4 Namibia 2 
Seychells 6 Angola 4 
Zimbabwe 6 Rwanda 4 
Kenya 7 Zambia 6 
Source: SVI questionnaires 2013 
 
This is the case for even states like Angola and Namibia which have been highly resistant to 
acceptance of an EPA.  
 
The purpose of this section has been to locate collective clientelism within a broader theoretical 
landing in intuitionalism. In agreement with Ravenhill’s perceptive observation, my 
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contention has been that in Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiations, the power 
of the seemingly not so weak ACP can be explained by their masterly of this successful 
associative strategy. However in disagreeing with Elgstrom, collective clientelism is neither 
EU altruism nor ACP demandeurs. Rather, clientelism fits aptly within normative 
institutionalism and works by institutionally tying-down a superordinate Gulliver like the 
little men of Lilliput. Similarly, in disagreeing with Lorenz, the quality of coalitions does not 
provide a cogent explanation for ACP states inordinate resistance power for the 
comprehensive - ACP vs. EU - super dyad. 
 
Since collective clientelism seeks to work by creating institutional constraints to a stronger 
superordinate state, it falls squarely within normative institutionalism and can be described as 
a form of Asymmetrical Normative Institutionalism. Asymmetrical Normative Institutionalism 
can explain the unique power ACP states hold over the EU unlike other south regions without, 
legalized institutionalized links with the EU (what Ravenhill calls associated states).  
Asymmetrical normative institutionalism – means a situation where a weaker state gains 
influence over a stronger state by dint of its use of entrapping norms and principles 
engendered by the two states’ institutionalized asymmetrical relations which have created a 
political union. Since flouting these principles and norms would be deemed as endangering 
the viability of the political union, the superordinate is forced to restrain itself in order to 
maintain the relationship. This restrain however is not done out of altruism but out of the 
institutional constraints placed on it. And as shown in tables 23 and 24 both parties in such a 
negotiation or relationship are subject to these principles and norms. Such norms are in force 
for the ACP as well as the EU. 
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6 CONCLUSION – NORMATIVE POWER AND THE PYCHOLOGY OF 
PERSUASION 
The research questions that guide this dissertation are based on seeking an empirical 
affirmation to the cogency of asymmetrical dependency as the chief explanatory factor in 
compelling outcomes of ACP-EU EPA negotiations. To what extent are variances in outcomes 
of EPA correlated to the variances in ACP states material (trade and tariffs) vulnerability to the 
EU? And if not, what other variable(s) provide the most compelling explanation on the nature 
of EPA outcomes? These questions were pursued through document analysis, elite interviews 
and subjective value index surveys with negotiators from 28 ACP states and the EU. Norm 
convergence among ACP and EU on utility of EPAs and perceptions of what is fair 
asymmetrical exchange are found as major explanatory variables for efficiency outcomes. 
Moreover, this research sought to provide an explanation of why ACP states wield remarkable 
resistance power to an EU offensive over extension of negotiation duration in spite of the 
inordinate material asymmetries between the two parties. Collective clientelism is provided as a 
compelling explanation of ACP strength. However, beyond extant characterizations of 
collective clientelism as a drifty concept that represents EU as a noble, altruistic actor, 
clientelism is empirically tested, demonstrated and placed within a formal institutionalist 
theoretical framework. It is argued that EU-ACP relations have produced norms and 
principles of membership which entrap and constrain both partners behavior in the 
negotiation. By inference, if norm convergence among rival negotiators is a critical variable in 
fomenting agreement, then negotiation processes should invoke appropriate means of norm 
socialization to insure greater convergence. Yet what are these ‘appropriate’ means of norm 
socialization? This conclusion summarizes the contents of each chapter and in ending 
proposes more empirical studies into models of norm influence and socialization processes in 
asymmetrical negotiations as further tasks for scholarship in negotiation analysis. 
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Chapter One: Chapter one sets out the problem and puzzle that informs the research. This 
puzzle is split into two questions regarding the efficiency of completing EPAs. In negotiation 
analysis negotiated outcomes can either refer to distribution outcomes or efficiency outcomes. 
This thesis focuses mainly on the efficiency question. That is, the amount of time taken by a 
negotiating dyad to reach agreement, in this case ratification or application of the agreement. 
The first question regards and entails explaining the intra-ACP variations in EPA ratification 
(or lack of it) as set out in table 2 and figure 2.  Why have some ACP regions and states moved 
faster than others in ratifying their EPA agreements. ACP EU negotiations on EPAs were 
divided into seven smaller negotiating dyads (what I call sub-dyads) and the first question 
entails explaining why we have variances in efficiency outcomes among this seven regions. 
What accounts for bargaining efficiency in EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements? 
(i) What accounts for the variable speed in EPA conclusion between the EU and various 
ACP states?  
 
(ii) What accounts for ACP’s inordinate resistance to EPA conclusion from the EU 
considering the EU’s putative power dominance in the negotiation? 
 
The second question entails explaining negotiation protraction in the super dyad (ACP vs. 
EU). Why is it that the ACP states are able to resist EPA ratification for so much longer beyond 
the deadline (2007) by which the EU had envisioned to have completed EPA negotiations.  
While the EU is quick to suspend (usually within 5 years) FTA negotiations that are seen as 
deadlocked with other regions in the world, it has neither suspended the EPAs, and nor has it 
sought to unilaterally impose the GSP preferences on ACP non LDCs in spite of the putative 
capability to do so. What explains this apparent EU ‘softening’ when dealing with ACP states? 
In addition this chapter introduces the tasks and three objectives inherent in any attempt at 
negotiation analysis of a given case.  One of the objectives as may be evident in this work is an 
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aspired contribution to improvement of conceptual frameworks (or theory) in understanding 
asymmetrical negotiations particularly or economic negotiations generally.  
 
Chapter Two: Chapter two is used as a literature review on extant explanations of negotiated 
outcome causation in EU-ACP economic negotiations. Further the chapter examines not only 
theoretical suppositions on outcome causation but also on empirical studies that have 
attempted to explain either the distributional or efficiency outcomes of the EPAs.   Chapter 
two is important in not just giving a broad view of state-of–the-art in scholarship on the 
subject, but also in establishing the deductive foundations of my own research.   Chapter two 
starts by outlining the three broad theoretical dispositions taken by scholars regarding the 
privileged variable(s) of outcome causation. For realist and liberalists outcomes are chiefly a 
function of the configuration of capabilities; for some scholars, negotiated outcomes can be 
explained mostly as a function of the negotiating process –negotiating strategies, coalitions, 
personalities and the physical components of the bargaining process.   For institutionalists the 
outcomes can be explained chiefly on the bases of how shared institutions (belonging) inform 
preferences and constrain strategy. Table 4 summarises the extant theoretical and empirical 
suppositions on causation of EPA outcomes.   Since one of the most consistently occurring 
hypothesis is on the role of asymmetrical trade interdependence in precipitating swift 
agreement to and EPA, examining the cogency of this supposition becomes the central 
deductive empirical task of the thesis. The role of ACP trade dependence in compelling 
ratification after 2007 is examined in chapter 4 section 4.3. The outcomes of this exercise reveal 
that trade and tariff dependence have only a rather weak influence the propensity of an ACP 
state to ratify an EPA.  
 
Chapter Three: This chapter outlines the method on how the question is answered. The 
research is conceived as a disciplined configurative and heuristic case study that compares the 
efficiency performance of different negotiating ACP regional dyads (all against the EU) and 
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tries to locate the determinants of negotiating success (in efficiency and distribution 
characteristics of outcomes).  As George and Bennett (2005: 20) one of the advantages of case 
studies is in their heuristic usefulness in identifying new explanatory variables for a given 
outcome. Starting out with a deductive foundation as indicated, the aim is to affirm or seek out 
new explanatory variables for attribution in asymmetrical economic negotiations. Starting out 
with an ontological reflection on the foundations of the research the chapter is then divided 
into five sections as below. 
- Phase One: Lay out the dependent and independent variables – section 4.2. 
 
- Phase Two: Test regularities in correlations of the deductive variables in question 
[relationship between asymmetry and intra-ACP variance] – Section 4.3. 
 
- Phase Three: Conduct conceptual interviews based on which new explanatory variables 
are established or existing suppositions affirmed- Section 4.4. 
 
- Phase four: Through use of standardized (Subjective Value Index) surveys examine intra-
ACP variations in hypothesized new variable [degree of intra-ACP convergence in EPA 
utility] from main EPA negotiators. Section 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
- Phase five: Use analytic induction to analysis the data and make inferences on the findings 
import on asymmetrical negotiations.  
 
The two key methodological propositions in the thesis is to show shared normative 
preferences between asymmetrical states in EPA negotiating dyads as constituting a causal 
mechanism in EPA outcomes. Secondly the thesis seeks to show that in EPAs normative value 
convergence has a greater causal impact on efficiency than trade or tariff dependency. For data 
the research relies on documentary data collection and interviews. The interviews were further 
divided into initial semi-structured elite interviews followed by highly structured 
questionnaire interviews aimed at a measurable calibration and comparison of normative 
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positions, preferences and entrapment. A central positivist problem in the conceptualization 
and attribution of norms and normative persuasion as a causal mechanism in international 
relations lies in how persuasively the putative norms can be captured in a gradable and 
calibrated format. This is done through use of the Subjective value Index. Such a gradable 
survey as has been used in this research renders inter-regional or inter-state comparisons more 
plausible and stands a s a unique use of a gradable, measurable calibration in measurement of 
states’ normative convergence or divergence.   The measurement objective of course 
corresponds to the ontological positivist aspiration outlined in the first section this chapter. 
The use of normative comparisons among 28 ACP states’ plus the EU analytic induction is 
considered to have been considerable met by subjecting the same hypothesis about the role of 
normative convergence and norm entrapment to not just one case, but many cases with 
concurring patterns of outcomes.   
 
Chapter Four: Chapter four is thought of as the centerpiece of the thesis that binds the 
empirical to the theoretical. This chapter is intended to provide the empirical data that answers 
the research questions on three sequential levels. First the chapter seeks to show that the EU 
‘wins’ on key contested (distributional) issues of the negotiation. By mapping out the zone of 
agreement on key negotiated issues, data on EPA outcomes at 2007 initialing stage show that 
final distributional agreements are closer to the EU’s original objectives than they are to the 
ACP regions’ (and states) initial preferences. The first section of this chapter therefore concerns 
itself with the issue of distributional outcomes of EPAs – which is actually not the principal 
puzzle for the thesis. However, this step is deemed important in order establish efficiency 
variances between ACP states and regions as the principal variance in EPA outcomes. When 
one looks at the distributional outcomes of EPAs among ACP states, they are more or less the 
same irrespective of whether the size or nature of coalitions constituted during the negotiation. 
Table 13 presents the outcomes on major contentious issues and who won on each item and 
why it is considered they won.  
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Secondly, through documentary materials and statistical records, chapter four establishes the 
weak import of ACP trade dependence and tariff vulnerability on the propensity of states to 
ratify their EPAs after 2007. The centrality of trade dependence and tariff vulnerability is a 
central deductive guiding concern of the research. How important is trade dependence in 
compelling EPA agreement, and if not, what other variables might explain an ACP state’s 
propensity to agree or withhold its EPA ratification? Having posed this question in conceptual 
interviews with ACP and EU negotiators, the role of norm convergence is found to be a cogent 
explainer of the patterns in propensity to ratify an agreement or not. In addition, when 
compared to other recent EU FTA attempts with countries in South Asia, Latin America and 
around the Mediterranean the EPAs suggest a noticeable level of resistance power of ACP 
states against a speedy agreement to EU wish for a speedy agreement. Ultimately chapter four 
shows that contrary to theoretical suppositions about the primacy of trade dependence in 
compelling an agreement, this supposition does not appear be affirmed in the EU-ACP EPAs.  
Norm convergence (or ideational liberalism), a variable arrived at after initial elite interviews 
with ACP and EU negotiators seems to be a more cogent explanatory variable for inter-state 
cooperation in asymmetrical negotiations. Normative convergence on states’ belief in the 
utility of EPAs as economic drivers as well as their satisfaction on mutual asymmetrical 
exchange defines the states’ propensity to agree to or withhold ratification to an EPA.  
  
Chapter Five: Chapter five deals with the theoretical inferences on asymmetrical negotiations 
presented by outcomes from EPAs. The fundamental claim empirically presented in this 
dissertation is that variances in outcomes of ACP-EU EPA agreements can be more cogently 
explained by the variances in ACP states’ depth of substantive beliefs rather than these states’ 
material dependencies or vulnerabilities. Contrary to widely held theoretical suppositions, EPA 
ratification by ACP states after the 2007 initialing is hardly driven by ACP states’ material 
dependencies. What seems to count most is ACP states’ depth of norm internalization and 
convergence with regard to belief in the utility of EPAs and the states’ assessment of what 
constitutes a fair asymmetrical exchange. My findings however do not discount the theoretical 
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role of asymmetrical vulnerabilities in shaping states preferences in all asymmetrical 
negotiations. As a contribution in reconciling and refining how these two major variables - 
[substantive beliefs and material incentives] - influence negotiated outcomes, the Asymmetry-
Credibility Model of assessing, anticipating and predicting efficiency in asymmetrical 
negotiations is proposed. The Asymmetry-Credibility Model of persuasion however does help in 
illuminating and clarifying two key aspects of asymmetrical negotiations especially as they 
relate to EU’s claim of normative power in its relations with ACP states.  
 
One, on a political psychology level, the kind of variances –initialing, signing and ratifying- 
that characterize ACP states outcomes suggest that negotiated agreements are not all the same. 
Some agreements are more emphatic and ingrained than others. As social psychology 
suggests, agreements can be precipitated by compliance, identification or internalization of 
norms. By reverting to political psychology and Kelman’s classifications on these three sources 
of social influence –compliance, identification and internalization- IR theory can become more 
perceptible, more nuanced in understanding exactly what the source of an agreement is. From 
an IR perspective, agreements precipitated by compliance cannot be said to be normative. 
Such compliance agreements rely on material sources of power through incentive or coercion. 
Beyond compliance however we have identification and internalization. By highlighting the 
constraining effects of the regimes of membership in a given group, institutionalists give a 
very perceptive identification based explanation of ACP power or EU emasculation in 
associative political partnerships. Normative influence in asymmetrical normative 
institutionalism is a function of complying with the expectations of belonging to a group. 
Behaving appropriately in accordance with the group traditions and regimes. While the 
institutional foundations of normative cooperation or entrapment can be explained be 
identification, it becomes very difficult to demonstrate the foundations of normative 
internalization. This is the constructivist Achilles heel.  
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Two, if therefore, in fact or theoretically the EU is deemed to derive its resources for 
persuasion in asymmetrical negotiations from its market power or EDF funds, then this power 
cannot be said to be normative. Since as Ian Manners (2009) has observed, normative 
persuasion relies on the power of ideas and a negotiation’s objectives are justified on the 
innate legitimacy of a principle (such as trade reciprocity, or a continued political partnership, 
or WTO compliancy in the case of EPAs), the primacy of material asymmetrical exchange in a 
negotiation such as EPAs calls into question the extent of EU’s normative powers with the 
ACP group. 
 
From a policy perspective, what the research outcomes implicitly suggest is that rather than 
deriving its power primarily from its material resources, the EU was more successful in ACP 
states where its normative objectives (freer and reciprocal trade in goods and services) were 
more rooted. The implication is that putative political hegemons in institutionalized 
asymmetrical economic relations such as the EU may increasingly have to rely more on 
hegemonic normative influence and norm diffusion as instruments of their power in the 
manner suggested by among others Inkeberry and Kupchan, (1990), Kroenig, McAdam and 
Weber (2010), Kivimäki (1993) and Manners (2002).  In associative political relationships where 
binding institutions can place serious coercive power constrains on the superordinate state 
(the EU in this case), such a state should be capable of utilizing its normative powers to 
socialize the subordinate states towards the aspired goal(s). Increased relational power for the 
ACP states from collective clientelism requires increased normative power from the EU.  
This thesis does not of course delve into examining the processes of socialization over the 
course of the negotiation process to capture or assess bi-directional shifts in ACP and EU norm 
socialization. Neither does this work seek to explain why some states have more agreeable 
normative preferences/positions with the EU than others. The subjective Value Index (SVI) 
surveys used capture normative variances among ACP states at a cross-sectional point rather 
than as a process. Yet the tracing of the process of norm diffusion as an instrument of influence 
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and clarifying the mechanism by which such socialization works remains a pertinent problem 
in explaining the process of social influence in negotiations. The exercise of normative power 
[which is based on the legitimacy of a principle] and the mechanisms by which a hegemonic 
state shifts the subordinate state from compliance to internalization or the other way round 
remains unclear. Similarly, while institutionalism does emphasize the role of institutional set 
ups in informing preferences or constraining behavior, it is also apparent that institutions are 
not static. Over time, path dependence is broken or altered. The suggestion from the 
differentiation among ACP states for instance does suggest that institutional expectation on 
asymmetrical exchange between the EU and ACP states are beginning to change. ACP states, 
by accepting a reciprocal trade agreement have tacitly indicated their willingness to shift the 
relational influence by making it more symmetrical. In the same vein, by reducing or 
eliminating its privileged trade preferences for ACP the EU has similarly suggested a move 
towards equalizing relations. This shift in institutional set up is not smooth and what 
precipitates a shift in institutions is not dealt with at length in this thesis. These two aspects of 
process shifts in bi-directional social influence and change of institutional sets ups are topics 
that this dissertation does not delve into.  Yet they are subjects that merit time and interest. 
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DANKSE RESUMÉ 
Det teoretiske udgangspunkt for denne afhandling er et ønske om at forstå og forklare to 
meget vigtige gåder, som relaterer sig til forhandlinger i EU vedrørende Frihandelsaftalen 
(den Økonomiske Partnerskabsaftale) med ACP-landene i Afrika, Carribien og 
Stillehavsregionen. Disse forhandlinger har stået på siden 2002. Disse gåder er: 
Den første gåde angår den varierende hastighed, hvormed ACP-regioner og -lande ratificerer 
deres ØPA-aftale. ACP-landende kan således deles op i tre kategorier: lande, som har 
ratificeret aftalen af 2007; lande, som har underskrevet den; og lande, som kun har paraferet 
aftalen. Mens cirka sytten stater nu har ratificeret deres 2007-aftale, har andre tilbageholdt 
deres ratificering og endda gennemtvunget nye forhandlinger vedrørende aftalen. I en 
rekalibrering af det, som John Ravenhill (1985) omtalte som ’horisontalt samarbejde’, oplever 
vi nu håndgribelige forskelle mellem ACP-lande med hensyn til deres indstilling og 
tilbøjelighed til at indgå gensidige handelsaftaler med EU-landene. Hvis et ACP-lands 
ratificering af en ØPA-aftale skal ses som et succeskriterium for EU, hvori ligger så 
forklaringen på EU’s succes med at bevæge nogle ACP-lande (og ikke andre) frem imod et JA?  
For det andet må man spørge, hvorfor disse handelsforhandlinger hen mod en Økonomisk 
Partnerskabsaftale (ØPA) er trukket mere i langdrag, og hvorfor har de været mere tilbøjelige 
til at gå i hårdknude end andre nyere ØAP-aftaler i EU-regi? Dette modsiger gængse 
teoretiske antagelser inden for forhandlingsanalyser (Lempereur, 2009; Hirshman, 1945; 
Emersion, 1962; Ravenhill, 1985; Elgstrom, 2005), som anfører, at ACP-landes afhængighed af 
samhandel med EU samt EU's umådelige markedskræfter burde have resulteret i, at 
forhandlingsrunden hurtigt kunne afsluttes, efterhånden som materielt afhængige lande 
indvilgede i denne afhængighed.  
I modsætning til andre nyere EU-ØPA-forsøg, som enten er blevet afsluttet eller afbrudt inden 
for en femårsperiode, har ACP-landende i ØPA-forhandlingsrunden i bemærkelsesværdig 
grad formået at give efter for EU’s offensiv, og de har dermed undgået at indgå i samhandel 
med EU gennem de seneste ti år, hvilket er ØPA’s formål. ØPA-forhandlingerne har trukket 
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ud i over ti år, hvilket er et positivt resultat af ACP-landenes modstand mod EU i det, der er 
blevet kaldt ’det ikke så svage syd’. Hvordan kan man forklare denne bemærkelsesværdige 
modstand i lyset af ACP-landendes formodede materielle svaghed og afhængighed af EU-
markedet? 
Nærværende forskning undersøger disse to eksempler på succes: ACP-staternes succes med 
hensyn til at modstå en hurtig overgivelse til ØPA, og EU’s succes med at få nogle ACP-lande 
til at sige ja. 
Både disse gåder og de tilhørende spørgsmål har at gøre med, hvordan man kan forklare 
effektiviteten i ØPA-forhandlingerne. Ved at forklare divergensen i den hastighed, hvormed 
ratificering af ØPA-aftalerne har fundet sted i de forskellige ACP-lande, kan forskningen vise, 
hvilken rolle normer spiller for katalysering af statslig adfærd – udover den krise-betonede 
materielle og økonomiske afhængighed, som nogle teoretikere inden for asymmetrisk gensidig 
afhængighed ville fremføre. Med hensyn til ACP-landes styrke i forhandlingerne på trods af 
deres formodede økonomiske svaghed viser forskningen, at denne kan forklares ud fra, 
hvordan ACP-landende udnytter normerne i ACP-EU-partnerskabet til at ’narre’ EU ind i en 
opretholdelse af partnerskabsidentiteten. Således stammer den kollektive klientelisme direkte fra 
den seneste tids fremadstormende institutionalisme, som er baseret på fortolkninger af EU's 
styrker og svagheder i unionens ledelse af eksterne anliggender. 
Heri ligger ACP-landendes unikke styrke, som muliggøres af de normer, der præger deres 
institutionaliserede relationer til EU. Herudover har forskningen, ud over at måle styrken af 
ACP-landendes overbevisning (tro/ideologi) i forhold til nytteværdien af en ØPA-aftale, søgt 
at afdække, hvorvidt et ACP-lands tilbøjelighed til at ratificere en ØPA-aftale er baseret på 
landets tro på det hensigtsmæssige i en ØAP-aftale i forhold til landets økonomi snarere end 
på landets afhængighed af handel. Ved at introducere disse to teoretiske fortolkninger 
(normativ institutionalisme og sammenfald af overbevisning) søger forskningen at påvise, at 
en hurtig afslutning af asymmetriske forhandlinger afhænger af graden af normativ 
konvergens med hensyn til forhandlingsemnerne samt af de svagere landes tilbøjelighed til at 
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afvise eller bifalde social indflydelse fra de materielt set stærkere lande – snarere end af 
handelsmæssig afhængighed. Det er således graden, hvormed de dyadiske parter udfylder 
deres forventede roller i det hierarkiske magtforhold, der bestemmer hastigheden, hvormed en 
forhandling kan afsluttes. 
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